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COUNTERMAJORITARIAN HERO OR ZERO? RETHINKING THE
WARREN COURT'S ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
REVOLUTION
CORINNA BARRETT LAINt
Our courts were entrusted with the responsibility of judicial review, in large part,
to protect individuals and minorities in their fundamental rights against
abridgement by both government and majoritzes.
When we think about judicial review, we tend to envision the Su-
preme Court as a "countermajoritarian hero,"' protector of minorities
from tyrannical majority rule. The Supreme Court itself has long
promoted this image, most famously in a 1938 footnote3 but elsewhere
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law;J.D., University
of Virginia, 1996. Like the Beatles, I get by with a little help from my friends. Special
thanks to Ron Bacigal, Michael Klarman, Earl Dudley, Michael Allan Wolf, Carl Tobias,
John Nowak, Warren Billings, Emmy Paulette Reeves, Jim Gibson, John Douglass, and
John Lain for their substantive input and editorial comments. Thanks also to Stacy
Reed, Dan Petouvis, and Anne Major for their research assistance and to Richmond's
talented library staff for helping me locate several period documents. I am likewise
grateful for a research grant provided by Hunton & Williams, P.C. Finally, I creditJes-
sica Marie Lain for her exceptionally impeccable timing.
Arthur J. Goldberg, The Court Sits-In the Center of the Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8,
1964, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. Justice Goldberg served on the Warren Court from Octo-
ber 1962 to July 1965. Linda Greenhouse, ArthurJ. Goldberg, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 848, 848 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
I credit Michael Karman for coining the term "countermajoritarian hero." See,
e.g., Michael J. Karman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutionalism Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1933-34 (1995) [hereinafter Klarman, A Re-
sponse] (referring to the "myth of the Court as 'countermajoritarian hero"'); MichaelJ.
Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 493
(1997) [hereinafter Klarman, The Entrenchment Problem] (arguing that 'judges do not
act as 'countermajoritarian heroes' or 'villains"'); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) [hereinafter Klar-
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Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 192 (1998) [hereinafter Klarman, What's So Great] (arguing that
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scribe to the romantic vision of the Court as countermajoritarian hero").
3 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Nor
need we enquire ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.").
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as well, touting courts as "havens of refuge for those who might oth-
erwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or be-
cause they are nonconforming victims of prejudice and public ex-
citement."4 It is hardly surprising, then, that as today's top constitu-
tional scholars debate the merits ofjudicial review,5 its defenders have
returned to the notion that the Court's involvement is necessary to
protect minority rights.6 For some, like myself, the Supreme Court's
role as countermajoritarian hero is theoretically appealing, but a nag-
ging question remains-how much does the Court actually play it?
If ever a Court played the heroic, countermajoritarian role we
romantically ascribe to judicial review, it was the Warren Court. After
all, it was the Warren Court that Alexander Bickel was referring to
when he coined the term "countermajoritarian difficulty,"' and it was
4 Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 6-
32 (1999) (arguing that judicial declarations deserve no preferential consideration);
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 285-91 (1999) (asserting that judicial re-
view violates precepts of liberalism); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115
HARV. L. REV. 4, 12 (2001) (arguing that people, not the judiciary, should be the final
resort for the resolution of constitutional disputes); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 779
(2002) (noting that "[a] ctive judicial intervention in constitutional debates and strong
deference by political actors to judicial interpretations are not necessary for achieving
constitutional order or preserving constitutional principles").
6 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popu-
lar Constitutionalism, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture, University of Illinois College
of Law (Feb. 17, 2003) (arguing that the Constitution requires judicial review to ade-
quately protect the rights of minorities), available at http://www.law.uiuc.edu/
conferences/baum/sp03.asp; see also Paul Butler, By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence
and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721, 725 (2003) (arguing that it
is thejudiciary's duty "to protect racial minorities from tyranny"); Mark D. Rosenbaum
& Daniel P. Tokaji, Healing the Blind Goddess: Race and Criminal Justice, 98 MICH. L. REv
1941, 1964 (2000) (arguing that it is the judiciary's role to protect the fundamental
rights of racial minorities).
The Warren Court began with Earl Warren's recess appointment as Chief Justice
in October 1953 and ended with his retirement in June 1969. G. Edward White, War-
ren Court, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 2023,
2023.
8 Professor Bickel explained:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our
system.... [W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative
act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives
of the actual people of here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the
prevailing majority, but against it.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962).
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN HERO OR ZERO?
the Warren Court that gave us Brown v. Board of Education.9 Earl War-
ren himself once declared, "'Everything that I ever did in my life that
was worthwhile I caught hell for,"" and the same was generally true
for his Court. Accused of protecting blacks, communists, criminals,
atheists, pornographers, and other perceived threats to white, middle-
class America, the Warren Court was quite possibly the most vilified
Supreme Court in United States history.
Yet even among the Warren Court's more controversial decisions,
few rulings are thought to epitomize the heroic, countermajoritarian
ideal better than those involving criminal procedure. By conventional
wisdom, the Warren Court's criminal procedure rulings were "plainly,
even aggressively countermajoritarian ""-the one doctrinal area
where the Court knew it lacked public support but took a stand any-
way.'2 Indeed, even constitutional historians who generally deny the
Supreme Court's capacity for countermajoritarian decision making
cite the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions as exceptions to
the rule, 1" and for good reason. Together, these cases produced what
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Klarman, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 19 (crediting
Brown for the Court's image as "heroic defender of minority rights"); Anthony Lewis,
Earl Warren, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICkN CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at
2019, 2020 (noting that Earl Warren "represented the hope of authority bringing jus-
tice to the downtrodden" and crediting Brown for giving him that status).
10 JACK HARRISON POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THEJUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA,
at vii (1979) (quoting ChiefJustice Warren).
11 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE LJ. 1, 54 (1997).
12 See THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT
OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 110 (1991) ("Perhaps the most
controversial of all the major rights movements identified with liberalism over the past
twenty-five years were the initiatives in behalf of criminal defendants and prisoners.");
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 95 (1998)
("Of all the rulings of the Warren Court, none was more unpopular than its criminal
justice decisions."); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS
394 (2000) ("The criminal procedure revolution was the one area where the Court
knew there was no public support for its actions."); STEPHEN L. WASBY, CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE: FROM THE WARREN COURT TO THE BURGER COURT 75 (1976) ("[T]he
reform of criminal procedure... was the policy area in which the Court's most con-
troversial set of rulings was handed down."); see also Ronald J. Bacigal, The Federalism
Pendulum, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 771, 782 (1996) ("The Warren Court would buck popular
consensus by swinging the federalism pendulum in favor of extending federal constitu-
tional protections to those suspected of criminal activity.").
13 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore: Through the Lens of Constitutional His-
tory, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721, 1750 (2001) (recognizing Miranda v. Arizona as one of few
cases where the Supreme Court's ruling was opposed by a clear majority of the nation);
Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48,
49 (2000) [hereinafter Klarman, Racial Origins] (contrasting the Supreme Court's
early criminal procedure cases with "the sort of countermajoritarian judicial decision
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is widely known as the "criminal procedure revolution," so vast were
the protections afforded to unpopular and politically powerless crimi-
nal defendants. 4 Like any revolution, the one to protect criminal de-
fendants did not go unnoticed. Its most aggressive decisions drew
criticism from coast-to-coast, faired poorly in major public opinion
polls, triggered contrary legislation, and even inspired a backlash "law
and order" campaign that helped send Richard Nixon to the White
House in 1968.15 It is therefore entirely understandable why scholars
have viewed the criminal procedure revolution as the quintessential
example of the Supreme Court playing a heroic, countermajoritarian
role.
For all the credit the revolution has received, however, no one yet
has paused to consider whether the Warren Court's criminal proce-
dure decisions were truly the bastion of countermajoritarian decision
making they have been made out to be.16 In fact, scholarship consid-
ering these decisions in their relevant social and political context is, as
one author has noted, "virtually nonexistent.' ' 17 With last fall marking
the fiftieth anniversary of Earl Warren's appointment as Chief Jus-
tice, s enough time has passed to place the criminal procedure revolu-
tion in proper historical perspective and rethink the Court's role
there as countermajoritarian hero. In the discussion that follows, I
making one often associates with landmark criminal procedure decisions such as Mapp
or Miranda").
14 The phrase "criminal procedure revolution" is commonly used to refer to the
Warren Court's rulings of the 1960s that extended new constitutional protections to
criminal defendants in state court. See, e.g., CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION, at xi (1993) ("The 'criminal procedure revolu-
tion' refers to a series of constitutional decisions by the United States Supreme Court
during the 1960s that 'revolutionized' the criminal procedures of the states.");Joseph
L. Hoffman, Substance and Procedure in Capital Cases: Why Federal Habeas Corpus Courts
Should Review the Merits of Eveiy Death Sentence, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1771, 1782 n.57 (2000)
(noting that the "so-called 'criminal procedure revolution"' refers to the Warren
Court's "enforce[ment of] often-unpopular new federal constitutional rules" in state
court proceedings); see also infra text accompanying note 57 (describing the Supreme
Court's change in approach to criminal procedure in the 1960s).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 65-68 and 205-08 (discussing the public and
political reaction to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1991), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966)).
16 Michael Klarman has come the closest. While recognizing the need for more
scholarship in this area, he has suggested that "the entire criminal procedure revolu-
tion was intertwined with changing popular attitudes" toward poverty and race. Klar-
man, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 64.
17 Id. at 62.
18 Earl Warren joined the Supreme Court as its fourteenth Chief Justice in Octo-
ber 1953, retiring inJune 1969. Lewis, supra note 9, at 2019.
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aim to do that by examining five of the revolution's most celebrated
decisions: Mapp v. Ohio,'9 Gideon v. Wainwright,
° Miranda v. Arizona,2
Katz v. United States," and Terry v. Ohio.2 3 In none of these cases, I ar-
gue, did the Supreme Court act in a manner truly deserving of its
countermajoritarian image. To be clear, I do not deny that these de-
cisions were historically significant, salient events; nor do I deny that
they were doctrinally revolutionary (though two fall short of even that
mark) 4 My point is simply that upon close inspection, the landmark
cases of the criminal procedure revolution say more about the Su-
preme Court's lack of inclination for countermajoritarian decision
making than the contrary-and that, in turn, has profound implica-
tions for the heroic, countermajoritarian function we tend to ascribe
to judicial review.
Before proceeding, the scope of this Article warrants a few further
points of clarification. First, I do not purport to provide a compre-
hensive analysis of the entire criminal procedure revolution. The
Warren Court decided hundreds of criminal procedure cases, several
dozen of which could be characterized as doctrinally significant, revo-
lutionary decisions.25 I cannot possibly discuss all of these within the
confines of a law review article, and thus my more modest aim: a dis-
cussion of the five decisions we most often think about when we think
about the revolution, the decisions that made the revolution famous
and helped create the Court's countermajoritarian image there.
Whether these decisions fairly represent the revolution as a whole is a
topic I leave for another day.
Second, even if (as I believe) the Warren Court's criminal proce-
dure decisions were less countermajoritarian than we tend to think, I
do not deny that, at times, they at least showcased the Court playing
19 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
22 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
24 See infra text accompanying notes 175-85 (discussing the doctrinal inevitability
of Gideon); infra text accompanying notes 355-71 (discussing the same regarding Katz).
25 See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest For Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519 ("In the sixteen years of Chief Justice War-
ren's tenure, the Supreme Court decided upwards of 600 criminal cases."). One need
only open a criminal procedure textbook to catalogue the dozens of Warren Court
cases that significantly shaped our modern jurisprudence. See generally RONALD JAY
ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2001) (discussing numerous
Warren Court decisions).
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26countermajoritarian hero at the local level . Of course, whenever a
locality is out of step with an emerging or established national consen-
sus and the Supreme Court validates that consensus, its decision will
be countermajoritarian in a way-but that kind of countermajori-
tarian decision making can occur even without judicial review. The
1964 Civil Rights Act,27 which was immensely unpopular in the South,
amply demonstrates that Congress can play local countermajoritarian
hero as well as the Court, at least when the nation's collective will is
behind it. Thus, to the extent we need the Supreme Court's heroism,
we need it to protect against an oppressive national majority, not a lo-
cal one, and it is therefore the national sociopolitical context that is
my focus.
Next, my claim that the Supreme Court lacks the inclination to
make countermajoritarian decisions is not a claim that it watches elec-
tion returns (or any other measure of public opinion) and then delib-
erately renders decisions that will enjoy popular support. Concededly,
the Court sometimes bows to public or political pressure, as it did in
1937's "switch in time that saved the Nine,"2 s and the Warren Court
was not immune to this phenomenon.2 9 But by and large, the Justices
26 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring the provision of
counsel in all felony prosecutions for indigent defendants); see also infta Part I.C (dis-
cussing the Gideon case).
27 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
28 THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393 (Fred R. Sha-
piro ed., 1993). The "switch" referred to Justice Owen J. Roberts' alleged change of
position in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), upholding a key New
Deal legislative program that coincided with the failure of President Franklin D. Roo-
sevelt's "court-packing" plan. See Michael Arens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107
HARV. L. REv. 620, 625-34 (1994) (describing the historical circumstances surrounding
the "court-packing plan" and contemporary allegations that Roberts had switched his
vote in West Coat Hotel to prevent President Roosevelt and Congress from restructuring
the Court). But see Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 311, 313-15
(1955) (asserting thatJustice Roberts voted to uphold the New Deal legislation in West
Coast Hotel prior to Roosevelt's proposal).
29 The Warren Court's change of heart on national security issues following its
heavily criticized "Red Monday" decisions of 1957 provides a prime example. See
HORWITZ, supra note 12, at 62-65 (describing the national security cases following Red
Monday as "The Court in Retreat" and attributing that retreat to hostile reaction to the
Court's earlier rulings); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 334-36
(1972) (arguing that the change in the Warren Court's stance on domestic security
issues was an "obvious and direct effect" of congressional pressure); POWE, supra note
12, at 135 (noting that the Warren Court "r[an] away from the domestic-security deci-
sions of its 1956 Term as fast as it could"); Alan F. Westin, Also on the Bench: "Dominant
Opinion", in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 63, 68-69 (Leonard W.
Levy ed., 1972) (noting that in the face of criticism, the Warren Court "reacted by
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of the Warren Court saw their ability to make unpopular decisions
when necessary as the judiciary's primary contribution to the political
system;3 0 reading the election returns was the last thing they thought
they were supposed to do, and the one thing they were rarely accused
of doing.3' This is not to suggest that the Warren Court tried to be
countermajoritarian any more than it tried not to be. For the most
part, I believe the Court made decisions based on what it thought the
Constitution said, or at least meant to say, or at the very least should
have said. In short, my claim that the Supreme Court lacks the incli-
nation to make countermajoritarian decisions has less to do with any
conscious considerations in the deliberative process and more to do
with its natural tendency toward adopting majoritarian positions.
Finally, my claim that the Supreme Court is naturally inclined to-
ward majoritarian positions has nothing to do with the political proc-
ess in which the Justices are selected. Admittedly, the fact that the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches determine the Court's membership
helps to ensure that the Justices' views somewhat resemble those of
the electoral majority. Presidents nominate, and Senates confirm, in-
dividuals who generally think like them and their constituencies.
But this "mirroring process, 33 is short-term; Supreme Court Justices
have a political life expectancy much longer than those who put them
on the bench and thus their views could still differ from the prevail-
ing ideology of any given moment. Moreover, the mirroring process
is itself imperfect, and no appointment better illustrates the point
than that of Chief Justice Warren-"'the biggest damn fool mistake"'
distinguishing or diluting virtually all of the bold and assertive rhetoric of the 1957 rul-
ings").
30 See supra text accompanying note 1 (quoting Justice Goldberg's view of the
Court's function); see also Fred Rodell, Crux of the Court Hullabaloo, in THE SUPREME
COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, supra note 29, at 191, 195 (describing the judicial phi-
losophy of Justices Black and Douglas as rhetorically asking "[w]hy have a written Bill
of Rights-if not to protect against majority rule [?]").
31 See The 'Warren Court'Era, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1968, at I ("The Warren Court
was rarely accused of reading the election returns."). But see Fred P. Graham, New Tide
in High Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1968, at 32 ("[T]he stop and frisk decision ... gen-
erate[s] feelings that the Justices are showing their ages or watching the election re-
turns.").
32 See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 613-14
(1993) ("As vacancies occur, presidents fill them with judges whose views are at least
somewhat similar to their own and, more important, to the views of the people who
elected them."). For an excellent discussion of the political aspects of the federal ap-
pointments process, see MICHAELJ. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOIN TMENTS PROCESS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000).
33 Friedman, supra note 32, at 614.
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President Eisenhower claimed he ever made.34 Thus, although the
process by which Justices are selected may contribute to their majori-
tarian leanings, it need not do so, and in any event, it is not the im-
pediment to countermajoritarian decision making that is my focus.
My focus is on the Supreme Court's tendency to adopt majori-
tarian positions just because of the sociopolitical context in which it
operates. The Court is a part of contemporary society, and so we can
(and should) expect its decision making to be naturally influenced by
contemporary societal norms. Indeed, it would be naive to think that
the Court could remain unaffected by the dominant normative as-. • 35
sumptions of its time, even if it wanted. We should therefore not be
surprised to see Supreme CourtJustices take positions coinciding with
those of the general public; the same historical events that shape our
opinions also shape theirs, and the same social and political currents
that move the rest of the country will undoubtedly move them as well.
Judges are, after all, people too. And when we forget that fact-when
we ignore the indelible historical context in which the Supreme Court
operates-we get a distorted image of the Court and overestimate
what it can realistically accomplish with judicial review.
In the discussion that follows, I argue that even the landmarks of
the criminal procedure revolution illustrate the Supreme Court's ten-
dency to decide cases consistent with the prevailing policy positions
and ideology of its time. In Part I, I consider two of the revolution's
early landmark decisions, Mapp v. Ohio
6 and Gideon v. Wainwright.3
7
Given the historical context in which each case was decided, I con-
clude that Mapp reflected an emerging national consensus about the
exclusionary rule and federal intervention in state criminal justice
34 MELVIN UROFSKY, THE WARREN COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS AND LEGACY 90-91
(2001) (quoting President Eisenhower); see also POLLACK, supra note 10, at 12 (noting
that President Eisenhower saw Earl Warren as "high level mediocrity," a middle-of-the-
road politician too good at pleasing the masses to upset the status quo with novel con-
stitutional interpretations).
35 See MichaelJ. Klarman, Rethinking the History ofAmerican Freedom, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 265, 278 (2000) (reviewing ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
(1998)) ('Judges are part of contemporary culture and thus are exceedingly unlikely
to interpret the Constitution in ways that depart dramatically from contemporary pub-
lic opinion."); Steven L. Winter, An Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Dfficulty,
69 TEX. L. REV 1881, 1925 (1991) ("[J]udges cannot even think without implicating
the dominant normative assumptions that shape their society and reproduce their po-
litical and cultural context."); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921) ("The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of
men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass thejudges by.").
36 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
37 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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affairs, while Gideon validated a well-established national consensus as
to the necessity of legal assistance for indigent felony defendants. In
Part II, I examine the strongest example of the Court's countermajori-
tarian inclinations in the criminal justice area, Miranda v. Arizona.38
While conceding that Miranda was controversial, I argue that it too
was a product of its time and well within the parameters of publicly
acceptable responses to the problem of coercive interrogation. In
Part III, I address two of the revolution's later landmark decisions,
Katz v. United States39 and Terry v. Ohio.40 Katz, I argue, was a welcomed
concession to law enforcement interests on the issue of wiretapping at
a time when the country as a whole was becoming more conservative
on criminal justice issues. Terry, I contend, was a complete capitula-
tion to law enforcement interests at a time when "law and order"
dominated the national mood. In Part IV, I conclude the analysis,
underscoring the need to recognize the Court's inherent limitations
and adjust our expectations ofjudicial review.
I. IN THE BEGINNING
The most sensible starting point for any historical discussion of
the criminal procedure revolution is at the beginning, when a change
in the Court's stance on criminal procedure first became apparent in
1961. Yet change is a relative concept, and revolutionary change no
less so. Thus, to understand what the revolution was and did, it is first
instructive to understand what life for criminal defendants was like be-
fore it.
A. Before the Revolution
Before the revolution, as now, only around 1% of all criminal
cases were prosecuted at the federal level. 4 ' As a practical matter,
then, the only constitutional protections that mattered for the vast
majority of criminal defendants were those available in state, as op-
posed to federal, courts. Prior to the revolution, the distinction was
38 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
40 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41 See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 29 (1970) ("[U]pwards of
99.6% of the criminal cases in the [United States] are handled by the states."); WAYNE
LAFAVE ETAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4 (3d ed. 2000) ("[T]he federal system is respon-
sible each year for less than 2% of the total number of criminal prosecutions brought
in the United States ....").
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an important one. Criminal defendants in federal courts received the
full panoply of protections enumerated in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
and Eighth Amendments. Criminal defendants in state courts, by
contrast, were protected only by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, which the Supreme Court early on refused to inter-
pret as incorporating the Bill of Rights guarantees. 4' Thus, for some
ninety-nine percent of all criminal defendants, those guarantees-at
least as a matter of federal constitutional law-were no guarantee at
all.
This is not to say that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause failed to provide state criminal defendants with any protection
whatsoever. To the contrary, it required states to meet a standard ofS 41
"fundamental fairness" in their criminal prosecutions, which, at least
in certain instances, necessitated providing defendants with protec-
tions akin to those enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Thus, while fun-
damental fairness did not require application of the full Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, 4 it did require the appointment of an
attorney when state defendants were charged with a capital crime45 or
46
when other "special circumstances" made one particularly necessary.
Similarly, although fundamental fairness did not require application
of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-
47incrimination, it did bar the admission of plainly coerced confessions
42 See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 113-14 (1908) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not an essential component
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
604 (1900) (rejecting claim that an eight-person criminal jury violated the Sixth
Amendment and suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
may not require state jury trials at all); see also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50-51
(1947) (rejecting argument that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of
Rights and applied it to the states).
43 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 55 (discussing the fundamental fairness doc-
trine).
44 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72 (1942) (upholding state court decision
denying counsel to indigent defendants).
45 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (requiring the provision of de-
fense counsel for capital crimes).
46 See Betts, 316 U.S. at 472-73 (holding that in special circumstances states may be
required to provide counsel); see also LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 555-56 (discuss-
ing Betts' "special circumstances" rule).
47 See Adamson, 332 U.S. at 50-51 (rejecting argument that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment incorporated the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimin-
ation).
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at state trials. 48 And even though fundamental fairness did require
application of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures in state courts, it did not require evi-
dence obtained in violation of that prohibition to be excluded at trial,
as was the rule in federal courts. 49 In state courts, evidence was consti-
tutionally inadmissible only when it was obtained in a manner so of-
fensive as to "shock[] the conscience" of the Court (if not also churn
its stomach). 50 In short, the fundamental fairness doctrine provided
state criminal defendants with some protections, but it fell far short of
those afforded under the Bill of Rights. Because the doctrine pre-
vented only the most unfair state practices, it was more like a litmus
test of egregiousness, eradicating abuses based on the same "I know it
when I see it" approach Justice Stewart would later use to describe
pornography. 1
With the Supreme Court otherwise unwilling to interfere in the
administration of state criminal justice, criminal defendants before
the revolution were largely dependent on the states for their treat-
ment before, during, and after trial. As a practical matter, that meant
the quality of criminal 'justice" rendered before the revolution varied
from state to state and, all too often, with the color of a defendant's
skin. Particularly in the Deep South, where racial prejudice fueled
already hostile sentiment toward those accused of criminal wrongdo-
ing, defendants were routinely treated like pieces of meat to be proc-
52essed and then forwarded for proper packaging. Police plucked in-
dividuals off the streets for little or no reason, searched them without
48 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (excluding evidence obtained
by brutality and violence). The facts of Brown are discussed infra in notes 212-13 and
accompanying text.
49 Compare Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (requiring an exclu-
sionary rule in federal courts), with Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949) (refusing
to extend the exclusionary rule to the states).
50 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that the use of a
stomach pump to retrieve evidence in the defendant's vomit "shocks the conscience"
and is therefore constitutionally inadmissible).
51 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I
shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be em-
braced within th[e] shorthand description [of hard-core pornography]; and perhaps I
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it .. ").
52 See Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal
Procedure, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1, 14-19 (A. E. Dick Howard ed., 1965)
(comparing treatment of defendants to cattle); Richard Neely, The Warren Court and the
Welcome Stranger Rule, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 184, 185 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1996) (noting that "[i]n the 1960s, the average criminal [suspect] was
treated like a piece of meat on its way to dressing and processing").
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a warrant, questioned them using strong-arm tactics, and then (if suf-
ficiently satisfied with the evidence of guilt) sent them on to the for-
mal adjudication process for trial or, more likely, a guilty plea. 3 In
sum, many state criminal justice systems before the revolution pre-
sented "'dismal pictures of official lawlessness, ''' 4 and criminal defen-
dants, who were disproportionately poor, uneducated, and black,55
lacked the wherewithal to do anything about it. They needed a hero.
Beginning in 1961, the Warren Court gave them one, at least for a
while. Tired of the steady stream of abuses that continued to filter up
from the states, the Supreme Court of the 1960s made policing the
police, as well as state courts, a distinctly federal concern. In all fair-
ness, the Warren Court showed some concern for criminal defendants
in the late 1950s as well, but its early attempts at cleaning up criminal
procedure were "sporadic and doctrinally modest" at best56 -nothing
like the activism that would later mark the Court's decisions in this
area. It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court started making
wholesale revisions to state criminal justice practices, demonstrating
what would become a sustained interest in protecting criminal defen-
dants on more than an ad hoc basis. By the time it was finished, the
Court would incorporate into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause nearly all of the relevant Bill of Rights guarantees, add-
ing bold new content to more than a few along the way 7 Clearly, the
Supreme Court's shift in stance on criminal procedure was itself
53 See Kamisar, supra note 52, at 19 ("The legal courts... [were] reduced to the
position of merely ratifying the plea of guilt which the police ha[d] obtained." (quot-
ing Ernest J. Hopkins, The Lawless Arm of the Law, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1931, at
279, 280-81)); Neely, supra note 52, at 185-86 (discussing the unfair treatment of sus-
pected criminals by both the police and the courts).
54 Russell Porter, Justice Brennan Finds Court fRaw, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1961, at 21
(quoting a speech by Justice WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr.).
55 See White, supra note 7, at 2029 (noting that "a high percentage of criminals in
the 1960s were poor and black"); see also GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 86-101 (reporting
sociological data that blacks committed proportionately more crimes than whites be-
cause of their disproportionate representation in low-status groups that tended to
commit more crime); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Na-
tion's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1357 (1968)
(describing the typical criminal defendant as "a young, single, Negro, male recidivist of
low socioeconomic status characterized by low income, low educational attainment,
high unemployment, poor job status, borderline overcrowded living accommodations,
and a dearth of voluntary affiliations").
56 Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Proce-
dure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1155 (1998).
57 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 70-71 (discussing the selective incorporation
doctrine of 1960s criminal procedure cases).
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revolutionary-and that shift began with the Court's 1961 decision in
Mapp v. Ohio.
5 8
B. Mapp v. Ohio: The Launch of a Revolution
Widely recognized for launching the criminal procedure revolu-
tion,59 Mapp v. Ohio required state courts to exclude evidence ob-
tained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, just as federal courts
had done since 1914.60 According to Mapp, the exclusionary rule was
more than just an evidentiary concept to be adhered to or discarded
at each state's will; it was an integral part of the Fourth Amendment
and thus fully binding on the states under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. 6' As contemporary observers quickly rec-
ognized, Mapp was no ordinary case. Commentators reacting to the
decision called it "the most significant limitation ever imposed on
state criminal procedure by the Supreme Court in a single decision, "62
and they were right. Gone in one fell swoop was the Court's willing-
ness to intervene in only the most egregious state criminal procedure
cases; that approach had marked the Court's 1949 decision in Wolf v.
63Colorado, which Mapp overruled. Equally remarkable was the setting
in which the Supreme Court chose to inaugurate its dramatically dif-
ferent approach to state criminal procedure. In Mapp, the Court not
only eschewed an ad hoc approach in favor of a bright-line rule, but
58 367 U.s. 643 (1961).
59 See, e.g., ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 375 (1997)
(marking the beginning of the criminal procedure revolution in 1961, when the Su-
preme Court decided Mapp); POwE, supra note 12, at 195 (same); Allen, supra note 25,
at 519 (same); Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionalization of
Criminal Procedure, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1992) (same); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court
and Criminal Justice, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 52, at 116,
116 (same); Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 471, 478 (2001) (same).
60 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-55; see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393
(1914) (imposing the exclusionary rule on federal courts).
61 367 U.S. at 657.
62 High Court Bars Evidence States Seize Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1961, at 1. The
Warren CourtJustices also recognized Mapp's enormous import. See CRAY, supra note
59, at 375 ("Mapp was 'so terribly important,' Warren told his son, so important, Earl
Junior decided that 'it's hard to say it's a case. It's like a huge cloud from which a lot
of things are raining."'); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS
SUPREME COURT-AJUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 391 (1983) (noting Justice Abe Fortas' de-
scription of Mapp as "the most radical decision in recent times").
338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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the bright-line rule it chose invalidated a long-established practice in
roughly half the states. 4
Not surprisingly, Mapp was less than well received in certain quar-
ters. Police across the country cried loudly in protest, blaming the de-
cision for a burglary wave in Minneapolis (which they later attributed
to lack of snow) 65 and a decrease in narcotics convictions in New
66
York. In their view, Mapp posed a serious obstacle to law enforce-
67
ment, one that the public might not be able to tolerate. Those more
solicitous of states' rights than the Court found Mapp disturbing as
well. The President of the American Bar Association, for example,
publicly criticized the Court for turning state criminal law into "a
mere appendage of [f] ederal constitutional law" while giving "inordi-
nate weight" to defendants' rights.6 8 With comments like that, Mapp's
holding appeared to be as controversial as it was consequential. In-
deed, scholars have long regarded Mapp as one of the two most un-
69popular criminal procedure decisions in Supreme Court history,
making it a seemingly perfect example of the Court's countermajori-
tarian role in the criminal procedure revolution.
In part, understanding the Court's ruling in Mapp requires an un-
70
derstanding of the facts of the case. Dollree Mapp was no saint, but
64 See High Court Bars Evidence States Seized Illegally, supra note 62, at I (noting that
twenty-four states admitted illegally seized evidence before Mapp); see also Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206 app. at 224-25 tbl.1 (1960) (listing each state's position on
the exclusionary rule as of 1960).
65 See Yale Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49
CORNELL L.Q. 436, 439 (1964) (discussing police comments to local papers).
66 Leonard E. Ryan, Narcotics Case Convictions Drop Since Ban on Illegal Searches, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 1962, at 35.
67 See Kamisar, supra note 65, at 440 (noting comments of local police superinten-
dent doubting "that the public 'can live' with the exclusionary rule"); Limit on Searches
Scored by Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1962, at 74 (reporting police commissioners' views
that the exclusionary rule was an obstacle to effective law enforcement).
68 Anthony Lewis, Bar Chief Assails High Court Views, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1962, at 7.
69 The other is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See, e.g., Bacigal, supra
note 12, at 782 (noting that "Mapp v. Ohio, which extended the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule to the states, and Miranda v. Arizona, which required the now famous
warnings, must rank among the most unpopular decisions in Supreme Court history"
(footnotes omitted)); Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 2, at 49 (contrasting the Su-
preme Court's early criminal procedure cases with "the sort of countermajoritarian
judicial decision making one often associates with landmark criminal procedure deci-
sions such as Mapp or Miranda"); Stuntz, supra note 11, at 53 (arguing that decisions
like Mapp and Miranda are "nothing if not countermajoritarian").
70j See CRAY, supra note 59, at 375 (noting that Mapp later moved to Queens, New
York, where she was ultimately convicted of operating a heroin factory out of her home
and sentenced to a prison term of twenty years to life).
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she presented about as attractive a case for overruling Wolfv. Colorado"
as one could ever find. Mapp lived in a boarding house in Cleveland
and was under investigation for harboring an alleged bombing sus-
pect. 2 When police arrived at her home and demanded entry, Mapp
called her lawyer, who advised her not to admit them without a war-
rant.1  She did exactly that, but the police (who numbered at least
74
seven) broke the glass on a back door and entered the home anyway.
When Mapp at once demanded to see their warrant, one of the offi-
cers waived a paper in front of her, which she grabbed and stuffed in-
side her bra.7 5 The police went after it. Mapp resisted and a struggle
ensued over the warrant's "official rescue" from her bosom.'6 The of-
ficers eventually retrieved their paper, at which time they handcuffed
Mapp for acting belligerent and searched her house.77 In the base-
ment they found a trunk containing the pornographic materials for
which Mapp was ultimately prosecuted: four pamphlets, a couple of
smutty pictures, and "a little pencil doodle."78 Although Mapp insisted
that the trunk and its contents belonged to a recent boarder, she was
convicted for possession of obscene material and sentenced to one to
seven years' imprisonment.
79
As it turned out, the police never had a warrant to search Mapp's
80home in the first place, though at the time that was irrelevant.
71 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
72 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644. Interestingly, that suspect was believed to have bombed
the home of future boxing promoter Don King, who at the time was an alleged
numbers racketeer. See FRED W. FRIENDLY & MARTHA J. H. ELLIOTT, THE CON-
STITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE 129 (1984) (noting that "Don King ... who
would later become the prominent promoter of championship boxing bouts," re-
ported the bombing that led to the Mapp case); see also Katz, supra note 59, at 471
("[P]olice officers, looking for a man suspected of bombing Don King's home, sur-
rounded Dollree Mapp's house .... ). I credit Michael Allen Wolf for locating this bit
of trivia.
73 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 644.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 644-45.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 668 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 645 (describing the search that
revealed the pornographic materials).
79 Id. at 668-69 (Douglas,J., concurring).
so See id. at 645 ("At the trial no search warrant was produced by the prosecution,
nor was the failure to produce one explained or accounted for. At best, 'There is, in
the record, considerable doubt as to whether there ever was any warrant for the search
of defendant's home."' (quoting State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ohio 1960))). A
police offer involved in the search later admitted that they had never secured a war-
rant. FRIENDLY& ELLIOTT, supra note 72, at 130-31.
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Under the Supreme Court's decision in Wolf v. Colorado, the exclu-
sionary rule was optional, so states like Ohio could convict a defen-
dant on illegally obtained evidence if they pleased.81 Still, the facts of
Mapp made crystal clear what Wolf had become in practice-a green
light for police to break the law. The old adage "[t]he criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered""2 had lost its intuitive
appeal under the facts of Mapp; police were violating the Fourth
Amendment on purpose, not by accident, because they had no reason
not to. At the very least, then, Mapp's egregious facts made it easier
for the Supreme Court to forge a new doctrinal path. Indeed, Mapp
even afforded the Court the relatively rare opportunity to reverse on a
Fourth Amendment claim where the defendant's factual guilt was in
doubt.
Even so, egregious facts would not have led to Mapp's revolution-
ary ruling unless the Justices were already poised to make it, as two
points amply demonstrate. First, Mapp began inconspicuously enough
as a First Amendment case and was briefed and argued as such before
the Supreme Court.83 In fact, when Mapp's lawyer was asked during
oral argument whether he also wanted the Court to reconsider its rul-
84ing in Wolf, he declined the invitation. Only the closing lines of an
American Civil Liberties Union amicus brief requested the Supreme
Court in Mapp to rethink Wolf, and its request consisted of just three
sentences completely devoid of argument.s5 Adding to the irony, a
81 See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 33 ("[I]n a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an un-
reasonable search and seizure.").
82 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
83 Brief for Appellants, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (No. 236), reprinted in
55 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
1081-1112 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK
BRIEFS]; Oral Argument, Mapp (No. 236), reprinted in 55 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra, at
1157-1200.
84 Oral Argument at 8-9, Mapp (No. 236), reprinted in 55 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 83, at 1157, 1165-66; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 673, 673-74 nn.4-6 (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (quoting at length Mapp's statement of the questions raised on appeal and
noting counsel's failure to advocate overruling Wolfduring oral arguments).85 ... . .
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union at 20, Mapp (No. 236),
reprinted in 55 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 1131, 1154; see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at
673 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (reproducing the ACLU's request for reconsideration
of Wolf). Even at oral argument, ACLU's counsel emphasized that its "principal rea-
son" for appearing before the Court was to argue that Ohio's obscenity statute was un-
constitutionally vague. See Oral Argument at 13, Mapp (No. 236), reprinted in 55
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 1170 ("Our principal reason for appearing on be-
half of the American Civil Liberties Union and its Ohio affiliate is to urge the unconsti-
tutionality of the Ohio obscenity law .... ).
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majority of the Justices in conference had already agreed to reverse
Mapp's conviction on First Amendment grounds, so there was no
need to even address the more difficult Fourth Amendment issue.
86
In short, Justice Harlan was undeniably correct when he argued in dis-
sent that the Mapp majority had "reached out" to overrule Wolf.87 For
those members of the Court already inclined to impose the exclusion-
ary rule on the states, Mapp provided the perfect opportunity to do it,
First Amendment case notwithstanding.
Second, and equally revealing, the Supreme Court had con-
fronted the same sort of egregious police conduct seven years earlier
in the 1954 case of Irvine v. California 8 but had little difficulty affirm-
ing Wolf under those facts. In Irvine, police sent a locksmith to the
defendant's home while he was absent to make a key to his door.90
They then entered the defendant's home on three separate occasions
to install and move a microphone hidden in his bedroom.9 For over
a month, the police listened in on the private marital communications
(and presumably, intimacies) of Irvine and his wife, not once attempt-
ing to secure a warrant for intrusions that would have landed anyone
92else in jail. The Justices were outraged. Noting that the police con-
duct in Irvine "would be almost incredible if it were not admitted,"
they went on to say that "[flew police measures have come to our at-
tention that more flagrantly, deliberately, and persistently violated...
the Fourth Amendment.' '93 Still, the Court affirmed Irvine's convic-
tion for illegal gambling, reasoning that it would rarely be proper
to force the exclusion of evidence in a state prosecution when the
burden of administering criminal justice rested almost entirely with
the states.94 Although Irvine was a difficult five-four decision for the
Court and produced only a plurality opinion, the central dispute in
that case was whether the police conduct was shocking enough to
86 THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 486 (Del Dickson ed., Oxford 2001)
[hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE] (reproducing the Conference
notes on Mapp).
87 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 674 (HarlanJ., dissenting).
88 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
89 See id. at 134 (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) ("We think that the Wof decision
should not be overruled for the reasons so persuasively stated therein.").
90 Id. at 130-31 (Jackson,J., plurality opinion).
91 Id. at 131 (Jackson,J., plurality opinion).
92 Id. at 132 (Jackson,J, plurality opinion).
93 Id. (Jackson,J., plurality opinion).
94 See id. at 134 (Jackson,J., plurality opinion) (declining to overrule Wofbecause
"[t]he chief burden of administering criminal justice rests upon state courts").
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require exclusion under the fundamental fairness doctrine, not
whether the fundamental fairness doctrine required overruling Wolf9'
Wolfs continuing validity, at least as of 1954, was never in serious
doubt.
Thus, although appealing facts certainly made the case for over-
ruling Wolfmore compelling, they alone cannot explain the Court's
willingness in 1961 to impose upon the states a federal notion ofjus-
tice. So what had changed since 1954? One answer is the composi-
tion of the Court, as four new Justices joined the bench between the• 96
years Irvine and Mapp were decided. With the exception of Justice
Brennan, however, these were all relatively conservative appointments;
the Warren Court did not become decidedly liberal in composition
until 1962-after Mapp was decided . Moreover, although Justice
Brennan helped form the fivejustice majority in Mapp, that majority
would not have materialized had not two other Justices also changed
their minds about the exclusionary rule. One of the two, Justice
Black, had been a member of the original majority in Wolf, s while the
other, Chief Justice Warren, had joined the plurality in Irvine that ex-
plicitly endorsed Wolf's hands-off rule and rationale. 9 Given these
considerations and the fact that conservative Justice Clark authored
95 Compare id. at 133-34 (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) (concluding that because
police conduct did not entail physical violence to the defendant's person, admission of
the evidence did not violate fundamental fairness), with id. at 144-49 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that police conduct was sufficiently outrageous to "shock the con-
science" despite lack of physical violence and therefore admission of that evidence vio-
lated fundamental fairness).
96 In October 1954, Justice Jackson died; Justice Harlan replaced him in March
1955. In September 1956, Justice Minton retired; Justice Brennan replaced him in
March 1957. In January 1957, Justice Reed retired; Justice Whittaker replaced him
that March. In October 1958, Justice Burton retired; Justice Stewart replaced him in
May 1959. See ARNOLD S. RICE, THE WARREN COURT, 1953-1969, at 6-17 (1987) (dis-
cussing the evolution of the Warren Court and the tenure of the individual Justices).
97 See id. at 20 (noting that the Warren Court's conservative voting block lost con-
trol in 1962, when liberal Justice Arthur Goldberg replaced conservative Justice Felix
Frankfurter); Kermit K. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 28 IND.
L. REv. 309, 315 (1995) (noting conventional wisdom that the increase in liberal deci-
sions in the early 1960s resulted from Justice Goldberg's appointment at the beginning
of the 1962 term); see also Rice, supra note 96, at xi-xii (discussing the liberal and/or
conservative bent of individual Warren CourtJustices).
98 See Wolf 338 U.S. at 39-40 (Black, J., concurring) ("But I agree with what ap-
pears to be a plain implication of the Court's opinion that the federal exclusionary
rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evi-
dence which Congress might negate.").
9) See Irvine, 347 U.S. at 134 (Jackson, J., plurality opinion) ("We think that the
Wofdecision should not be overruled, for the reasons so persuasively stated therein.").
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the Mapp opinion, something else had to be driving the result in Mapp
besides the Court's increasingly liberal composition-but what? Con-
cededly, the question can never be answered in any definitive sense,
though evolving legal and extralegal contexts afford the most plausi-
ble explanation.
1. Mapp's Legal Context
As the Supreme Court in Mapp openly acknowledged, its decision
to overrule Wolf was based in part on the exclusionary rule's growing
support at the state level. 00 According to the Court, almost two-thirds
of the states had rejected the exclusionary rule in 1949, when Wolf was
decided, while more than half of the states had adopted it by 1960.01
Truth be told, the Court was only talking about an eight-state gain, for
a grand total of twenty-six states in favor of the exclusionary rule when
Mapp was decided-and those eight states included newcomers Alaska
and Hawaii, which arguably had little choice in the matter. 0 2 Still, the
remaining six states to endorse the exclusionary rule after Wolf pro-
vide valuable insight as to just how accepted the rule had become by
1961. Four of the six states-Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island-adopted the exclusionary rule by statute, rather than
judicial decision making, and in Rhode Island, the statute was passed
after a judge rejected the exclusionary rule the year before. 0 3 The
100 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 ("While in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost two-
thirds of the [s]tates were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now... more
than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial opinion,
have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to [it].").
101 See id. (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 app. at 224-25 tbl.1 (1960)).
102 In 1949, when Wolf was decided, twenty-nine of the forty-nine states admitted
illegally seized evidence, while in 1961, when Mapp was decided, twenty-four of fifty
states still did. In addition to the five states that changed their position on the issue,
Rhode Island, Hawaii, and Alaska adopted the exclusionary rule without having re-
jected it before Wolf bringing the total number of states adopting the exclusionary
rule between 1949 and 1961 to eight. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at app. 224-25 tbl.1 (listing
each state's position on the exclusionary rule before and after the Wolf opinion).
While federal territories, Hawaii and Alaska had been required to follow the exclu-
sionary rule, so each would have had to overrule existing judicial precedent to reject
the exclusionary rule upon achieving statehood. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 393 (1914) (requiring the exclusionary rule in federal courts).
103 SeeAtA. CODE § 210 (1951) (enacting a limited exclusionary rule); MD. CODE
ANN., art. 35, § 5 (1951) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 (1951) (adopting the exclu-
sionary rule); R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-19-25 (1956) (same); State v. Hillman, 125 A.2d 94,
95-96 (Rt. 1956) (reexamining precedent rejecting the exclusionary rule based on a
newly enacted statute to the contrary). For an excellent discussion of each state's posi-
tion on the exclusionary rule after 1949, see E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status
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other two states, California and Delaware, adopted the exclusionary
rule by overruling prior precedent,0 4 a move the Court considered to
be "most illuminating. 1 0 5 Importantly, no state to consider the exclu-
sionary rule rejected it during this time, whether deciding the ques-
tion as a matter of first impression or after having experimented with
the rule in practice.1
6
For the majority in Mapp, California's conversion to the exclu-
sionary rule in 1955 was particularly persuasive. One might surmise
that this was partly due to the fact that California was a recognized
leader in progressive law enforcement practices, as well as Earl
Warren's home state.1 08 The fact that California Supreme Court Chief
Justice Roger Traynor, one of the nation's most respected and influ-
ential state jurists, authored the California opinion adopting the ex-
clusionary rule probably played a role too-especially since he had
written the 1942 opinion it overruled.' 9 None of this, however, was
of Rule Governing Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Unlawful Search and Seizure, 50
A.L.R.2D 531, 556-68 (1957).
104 See People v. Cahan, 82 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955) (overruling People v. Gonzales,
124 P.2d 44 (Cal. 1942)); Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199 (Del. 1950) (overruling State v.
Chuchola, 120 A. 212 (Del. 1922)).
105 See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 220 ("The experience in California has been most illumi-
nating. In 1955 the Supreme Court of that State resolutely turned its back on many
years of precedent and adopted the exclusionary rule." (citation omitted)).106 . ..
Michigan is the only state that even comes close. In 1952, Michigan expanded
its already established exception to the exclusionary rule to include in the class of
nonexcludable items evidence related to drug offenses. See People v. Gonzales, 97
N.W.2d 16, 23-24 (Mich. 1959) (recognizing the validity of a 1952 state constitutional
amendment expanding the class of nonexcludable evidence). In 1957, South Dakota
recognized a limited return to the common law rule of admissibility, but it did so based
on a statute that was passed long before Wolf was decided. See State v. Lane, 82 N.W.2d
286, 289-90 (S.D. 1957) (recognizing a limited return to common law rule of admissi-
bility based on S.D. CODE § 34.1102 (1939)).
107 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 ("Significantly, among those now following the rule is
California....").
108 See SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 175 (1st ed. 1980) ("California made the greatest advances in both law en-
forcement and corrections through the 1940s and 1950s.... In other states reformers
and progressive administrators looked to California for a model they might follow.").
Given Earl Warren's law enforcement background, California's position on the exclu-
sionary rule may well have struck him as particularly influential. See POLLACK, supra
note 10, at 43-66 (discussing Warren's experience as a district attorney and state attor-
ney eneral).
See Cahan, 282 P.2d at 911 (overruling People v. Gonzales, 24 P.2d 44 (Cal.
1942)); see also POWE, supra note 12, at 199 (noting the well-respected and influential
reputation of California ChiefJustice Roger Traynor); RogerJ. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio
at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 321 (referring to "[t]he education that
leads ajudge to overrule himself").
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mentioned in Mapp. What did merit discussion was the reason Cali-
fornia had changed its mind about the exclusionary rule: other
methods of enforcing the Fourth Amendment had proven to be an
abject failure in curbing the brazen, illegal practices of local police.I"°
To the majority in Mapp, the point was an important one. Indeed,
cases like Irvine had led the Court to the same conclusion a full year
before Mapp was decided."'
Given the exclusionary rule's growing popularity among the states
by 1961, it is worth noting even at this juncture of the analysis that
Mapp was not the aggressively countermajoritarian decision scholars
thus far have thought it to be. By the time the Court decided Mapp, a
solid half of the states had already adopted the exclusionary rule, with
the trend among them unmistakably in favor of the Court's deci-
sion. 1 2 Indeed, no state to consider the exclusionary rule after 1949
rejected it (despite Wolf's tacit encouragement to do so), while most
of those adopting it used majoritarian politics to effectuate the
change.113 With California's prestige behind the exclusionary rule as
of 1955, the rule's momentum was, as the Court itself noted in 1960,
"seemingly inexorable."' 4 It would appear, then, that the Supreme
Court's decision in Mapp coincided with an emerging national con-
sensus on the exclusionary rule, albeit at its early stages. Even under
the most begrudging analysis, however, the exclusionary rule imposed
by Mapp had the support of half the states-hardly an example of the
Court acting against a clear majority preference to the contrary. Had
110 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651 ("Significantly, among those now following the rule is
California, which, according to its highest court, was 'compelled to reach that conclu-
sion because other remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the
constitutional provisions ...' (quoting People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445 (1955))).
III See Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, 217 ("[O]ther remedies have completely failed to se-
cure compliance with the constitutional provisions on the part of police officers with
the attendant result that the courts under the old rule have been constantly required
to participate in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement offi-
cers."). In Irvine, Justice Jackson and Chief Justice Warren noted the availability of a
federal prosecution against the officers in that case, directing that the record and a
copy of the opinion be forwarded to the Attorney General for possible action. Irvine,
347 U.S. at 137-38. Apparently, nothing was ever done, which profoundly affected at
least Warren's perspective on the necessity of judicial involvement. See Bernard
Schwartz, Earl Warren, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 52, at
256, 268 (discussing Irvine and its effect on Chief Justice Warren's views regarding ju-
dicial activism).
112 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (describing the trend among the
states toward adoption of the exclusionary rnle).
113 Id.
114 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 219.
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the Supreme Court mandated the exclusionary rule in 1949, when it
decided Wolf, one could have concluded differently. But the Court in
Wolf refused to make that move, in part because state practices at the
time did not support it. 15
Still, it is one thing to recognize that the states were choosing the
exclusionary rule on their own and quite another for the Supreme
Court to force that choice upon them. Even the apparent futility of
other means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment cannot fully ex-
plain the Court's impetus to overrule Wolf; after all, if the states were
concluding for themselves that the exclusionary rule was necessary (an
argument that had been made since 1914),"6 why bother to intervene?
If anything, the exclusionary rule's momentum among the states
urged patience from the Court, not intervention-and in years past,
the Justices would have agreed. ' 7 By 1961, however, the Supreme
Court was more interested in curbing police abuses than in waiting for
the states to do it themselves. To understand why, one need only ex-
amine the extralegal context in which Mapp was decided.
2. Mapp's Extralegal Context
By 1961, the American public was clearly more concerned with il-
legal law enforcement practices than it had been in years past. Even
by the late 1950s, courts and commentators alike had begun to note
the nation's growing unease with unchecked police power."" For the
115 See Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29 ("The contrariety of views of the States is particularly
impressive in view of the careful reconsideration which they have given the problem in
the light of the Weeks decision.").118
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (reasoning that if evidence
illegally seized can still be used as evidence, "the protection of the Fourth Amendment,
declaring [the] right to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Con-
stitution").
117 AsJustice Harlan stated in Mapp:
The preservation of a proper balance between state and federal responsibil-
ity in the administration of criminal justice demands patience on the part of
those who might like to see things move faster among the States in this re-
spect.... For us the question remains, as it has always been, one of state
power, not one of passing judgment on the wisdom of one state course or an-
other.
367 U.S. at 680-81 (Harlan,J., dissenting); see also Porter, supra note 54, at 21 (summa-
rizing a speech in which Justice Brennan stated that considerations of federalism had
previously prevented the Supreme Court from applying various Bill of Rights safe-
guards to the states in criminal prosecutions).
11 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959) (noting "the deep-
rooted feeling that police must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end
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purposes of the present analysis, however, the most interesting com-
mentary on the subject came in 1962, following the Supreme Court's
decision in Mapp. Reporting for the New York Times, Anthony Lewis
wrote that the Court's efforts to eradicate unfair criminal justice prac-
tices "reflect[ed] a national moral sentiment." 9 Explaining the point,
he went on to write:
Americans [a] re plainly less willing to tolerate police misbehavior in any
state, regardless of the political niceties of Federal-state relations, than
they were in earlier years. Many Americans have a national conscience
that is injured by any state's misbehavior. And more and more the na-
tional ideal is prevailing over state orientation.'20
If Lewis was right, then the Supreme Court's newfound willingness to
intervene in matters of state criminal procedure coincided with a
readiness among the American public for it to do so. 12' As such, Mapp
may well have reflected an emerging national consensus regarding not
only the exclusionary rule, but also the legitimacy of federal interven-
tion in state criminal justice affairs. The intriguing question, again, is
why that would have been so. Here the analysis necessarily becomes
more speculative, though two developments provide at least part of
the explanation.
First, the nation in 1961 was almost certainly still trying to distance
itself from the more unpleasant aspects of totalitarian police practices
it had witnessed during World War II. Having seen for itself where
unrestrained police power could lead, the American public in the late
life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves"); People v. Cahan, 82
P.2d 905, 912 (Cal. 1955) (recognizing that "[t]oday one of the foremost public con-
cerns is the police state"); Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sys-
tems of Criminal Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REv. 213, 254 (1959) (noting the "quickening pub-
lic interest in the administration of criminal justice"). An early draft of the Mapp
opinion reportedly noted the phenomenon as well. See Schwartz, supra note 111, at
267 (relaying contents of Justice Clark's first Mapp draft, including his reference to
"aroused public opinion" on the issue of police discipline).
119 Anthony Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1962,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 7.
120 Id.
121 The fact that editorials praised the Court's decision in Mapp, despite the mis-
givings of police and states' fights advocates, provides at least anecdotal support for
Lewis's claim. See, e.g., Editorial, The Individual's Rights, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1961, at
30 (arguing that "police illegality can only breed public disrespect for law, and there is
no effective way to curb it save by making the evidence inadmissible"); Nathaniel Phil-
lips, Letter to the Editor, Ban on Unlawful Search Hailed, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1961, at
30 (describing the ban on evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure as contribut-
ing to the nation's image as a champion of individual rights).
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1940s quite naturally developed an "ideological revulsion" against Ge-
stapo-type law enforcement techniques that translated into an ongo-
ing desire to rein in police authority at home.122 The ensuing Cold
War of the 1950s would have only reinforced this desire as Americans
sought to prove to themselves and the rest of the world that demo-
cratic freedoms were superior to KGB-enforced communist controls.
1 23
And with the national crime rate in 1961 atjust 1% over 1960,124 there
was little to distract the public from the need to more meaningfully
safeguard its Fourth Amendment protections.
Second, the nation had become a much more cohesive unit by
1961, and so Americans were more comfortable with the idea of fed-
eral intervention in areas traditionally considered to be state affairs.
Advances in communication and transportation had given the public
an increasingly national perspective and that, in turn, had made in-
creasingly obsolete the notion that criminal defendants could be
treated poorly just because it was a state's prerogative. 2 5 With charis-
maticJohn F. Kennedy's election to the presidency in 1960, the public
became even more focused on the national scene, causing the "feder-
alism pendulum" to swing even further away from the states."" By
1961, then, the legitimacy of using federal power to solve nationwide
problems (even those traditionally considered to be local ones) was
not in serious dispute.
122 See Klarman, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 65 (discussing the likely impact of
"ideological revulsion against Nazi practices" on criminal procedure norms).
123 See id. at 34 (discussing the so-called "Cold War imperative" pushing post-World
War II America to demonstrate to the world that democratic capitalism was superior to
communism).
124 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REP-
ORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1961, at 3 (1962). As it turned out, 1961's 1% increase
in crime over 1960 was the lowest of the decade. See infra notes 292, 336, 424 (report-
ing higher crime rates throughout the mid- to late-1960s).
M See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 4 ("[D]ifferences from state to state in the treat-
ment of persons who ran afoul of the law had become intolerable in a nation where
state lines had come to mean so little."); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal
Procedure, 67 MICH. L. REv. 249, 258 (1968) ("The mere status of being in America
should confer protection broad enough to protect any man from the vagaries of a state
which by inertia or design fails to keep pace with a national consensus concerning the
fundamental rights of the individual in our society."); see also WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS,
WE THEJUDGES 42 (1956) ("In America, the trend has been toward the development of
a strong and powerful national government.").
16 See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 16-17 (crediting the election of PresidentJohn F.
Kennedy for "a brief era of immense national faith in the capacity of enlightened and
powerful men-especially in Washington-to accomplish reform"). See generally Baci-
gal, supra note 12 (coining the phrase "federalism pendulum").
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That said, neither of the above developments provides a fully satis-
factory explanation for the nation and Supreme Court's attitudinal
shift between the time Wolf and Mapp (and even Irvine and Mapp)
were decided. For starters, it was the New Deal of the 1930s that gave
the public its confidence in a strong national government,2 7 so to
some extent that factor was present when the Court decided Wolf and
Irvine as well. Even the incorporation aspect of Mapp was nothing
new; by the early 1930s, the Supreme Court had already extended the
First Amendment's freedoms of speech, religion and assembly to the
states, 28 incorporating civil rights long before it ever turned to those
in the criminal context. Similarly, the nation's recoil against totalitar-
ian-style law enforcement tactics must have also existed when Wolf and
Irvine were decided. In fact, given the temporal proximity of both de-
cisions to World War II and the widely publicized Nuremberg trial
that followed in 1945-46, l29 one would think public sentiment would
have been just as strong (if not stronger) in the late 1940s to mid-
1950s as it was in the early 1960s.
Perhaps the most that can be said is that the nation may well have
been ready for Mapp's ruling before the Supreme Court was ready to
render it. There is reason to believe, however, that another, more re-
cent development was making federal regulation of police conduct
particularly attractive to the Supreme Court and many Americans-
the burgeoning civil rights movement. Granted, black Americans had
made significant strides in racial relations even by the time Wolf and
Irvine were decided; as Michael Klarman has persuasively argued,
World War II provided the egalitarian social, economic and political
conditions that made possible the Court's 1954 decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.30 Still, it was not until after 1954 that the modern
civil rights movement truly began. Historically salient events like the
1955-56 Montgomery bus boycotts, the 1957 showdown at Little Rock,
127 Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court in Historical Perspective, in THE WARREN COURT:
A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 52, at 293, 300 (describing the rise of big government as
"one of the enduring legacies of the New Deal").
128 See, e.g., Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (incorporating the
First Amendment's freedom of speech and freedom of the press into the Fourteenth
Amendment); Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (incorporating the First
Amendment's freedom of assembly into the Fourteenth Amendment).
129 See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV 820,
842 (1994) (discussing the salience of the 1945-46 Nuremberg trial and its impact on
Justice Jackson).
130 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see MichaelJ. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) ("Many of the factors conductive to racial
change.., were byproducts of World War II .... ").
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the 1960 sit-ins, and the early 1961 Freedom Rides all occurred be-
tween the time Irvine and Mapp were decided; indeed, in the inter-
vening years between those decisions, Congress passed the first two
132
pieces of civil rights legislation since Reconstruction. None of this is
to say that by 1961, the civil rights movement had taken the country by
storm-i-it would have to wait two more years for that.1 3 3 But between
1954 and 1961, the nation had begun to undergo fundamental
change as the civil rights movement gained momentum.
In two ways, the burgeoning civil rights movement almost certainly
influenced the Supreme Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence.
First, it gave the Court a good reason not to respect the power of the
states to manage their own criminal justice affairs as in years past.
States were using their power to discriminate, and the Supreme Court
knew it as well as anyone. In the years immediately following Brown,
state courts had joined local politicians in doing everything within
their power to resist school desegregation; 3 4 in one case, a Southern
court's obviously obstructive efforts necessitated four trips to the Su-
preme Court before 1960 for enforcement of an early integration de-
cree.' 3' By the late 1950s, the Justices were clearly fed up with South-
ern states' massive resistance to Brown136 and that, in turn, made them
131 SeeJUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 1954-
1965, at 59-147 (1988) (providing an in-depth discussion of early events in the civil
rights movement).
132 See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 101, 71 Stat. 634, 634 (1957)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (2000)) (creating the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, §§ 101-301, 74 Stat. 86, 86-88
(1960) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C., and 42
U.S.C.)) (establishing penalties for obstruction of court orders, flight to avoid prosecu-
tion, and failure to maintain federal election records).
133 See ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIB-
ERALISM IN THE 1960S, at 86-87 (1986) (crediting events in Birmingham in 1963 for
creating a mass constituency sympathetic to the civil rights movement); POWE, supra
note 12, at 225-26 (recognizing Birmingham as a catalyst for the civil rights move-
ment); Klarman, supra note 130, at 130 (discussing the marked change in Northern,
white opinion on the issue of civil rights after Birmingham). Birmingham is discussed
infra in note 278 and accompanying text.
134 See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN
THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 121 (1987) (noting that "many [state court] southern judges
seemed to view themselves 'less as impartial umpires and dispensers of justice than as
defenders of white supremacy"').
135 See Robert J. Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61
TENN. L. REV. 869, 880-84 (1994) (describing Virgil D. Hawkins's attempt to desegre-
gate the University of Florida College of Law).
136 See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950's (1969) (discussing Southern states' mas-
sive resistance to school desegregation).
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highly unreceptive to cries of states' rights. After all, deferring to the
states had little appeal when the states were using their power to mas-
sively resist a Supreme Court ruling on racial equality.3 7 As Robert
Glennon has noted, the Supreme Court's lack of faith in state courts
to decide cases in a fair (i.e., nondiscriminatory) manner led to a re-
stricted "adequate and independent state ground" doctrine in the late
1950s.' m Given that development and the sentiment driving it, it is
not surprising that the Court contemporaneously refused to abide by
traditional federalism constraints in other doctrinal areas as well. By
1961, federalism was just enabling local power structures to discrimi-
nate against blacks, and that had become unacceptable.
Indeed, in matters regarding the regulation of police conduct, the
Supreme Court had even less reason to defer to the states. Police
played an integral part in perpetuating racist culture, and as such,
Southern states had every reason not to enforce checks on their behav-
ior. It is no coincidence, I believe, that just months before Mapp was
decided the Court provided a § 1983 remedy to victims of police mis-
conduct under facts clearly demonstrating the propensity of police to
enforce racist social mores. 39 By 1961, the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights had been investigating the connection between race and police
140brutality for two years, so the notion that law enforcement was being
1.I7 1 credit Michael Klarman for this insight.
138 See Glennon, supra note 135, at 910-11 (discussing the connection between the
civil rights movement and the Warren Court's interpretation of the "adequate and in-
dependent state ground" doctrine).
139 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 192 (1961) (recognizing a cause of action
against police officers in their individual capacity). Dissenting Justice Frankfurter de-
scribed the facts of the case as follows:
The complaint alleges that on October 29, 1958, at 5:45 a.m., thirteen Chi-
cago police officers, led by Deputy Chief of Detectives Pape, broke through
two doors of the Monroe apartment, woke the Monroe couple with flashlights,
and forced them at gunpoint to leave their bed and stand naked in the center
of the living room; that the officers roused the six Monroe children and
herded them into the living room; that Detective Pape struck Mr. Monroe
several times with his flashlight, calling him "nigger" and "black boy"; that an-
other officer pushed Mrs. Monroe; that other officers hit and kicked several of
the children and pushed them to the floor ....
Id. at 203 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In response to claims that the Court's ruling
would disturb the delicate balance of federal-state relations, the majority stated, "It is
no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the [state remedy] need not be first
sought and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id. at 183.
140 See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,JUSTIcE: 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
REPORT, at xi (1961) [hereinafter 1961 CrIvL RIGHTS REPORT] (noting that in 1959,
the Commission's term was extended so that it could investigate, among other things,
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used to maintain black subordination was hardly anything new. For
good reason, then, the Supreme Court may well have concluded that
some states would not come around to the exclusionary rule after all.
Even the two Southern states that had adopted the exclusionary rule
after Wolf did so in 1951, T well before Brown propelled their racial
politics to the right. In light of the South's stiffening racist resolve af-
ter Brown,142 it was almost unfathomable that any Southern state in the
mid- to late-1950s would have taken action to curb police excesses on
its own.
In sum, one thing the burgeoning civil rights movement did was
give the Supreme Court a reason to distrust the states, especially on
matters of criminal procedure. Yet the nation's growing interest in
protecting black Americans did something else too: it gave the Court
a reason to take an interest in criminal defendants. Whether or not
the Supreme Court was consciously thinking about racial discrimina-
tion under the facts of Mapp, it knew from prior cases that the most
egregious abuses of police power were perpetrated against blacks,
1 43
and that to the extent its ruling corrected an injustice, it would have
the most impact there. 1 With the civil rights movement gaining mo-
mentum, it was only natural for the Supreme Court to launch a crimi-
nal procedure revolution when it did-criminal defendants were
treated horribly in certain jurisdictions, and a disproportionate num-
ber of them were black.'4 5 Perhaps, then, the best explanation for
racial discrimination in the administration of justice). The Commission's report,
which was issued several months after Mapp was decided, concluded that "police bru-
tality in the United States today is a serious and continuing problem in many parts of
the country .... The statistics suggest that Negroes feel the brunt of official brutality
proportionately more than any other group in American society." Id. at 26-27.
141 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Alabama and North
Carolina's change of stance on the exclusionary rule between the time Wofand Mapp
were decided).
142 See Klarman, supra note 130, at 85-149 (discussing the Brown backlash thesis).
143 For an excellent discussion of the connection between race and the Court's
earliest criminal procedure cases, see Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 13, at 50-77.
144 As Lewis Katz has noted:
The impact of Mapp was naturally greatest in the African-American com-
munity where Fourth Amendment violations were the most common. What-
ever limited effect Mapp would have, it would be felt most where police con-
duct was the least restrained. It was this community which the Warren Court
intended to benefit by the due process revolution, because wherever injustice
existed in America, its worst impact was felt in the black community.
Lewis R. Katz, Mapp After Forty Years: Its Impact on Race in America, 52 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 471, 482 (2001).
145 See supra note 55 (describing the typical criminal defendant).
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Mapp and the revolution it inaugurated comes from the words of
Archibald Cox: "Once loosed, the idea of [elquality is not easily
cabined." 146 After Brown gave blacks equality in education, it was only
a matter of time before the Supreme Court would turn to racial equal-
ity in other contexts, such as criminal procedure. Indeed, as the
civil rights movement gained momentum, the notion that blacks
should be protected in their civil rights, but not when their liberty and
lives were at stake, must have seemed patently absurd.
Thus, for several reasons, 1961 presented a much more favorable
climate to launch a criminal procedure revolution, starting with re-
straints on police power, than had earlier years. By that year, a solid
half of the states (and counting) had already adopted the exclusionary
148rule on their own. Moreover, by 1961, the nation as a whole was less
tolerant of local law enforcement abuses and more receptive to the
notion of federal intervention in traditional state affairs. The Su-
preme Court's decision in Mapp reflects these developments. In
Mapp, the Court took power from the states at a time when the states
could not be trusted and protected blacks at a time when the nation
was awakening to the need to protect them. As such, the common
conception of Mapp as an aggressively countermajoritarian decision is
simply inaccurate. That said, Mapp was still not the enormously popu-
lar decision that would come next among the landmark cases of the
revolution, Gideon v. Wainwright."
49
C. Gideon v. Wainwright: A Piece of Storybook Americana
Decided in March 1963, Gideon v. Wainwright incorporated the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the states, entitling all indigent
felony defendants to a court-appointed attorney.' 50 In so doing, the
Court in Gideon overruled its 1942 decision in Betts v. Brady15 ' and
erased any doubts that a revolution in criminal procedure had begun.
Unquestionably, Gideon was one of the most monumental criminal
procedure cases ever decided-it guaranteed to state felony defen-
dants "the most pervasive right," the one right defendants must have
146 ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT 6 (1968).
147 See Pye, supra note 125, at 256 ("Concern with civil rights almost inevitably re-
quired attention to the rights of defendants in criminal cases.").
148 See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text (discussing the trend among the
states toward adoption of the exclusionary rule).
149 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
150 Id. at 345.
151 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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in order to meaningfully exercise any others. 152 Moreover, because
the vast majority of criminal defendants are indigent,1 53 Gideon's po-
tential impact on the administration of criminal justice was truly as-
tounding. Presumably for these reasons, Earl Warren considered
Gideon to be the most important criminal procedure case his Court
154had decided and the third most important case of his tenure overall.
As important as it was, however, Gideon merits a place in the pres-
ent analysis for another reason: it has been canonized by popular cul-
ture as a classic example of the Supreme Court's heroic, counterma-
joritarian role in the criminal procedure revolution.1 5 5  In part,
Gideon's acclaim stems from the holding of the case-that even the
poor are entitled to an attorney's help when faced with serious crimi-
nal charges. In part, however, Gideon's fame stems from the facts of
the case itself. Clarence Earl Gideon was by all accounts "the least
among men," a 51-year-old drifter with nothing more than an eighth-
grade education and four felony convictions to his name.1 56 Gideon
was not the dangerous sort, just a small-time gambler and thief; those
who would later write about him would say he was "a perfectly harm-
less human being, rather likeable, but one tossed aside by life."'1
7
152 Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on
"The Most Pervasive Right"of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (1962).
153 See Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, TIME, Apr. 29, 1966, at 52, 53
(noting that 60% of criminal defendants could not afford lawyers); supra note 55 and
accompanying text (describing characteristics of a typical criminal defendant).
154 Only the school desegregation and reapportionment cases ranked higher. See
Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, supra
note 29, at 3, 20 (discussing Earl Warren's ranking of cases in order of importance).
155 See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (mentioning popular conceptions
of Gideon); see also Gideon's Trumpet: The Poor Man and the Law (CBS News television
broadcast, Oct. 7, 1964); infra note 157 (recounting depiction of Gideon in Gideon's
Trumpet).
CRAY, supra note 59, at 405.
157 ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 6 (1964). Lewis' full introduction on
Gideon was as follows:
Gideon was a fifty-one-year-old white man who had been in and out of pris-
ons much of his life. He had served time for four previous felonies, and he
bore the physical marks of a destitute life: a wrinkled, prematurely aged face,
a voice and hands that trembled, a frail body, white hair. He had never been
a professional criminal or a man of violence; he just could not seem to settle
down to work, and so he had made his way by gambling and occasional thefts.
Those who had known him, even the men who had arrested him and those
who were now his jailers, considered Gideon a perfectly harmless human be-
ing, rather likeable, but one tossed aside by life. Anyone meeting him for the
first time would be likely to regard him as the most wretched of men.
Id. at 5-6.
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When he was charged with breaking and entering a Panama City, Flor-
ida, poolroom, Gideon requested a court-appointed attorney to repre-
sent him at trial. The trial court denied his request. In the colloquy
that has since become famous, Gideon challenged the trial court,
claiming (mistakenly at the time), "the United States Supreme Court
says I am entitled to be represented by [c]ounsel."' 8 Again, the trial
court denied his request. Gideon went to trial without an attorney
and was promptly convicted of the felony charge, receiving a five-year
sentence. Having time on his hands and some experience injailhouse
legal matters, Gideon fastidiously pursued an appeal of his case, ulti-
mately penciling a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court on lined
sheets of paper from the Florida prison where he resided. All things
considered, the Court could not have found a more perfect case to
defend indigent felony defendants had it been looking for one-and
the little-known truth is, it had been.
The rest, as they say, is history. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari in Gideon's case and appointed one of Washington's most
prominent lawyers, Abe Fortas, to argue on his behalf.160 It then vin-
dicated Gideon's faith in the Court, refusing to allow the vagaries of
personal finances determine a felony defendant's chances of prevail-
ing at trial. As Earl Warren's biographer, Ed Cray, would later write,
Gideon was "a piece of storybook Americana .... No tale so affirmed
the American democracy. No story broadcast around the world so
clearly proclaimed that not just the rich received justice in American
courts. ' ' Even last year, as Gideon celebrated its fortieth anniversary,
scholars reminisced about the pride they felt when the highest court
of the land reached down to rescue the quintessential little man,
158 The Supreme Court's opinion in Gideon quoted the passage, and CBS reen-
acted the colloquy in its special broadcast of the case, using the actual trial judge and
Gideon himself as actors. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963); Gideon's
TrumPet: The Poor Man and the Law, supra note 155.
9 ChiefJustice Warren reportedly directed his clerks to search for a good case to
overrule Betts, passing by the opportunity in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962),
because the defendant in that case was charged with incestuous sexual intercourse with
his 13-year-old daughter. See PowE, supra note 12, at 381-82 (discussing Carney and
relaying Justice Frankfurter's comment that he could not "'imagine a worse case, a
more unsavory case to overrule a long standing decision"' (quoting SCHWARTZ, supra
note 62, at 408)); UROFSKY, supra note 34, at 172 (describing the Court's decision not
to use Carnley to overrule Betts as an indication that the Court "controls its docket as
well as its image").
160 Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 932 (1962) (order appointing Abe Fortas as coun-
sel to Gideon).
161 CRAY, supra note 59, at 405-06.
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162Clarence Gideon. If ever the Supreme Court played the role of
countermajoritarian hero, surely it played it here-or so we think.
Although Gideon was undoubtedly a heroic decision, our common
perception of the Supreme Court's role there is only partly right; the
Court may have rescued Gideon from the State of Florida, but it was
hardly acting in the countermajoritarian fashion we tend to associate
with the case. By the time the Court decided Gideon, all but five
states-Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South
Carolina-already provided counsel to indigent felony defendants,
and those five were a less than prestigious lot in 1963. Even Florida
provided counsel to indigent felony defendants in certain localities; it
just so happened that Panama City was not one of them.1 6 Equally, if
not more, telling of the nature of the Supreme Court's decision in
Gideon was the fact that twenty-two state attorneys general joined to-
gether to file an amicus curiae brief on Gideon's behalf; Florida, by
contrast, could muster only two to support its position. As contem-
porary observers recognized, it was nothing short of extraordinary for
the top law enforcement officials of so many states to ask the Court to
impose upon them a constitutional protection for criminal defen-
dants. 66
Given the states' position on the issue, it should come as no sur-
prise that Gideon was one of the most popular cases of the Warren
Court era. Newspaper and television coverage praised the decision,' 6'
as did the law review literature, which had long advocated that Betts v.
162 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Gideon's Unkept Promise, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 17, 2003, at A12
("Most of us experienced a surge of pride when the highest court of the land reached
down to hear this little man's case .... ").
163 PowE, supra note 12, at 380; see also Kamisar, supra note 152, at 17-19 (detailing
the breakdown of state practices on the issue).
164 CRAY, supra note 59, at 403-04.
165 The Attorney General of Oregon filed a separate amicus brief on Gideon's be-
half, for a total of twenty-three states supporting the Court's ruling. Only Alabama and
North Carolina filed an amicus brief supporting the State of Florida. Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 335-36 (1963).
166 See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, The Criminal Law Cases: Supreme Court Rulings on Coun-
sel and Other Points Pose Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1963, at 6 [hereinafter Lewis, The
Criminal Law Cases] (describing position of the twenty-two attorneys general in Gideon
as "an extraordinary event in the Court's history"); Anthony Lewis, Supreme Court
Changes Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1963, at 12 [hereinafter Lewis, Supreme Court
Chang!es Again] (describing same as "most unusual").
See, e.g., Lewis, The Criminal Law Cases, supra note 166, at 6; Gideon's Trumpet:
The Poor Man and the Law, supra note 155; see also PowE, supra note 12, at 381 (quoting
an editorial from the Washington Post praising the Gideon decision).
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Brady be overruled. 168 Even the American Bar Association strongly
supported Gideon, a remarkable endorsement given its previously
critical stance on Supreme Court decisions that took power from the
states. 69 Gideon was so appealing, in fact, that it quickly became a part
of pop culture, inspiring the best-selling novel Gideon's Trumpet170 in
1964 and, much later, a prime-time television movie with a handsome
171Henry Fonda playing the downtrodden Gideon role.
Among the Supreme Court Justices, too, Gideon was a popular de-
cision. Indeed, of the five landmark cases discussed in this paper, it is
the only one to have received the Justices' unanimous support, provid-
ing yet another indication of just how mainstream the Court's ruling
was by 1963. Conservative Justices Clark and Harlan both had little
difficulty voting to overrule Betts; in conference, Justice Harlan re-
portedly went so far as to say, "[Betts] is a freak, and we should get
done with it."' 17 2 Even the Burger Court of the early 1970s-the Court
known for launching a "counter-revolution" in criminal proce-
173dure -would embrace Gideon, unanimously extending its holding to
misdemeanor cases where the defendant received jail time. 174  In
short, Gideon's holding was agreeable to just about everyone, both in
1963 and in later, more conservative years.
Granted, much of Gideon's appeal for the Warren Court Justices
and others had to do with the doctrinal landscape at the time it
was decided. Although Betts required the states to provide counsel to
168 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 404 (noting that "the legal profession had long held
[Betts] in faint regard, the law journals in even lower repute"); Kamisar, supra note 162,
at A12 (noting that Gideon "was widely applauded by both the legal profession and the
general public"); Lewis, Supreme Court Changes Again, supra note 166, at 6 (noting that
Betts had been "subjected to unrelenting attack in the law reviews").
69 See Counsel for Poor Acclaimed by Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1963, at 5 (noting
"strong support" for Gideon from the American Bar Association); supra text accompa-
nying note 68 (quoting the American Bar Association President's criticism of Mapp on
federalism grounds).
170 LEWIS, supra note 157.
171 See John J. O'Connor, TV- 'Gideon's Trumpet, 'Landmark Rights Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1980, at C30 (describing the movie as "absorbing" and Henry Fonda's per-
formance as "utterly convincing").
172 THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 503. Publicly, Justice
Harlan took a slightly different stance, stating that he believed Betts was "entitled to a
more respectful burial" than the majority's opinion in Gideon had given it. Gideon, 372
U.S. at 349 (Harlan,J., concurring).
173 See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
(Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
174 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1972) (recognizing a criminal
defendant's right to counsel if punished with incarceration).
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indigent felony defendants only in "special circumstances,'' 5 the
Court had found special circumstances present in every case it had re-
viewed after 1950. 17 By the time the Supreme Court decided Gideon,
it had even recognized as a special circumstance the complexity of le-
gal issues involved, though lawyers would have found those issues to
be "of only routine difficulty.' 7 7 Clearly, the Court had come to real-
ize that a felony charge was, like a capital charge, its own special cir-
cumstance-a situation sufficiently perilous to justify the right to
counsel. That being the case, it was easy to see why so many states
urged the Court to overrule Betts and formalize the bright-line rule it
had already implicitly adopted: more federal intrusion would actually
mean less.
17
1
Equally significant were developments in the Supreme Court's
appellate criminal procedure jurisprudence. In 1956, the Court had
held that indigent defendants were entitled to a free transcript on
appeal, 79 leaving little doubt among commentators that indigent de-
fendants were entitled to an attorney on appeal as well.'80 Indeed, as
Scott Powe's research has revealed, a majority of the Justices had
already agreed on the right to appellate counsel in another case,
175 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 46, at 555-56 (discussing Betts's "special circum-
stances" test ).
176 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 350-51 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that in no deci-
sion after Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U.S. 660 (1950), had the Court found special cir-
cumstances lacking).
177 See id. at 351 (Harlan,J., concurring) ("At the same time, there have been not a
few cases in which special circumstances were found in little or nothing more than the
'complexity' of the legal questions presented, although those questions were often of
only routine difficulty." (footnote omitted)).
]78 SeeJEROLD H. ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
LEADING SUPREME COURT CASES AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT 274 (2000) (noting that
Betts' special circumstances rule was less, rather than more, consistent with federalism
principles given the proliferation of habeas corpus cases it produced and the resulting
friction between state and federal courts). Future Justice Abe Fortas made the same
point in an interview with CBS News. See Gideon's Trumpet: The Poor Man and the Law,
supra note 155.
179 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (requiring the provision of trial
transcripts for indigent defendants appealing their conviction).
180 See Francis A. Allen, Griffin v. Illinois: Antecedents and Aftermath, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 151, 170-71 (1957) (noting that Griffin's rationale "is very suggestive of a forth-
coming requirement that indigents be furnished with counsel for an appeal"); R.D.
Hursh, Annotation, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State as Regards
New Trial or Appea4 55 A.L.R.2D 1072, 1085 (1957) (noting that the right to counsel for
indigent defendants on appeal addresses the same problem as Griffin and therefore
"would appear to be no more than a logical extension of the Griffin doctrine").
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Douglas v. Calformia,'8 ' well before Gideon was briefed and argued.12
Naturally, if indigent defendants had a right to counsel on appeal,
they also had a right to counsel at trial, which perhaps explains why
the Court carried Douglas over to the following term and decided it
the same day as Gideon.'8 3 In retrospect, then, Abe Fortas had the not-
so-difficult job of convincing the Supreme Court to do what it was go-
ing to do anyway. No wonder Justice Douglas would remember For-
tas' presentation as "the best single legal argument" he had heard inS 184
his thirty-six years on the bench; Gideon himself could have argued
the case and still won without a fight.
8
5
No doubt, Gideon's doctrinal inevitability explains much of its ap-
peal among conservatives and law enforcement officials, yet there
must have been more to it than that. Justice Harlan privately sur-
mised that he would have been among the Betts dissenters in 1942,86
and the state attorneys general shared that sentiment, describing Betts
as "'an anachronism when handed down." 8..7 The Court's opinion in
Gideon also took the position that Betts was wrong when it was de-
cided,' so Gideon's holding must have been more than just a product
of doctrinal attrition. Changing ideology played a role too; in fact,
that was most likely the reason the Court's jurisprudence had strayed
from Betts in the first place. By 1963, however, it was only natural for
the Justices to support the provision of counsel for indigent felony de-
fendants as a matter of principle, and notjust precedent. At the time,
it was considered almost immoral not to. 1 9 To understand why, one
181 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963).
182 The Justices had agreed upon the result and rationale of Douglas in June 1962,
the same month the Court granted certiorari in Gideon. For an excellent discussion of
the timing of events in the two cases, see POWE, supra note 12, at 381-85.
Both cases were decided on March 18, 1963. Id. at 384.
184 THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 502.
185 See POWE, supra note 12, at 385 ("[W]ith Douglas in existence (although not
publicly), Gideon could have argued Gideon and won 9-0.").
See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 503 (reproducing
the Conference notes on Gideon).
187 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345 (quoting the state attorney generals' amicus brief
with approval).
See id. at 342 ("We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental
rights."); id. at 344 ("[1]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless coun-
sel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.").
189 See LIvA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 82 (1983) ("[Tlalking
against the obligation of a democratic society to provide a fair trial for a poor, unedu-
cated fellow seemed immoral."); Lewis, The Criminal Law Cases, supra note 166, at 6
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must again turn to the extralegal context in which the Court was op-
erating.
Much of what has already been discussed regarding the impact of
the civil rights movement on the Supreme Court's decision in Mapp
applies with equal, if not more, force to its decision in Gideon just two
years later. Though the events in Birmingham were still a month away
when Gideon was decided, 190 the civil rights movement had gained sub-
stantial support by the beginning of 1963 and the plight of black de-
fendants in Southern courts had already begun to receive publicity.' 9'
No doubt, the Supreme Court was thinking about the right to counsel
in light of these developments; Gideon happened to be white, but the
fact that only Southern states had refused to provide an attorney to
indigent felony defendants made the connection impossible to ig-
nore. For a Court presumably interested in protecting blacks from
Jim Crow justice, extending the right to counsel to the states was at-
tractive for two reasons. First and most obvious, it gave black defen-
dants a sorely needed legal advocate to argue on their behalf. Sec-
ond, and perhaps less obvious, it increased the opportunities for
judicial oversight of suspect Southern courts. Appellate review of a
defendant's conviction did little good if someone was not making mo-
tions and objections at the trial level, and most defendants needed an
attorney to make that happen. In that regard, the Court's decision in
Gideon served the same purpose as its habeas corpus ruling in Fay v.
Noia,192 which coincidentally (or not) was decided the same day: both
("The idea that a man should be forced to undergo a criminal prosecution without a
lawyer's help simply because he is poor seems to offend nearly everyone's sense ofjus-
rice.").
190 See supra note 133 (discussing the importance of Birmingham to the civil rights
movement).
191 See, e.g., Claude Sitton, When a Southern Negro Goes to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1962, § 6 (Magazine), at 10 (discussing the treatment of blacks in and out of Southern
courtrooms); see also MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 85-86 (noting that eighty-nine
members of the House of Representatives submitted civil rights bills at the beginning
of the new congressional session in 1963). Events contributing to the movement's
growing success included the Freedom Rides of 1961 and the admission of James
Meredith into Ole Miss in 1962, along with the racist resistance those events provoked.
For an in-depth discussion of those events, see WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at 144-61,
213-18.
192 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (holding that federal habeas corpus is available even
to those who procedurally defaulted their claims so long as state courts were not delib-
erately bypassed).
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cases allowed federal courts to more easily scrutinize the treatment of
black defendants by Southern criminal justice systems.1
93
Even so, the civil rights movement was not the only factor con-
tributing to the Court's ideological shift in favor of the right to coun-
sel. By the late 1950s, the problem of poverty had begun to infiltrate
the American consciousness, and with Michael Harrington's publica-
tion of The Other America in 1962, it moved to America's conscience as
well.194 By all accounts, Harrington's book had an enormous impact
on the national mood,195 though by 1962, Americans were in the
mood to be sympathetic to the plight of poverty anyway. The late
1950s to early 1960s marked one of the strongest peacetime econo-
mies in recorded business cycle history, with record-breaking profits
and wages as high as anyone could remember.'96 At the same time,
Americans were only a generation away from the Great Depression of
the 1930s, so many knew how it felt to be poor through no fault of
their own. In short, the early 1960s were a perfect time for the nation
to turn its attention to the problem of poverty: the American public
had wealth and was relatively open to the idea of sharing it.
As one might expect, the plight of poverty had captured the atten-
tion of majoritarian politics by the early 1960s as well. Though Lyn-
don B. Johnson would not formally declare war on poverty until Janu-
ary 1964,197 the executive branch began to focus on the problem
as early as 1960, when John F. Kennedy campaigned on the country's
193 The Supreme Court itself later recognized this point. See Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976) (noting "the unsympathetic attitude to federal constitutional
claims of some state judges in years past").
194 See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGERJR., A THOUSAND DAYS: JOHN F. KENNEDY IN THE
WHITE HOUSE 1010 (1965) (creditingJohn Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society in
1958 for bringing poverty to the national consciousness and Michael Harrington's The
Other America in 1962 for placing it on the national conscience).
195 See DAVID ZAREFSKY, PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S WAR ON POVERTY: RHETORIC AND
HISTORY 24-25 (1986) (characterizing The Other America as "the most significant event
in making the general public aware of poverty"); see also Dwight MacDonald, Our In-
visibe Poor, NEW YORKER, Jan. 19, 1963, at 84 (reviewing The Other America and noting
that "[i]n the last year we seem to have suddenly awakened, rubbing our eyes like Rip
van Winkle, to the fact that mass poverty persists, and that it is one of our ... gravest
socialproblems").
196See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 126-27 (noting that "[t]he era's affluence
spawned both social optimism and the revenues to pay for modest new welfare meas-
ures"); SCHLESINGER, supra note 194, at 1012 (discussing economic strength of country
in Kennedy years).
197 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 8. 1964), in PUB. PAPERS 112, 114 ("This administration today, here and
now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America.").
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callous disregard for its poor. 98 In 1961, the Kennedy Administration
turned specifically to problems faced by poor criminal defendants, es-
tablishing the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Ad-
ministration of Federal Criminal Justice-better known as the Allen
Committee for its prestigious chairman, Francis A. Allen.' 9  In 1963,
just weeks before Gideon was decided, the Allen Committee reported
its findings. Presuming at the outset that poverty should be irrelevant
in any "civilized administration of justice," the Committee recom-
mended, among other things, federal legislation to adequately fund
200representation for indigent criminal defendants in federal courts.
With the executive branch contemplating ways to ensure that the poor
received assistance of counsel in federal courts, the Supreme Court
had even more reason (as if it needed one) to do the same at the state
level, where it mattered most.
Thus, for several reasons, Gideon was anything but an example of
the Supreme Court swooping down to protect the underdog in the
face of great opposition. Indeed, in light of the sociopolitical context
of 1963, it is difficult to imagine the Court in Gideon not ruling as it
did. In Gideon, the Supreme Court validated a well-established na-
tional consensus, suppressing Southern states that were out-of-step
with the rest of the country's enlightened sense of fairness and equal-
ity by the early 1960s. As others have noted, this was the Warren
201Court's signature role °. Still, it is more than a little ironic that the
same legal assistance at issue in the Warren Court's most popular
198 Arthur Schlesinger vividly described this theme in Kennedy's presidential cam-
paign:
[T]he message of Kennedy's 1960 campaign had been that the American way
of life was in terrible shape, that our economy was slowing down, that we were
neglectful of our young and our old, callous toward our poor and our minori-
ties, that our cities and schools and landscapes were a mess, that our motives
were materialistic and ignoble and that we were fast becoming a country with-
out purpose and without ideals.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 194, at 726.
19 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at i, 1 (1963) [hereinafter ALLEN
REPORT] (relaying the Committee's mission); see also BAKER, supra note 189, at 15-16
(discussing the Kennedy Administration's "appointment of a Committee on Poverty
and the Administration of Criminal Justice-known as the Allen Committee for its
chairman, Francis A. Allen of the University of Michigan Law School-to evaluate the
quality ofjustice being offered [to] the poor in the courts"); Kamisar, supra note 52, at
76 n.233 (referring to the Allen Report).
200 See ALLEN REPORT, supra note 199, at iv-ix, 5-6.
201 See, e.g., POWE, supra note 12, at 490 ("In fact, the dominant motif of the War-
ren Court is an assault on the South as a unique legal and cultural region.").
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criminal procedure decision would also become the subject of its
least popular criminal procedure decision three years later, Miranda v.
Arizona.
0 2
II. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA: THE EXCEPTION THAT PROVES THE RULE
Of the five decisions considered in this analysis, Miranda v. Arizona
comes closest to realizing the heroic, countermajoritarian ideal we
tend to associate with the criminal procedure revolution. Scholars
have long regarded Miranda as a symbol of countermajoritarian deci-
sion making and controversy, the epitome of all that was wrong (and
203right) with the Warren Court's activism in the criminal justice arena.
Indeed, Miranda may even be the most countermajoritarian criminal
procedure decision in Supreme Court history. In June 1966, when
Miranda was decided, only three states required police to warn sus-
204pects of their rights prior to custodial interrogation. Moreover,
twenty-six state attorneys general filed an amicus brief in Miranda ask-
ing the Supreme Court not to impose any new constitutional restric-
tions on the admissibility of confessions-a complete 180-degree turn
from the support the Court enjoyed when it decided Gideon just a few
S 205
years earlier. Police across the country complained bitterly about
the Court's holding in Miranda,2°6 and they were not alone in their
displeasure. Prominent public opinion polls reported Americans'
202 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
203 See POwIE, supra note 12, at 394 ("If Miranda is not the most controversial deci-
sion by the Warren Court, it is close enough, and it is the most controversial criminal
procedure decision hands down . ); Martin H. Belsky, Whither Miranda, 62 TEX. L.
REv. 1341, 1341 (1984) (reviewing BAKER, supra note 189) ("In the second half of the
1960s, the case of Miranda v. Arizona became a symbol of much that was wrong with
our criminal justice system and perhaps with society in general."); Alfredo Garcia, Is
Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 461, 477
(1998) (describing Miranda as "the archetypal symbol of the Warren Court's excesses
in expanding the constitutional rights of criminals"); Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 666 (1996) ("Miranda has been
the most celebrated and most reviled Supreme Court case in the history of American
criminal justice."); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: THE LAW OF PRE-TRAL INTERROGATION 119 (1986) (refer-
ring to Miranda's "symbolic status as the epitome of Warren Court activism in the
criminal law area").
204 Infta note 254 and accompanying text.
205 Supra note 165 and accompanying text; infra note 305 and accompanying text.
206 See infra notes 307-10 and accompanying text (discussing the reaction of police
to Miranda).
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207
disapproval of the decision by a two-to-one margin. By 1968,
Miranda was so unpopular that Congress legislatively overruled it (or
at least tried), and Richard Nixon made it a prominent part of his "law
and order" presidential campaign. With all that in mind, how could
Miranda not prove the Court's inclination for countermajoritarian de-
cision making?
In all fairness, perhaps it does-at least if the relevant benchmark
is what the states were doing when Miranda was decided. Yet the
closer one looks, the clearer it becomes that Miranda, too, was a prod-
uct of its time and well within the parameters of publicly acceptable
responses to the problem of coercive police interrogation. As dis-
cussed below, Miranda may have been controversial, but it was not the
wildly countermajoritarian decision scholars have heretofore thought
it to be. Like the other cases discussed in this Article, Miranda makes
sense once placed in proper historical context, and that begins with
an understanding of the Court's prior attempts to curb coercive police
interrogation.
A. Pre-Miranda Attempts to Curb Coercive Police Interrogation
In its 1936 decision of Brown v. Mississippi,209 the Supreme Court
first addressed the problem of coercive police interrogation, also
known as the "third degree. 2' 0  As others have noted, the facts of
211
Brown were perfectly suited for the task. In Brown, the police
whipped three black sharecroppers, repeatedly hanging one of them
212from a tree, until they confessed to murdering their white landlord.
207 See infra notes 311-19 and accompanying text (describing public opinion poll
data regarding Miranda).
208 See infra notes 322-31 and accompanying text (discussing Miranda's role in the
1968presidential election campaign and legislation purporting to overrule it).
2 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
210 The phrase "the third degree" generally refers to the infliction of pain to ex-
tract statements from a person against that person's will. See WALKER, supra note 108,
at 174 (discussing various physical measures and sexual indignities used by police em-
ploying "third degree" methods); Peter Carlson, You Have the Right to Remain Silent ... ,
WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 1998 (Magazine), at 6 (same). At least one commentator has
claimed that the term "third degree" came from Russian police procedures, which re-
portedly had three degrees-first, cross-examination; second, confrontation; and third,
physical duress. See BRADLEY, supra note 14, at 13 n.* (1993) (noting the possible ori-
gins of the phrase the "third degree").
2 See, e.g., Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 13, at 68 (noting that Brown "in-
volved an especially appealing set of facts in which to create a new constitutional
right").
212 297 U.S. at 281-82.
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At trial, a deputy sheriff admitted to the whippings but claimed they
were "not too much for a Negro., 13 The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the convictions, but the United States Supreme Court re-
versed, interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
to preclude the use of convictions that relied on confessions extracted
by brutality and violence.214 In so doing, the Court established a "vol-
untariness" standard for determining the admissibility of police-
procured confessions.
In 1936, Brown was a major doctrinal move for the Supreme
Court, though even then its interference with state criminal proce-
dure was anything but countermajoritarian. Every state to consider
the issue, including Mississippi, had already agreed on the general
principle that coerced confessions were inadmissible, so the Court was
only holding the states to a standard they themselves purported to
employ.2 6 Even so, Brown's voluntariness standard did not accomplish
much either. The most immediate effect of the decision was to dis-
courage law enforcement officials from candidly reporting the cir-
cumstances of interrogation, Iv leaving trial courts to decide the issue
based on credibility determinations. With predominantly black de-
fendants pitted against predominantly white officers, the results were
generally as one might predict.
Years passed, but the problem of coerced confessions did not. By
the early 1960s, the Supreme Court had nearly three decades of expe-
rience with the voluntariness standard and had developed a long list
of factors (thirty-some in all) relevant to the determination of whether
a defendant's confession was freely given."' Some of those factors
looked at the defendant's personal characteristics, such as age, intelli-
gence, and education, while others looked at the circumstances of the
interrogation, such as its length and whether the defendant had been
213 Id. at 284.
214 See id. at 286 ("And the trial equally is a mere pretense where the state authori-
ties have contrived a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by vio-
lence.... [T]he use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and
sentence was a clear denial of due process.").
215 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 311-12 (discussing Brown's voluntariness
requirement).
216 See Klarman, Racial Origins, supra note 13, at 67-68 ("[T]he new federal consti-
tutional right identified by the Court... already was recognized by the law of every
state.").
217 Id. at 83.
218 See CriminalJustice: Conkern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 57 ("To weigh
'totality,' the court developed no fewer than 38 criteria .... ").
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denied food, sleep, or access to an attorney upon request.219 None
proved to be particularly helpful. In 1961, a highly publicized Civil
Rights Commission Report found that police brutality in obtaining
confessions remained a "serious problem" throughout the country,
especially among black defendants. 22° Meanwhile, state courts contin-
ued to affirm convictions based on confessions obtained under dubi-
ous circumstances and the Supreme Court continued to reverse,
knowing that for every case it reviewed, there were many more it could
not.
22 1 In the end, the voluntariness standard had proven to be too
fact-driven to restrain police behavior or provide guidance to lower
courts, particularly those inclined to protect defendants no more than
they absolutely had to. If the Court was going to make a dent in the
number of coerced confessions, it needed a more definitive rule.
The Supreme Court's first attempt at imposing a bright-line rule
to curb coercive police interrogation came in the 1964 case of Escobedo
v. Illinois.22 2 Again, the facts were ideally suited for doctrinal change.
Danny Escobedo was twenty-two years old when Chicago police ar-
rested him for murdering his brother-in-law and brought him in for
223
questioning. During the interrogation, Escobedo repeatedly told
the police he wanted to talk to his lawyer, who, as it turned out, was
219 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 41, at 313-17 (discussing factors relevant to the
voluntariness test).
220 See 1961 CML RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 140, at 28 ("Police brutality-the
unnecessary use of violence to enforce the mores of segregation, to punish, and to co-
erce confessions-is a serious problem in the United States."); id. at 27 ("The statistics
suggest that Negroes feel the brunt of official brutality proportionately more than any
other group in American society."); see also Sitton, supra note 191, at 10 (noting law
enforcement's use of fear and brutality in making arrests and obtaining evidence).
221 Of the thirty-six coerced confession cases the Supreme Court heard from 1940
to 1964, the Court reversed in twenty-six. BAKER, supra note 189, at 74. During oral
arguments in Miranda, Justice Black candidly conceded that the Court was institution-
ally incapable of maintaining the case-by-case review that the voluntariness standard
required:
If you are going to determine [the voluntariness of a confession] each time on
the circumstances after a man has been arrested, this means that someone has
just-that this Court will take them one-by-one, and no court in the land can
ever know what violates that right not to be compelled to incriminate oneself,
until it comes to us and we decide it.... It is more than we are capable of do-
ing.
Oral Argument, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), reprinted in 63
LAmNDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 843, 894; see also Fred P. Graham, Court Ponders
Where to Draw Line on Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1966, at E6 ("Everybody knew that
for every coerced confession the Supreme Court struck down, thousands passed unno-
ticed.").
222 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
223 Id. at 479.
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN HERO OR ZERO?
also at the police station trying to talk to him. 2 4 Despite the existence
of a state statute specifically providing persons in custody access to an
attorney upon request,2 5 the police refused to allow the two to meet
until after Escobedo had confessed. 2 26  By that time, he had been
handcuffed in a standing position for three hours and promised that
he would only be used as a witness if he gave a statement implicating
an alleged accomplice as the triggerman.2 Naturally, Escobedo was
indicted for murder shortly thereafter and subsequently convicted of
2281the charge.
Though the Supreme Court could have easily reversed Escobedo's
229
conviction under the voluntariness standard, it relied on the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to do so instead. The Court's holding in
Escobedo was extremely limited, so much so that just stating it took an
entire paragraph.230 The bottom line, however, was that the Sixth
Amendment prohibited police who had "focused" on a suspect from
denying that suspect's request to consult an attorney during custodial
interrogation."' In 1964, the proposition that arrestees who had law-
yers should be able to see them upon request was not particularly star-
tling; as one officer told the press, "[a] nybody would have known that
224 Id. at 480.
225 See id. at 481 n.2 ("The statute then in effect provided.., that: 'All public offi-
cers... having the custody of any person ... restrained of his liberty for any alleged
cause whatever, shall, except in cases of imminent danger of escape, admit any practic-
ing attorney... whom such person ... may desire to see or consult... ' (quoting
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 477 (1959) (repealed 1963))).
226 Id. at 481-82.
227 Id. at 482.
228 Id. at 483.
229 At conference, fiveJustices initially voted to do just that. THE SUPREME COURT
IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 513-14.
230 The Court stated its holding as follows:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements,
the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute consti-
tutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of
Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment," and that no
statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against
him at a criminal trial.
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91 (citation omitted).
231 Id. The Court later limited Escobedo's holding to its own facts. See Kirby v. Illi-
nois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (recognizing this limitation),
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guy had a right to see his attorney. , 32 Yet Escobedo's bark was worse
than its bite. Nestled into the Court's opinion were sweeping con-
demnations of police interrogation and convictions based on a defen-
dant's confession 233--and the fact that the Court had moved the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel from the courtroom to the "squealroom"
had an ominous cast. At the time, it certainly looked as though the Su-
preme Court was about to give suspects subject to custodial interroga-
tion Gideon's right to an attorney, and that would have effectively
ended police-procured confessions altogether.
Not surprisingly, those in law enforcement sharply criticized the
Court's decision in Escobedo, as did the conservatives who tended to
234back them. Among the general public, however, Escobedo was not sa-
lient enough to cause a reaction one way or the other.23  In 1966,
232 Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 65; see alsoJoseph
W. Bishop, Jr., The Warren Court Is Not Likely to Be Overruled, in THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER EARL WARREN, supra note 29, at 93, 97 (describing Escobedo as laying down "the
not-very-startling rule that a man who is being questioned by the police is entitled to a
lawyer when he asks for one"); supra note 225 and accompanying text (noting an Illi-
nois statute providing the same right recognized in Escobedo).
233 See Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-89 ("We have learned the lesson of history... that
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'confession' will,
in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which de-
pends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation."
(footnotes omitted)); id. at 490 ("This Court also has recognized that 'history amply
shows that confessions have often been extorted to save law enforcement officials the
trouble and effort of obtaining valid and independent evidence .... '" (quoting Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963))); id. ("If the exercise of constitutional rights
will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something
very wrong with that system." (footnote omitted)).
234 See POWE, supra note 12, at 391-92 (discussing the hostile reaction to Escobedo
among police and conservatives and mentioning sharp criticism of the decision by
former President Eisenhower and 1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater). It is
somewhat puzzling why the law enforcement community was so upset with Escobedo
when the Court's holding was relatively uncontroversial. The answer, I believe, lies in
the press coverage of Escobedo, which relayed the decision's disturbing implications.
See, e.g., Use of Confession in Trial is Curbed, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1964, at 1 (quotingJus-
tice White's dissenting view that Court's ruling in Escobedo would cripple law enforce-
ment).
235 See Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and Supreme Court:
The Goldwater Campaign, 31 PUB. OPINION Q. 31, 35-36 (1968) ("The Supreme Court's
decisions on reapportionment and on the rights of defendants in criminal cases, the
two subjects that Goldwater assailed most frequently and stridently, were barely visible
to the public at large."); id. at 46 ("Goldwater's complaints about the Court's decisions
on reapportionment and the rights of criminal defendants could not possibly have had
a great impact on public opinion. There was simply little popular reaction to these
rulings."). Given law enforcement's low public esteem in 1964, there is no reason to
assume that the views of police on Escobedo were representative of the public at large.
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when Escobedo's picture graced the cover of Time, that was no longer
the case. 23 6 At that time, however, the press was eagerly awaiting the
Court's decision in Miranda, and its coverage of Escobedo was com-
pletely favorable. Indeed, Time's 1966 cover story portrayed Escobedo
much like Gideon had been depicted three years earlier, describing
him as "a nobody for everybody" and using his case to illustrate why
further police restraints-like those being considered in Miranda-
237were both appropriate and necessary.
Even so, the Supreme Court's approach in Escobedo was, like its
voluntariness standard, inherently problematic. Lower courts gener-
ally construed Escobedo's holding in the same limited fashion in which
it had been presented, recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel during custodial interrogation only when defendants had hired
lawyers and asked to see them. 23' Because most defendants were too
poor to hire their own attorney and too ignorant to know they could
access one upon request, Escobedo had little practical effect.239 Mean-
while, the problem of coerced confessions began to receive substantial
See infra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing the negative public image of law
enforcement officials in 1964).
236 See Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153 (reproducing Es-
cobedo's booking photo on front cover).
237 Id. at 53-58. Interestingly, Time described Escobedo as a man who, at 5'5" and
106 pounds, "hardly seem[ed] a threat to any healthy policewoman." Id. at 54, 60.
The article even went so far as to suggest that Escobedo may have been justified in kill-
ing his brother-in-law and that Chicago police had planted evidence on him after his
murder charges were dropped so they could bring another charge. Id. at 54, 58. As
time passed, however, it became clear that Escobedo was not the victim Time made him
out to be. He was subsequently convicted of drug dealing, attempted murder, inde-
cent liberties, and possession of illegal weapons; as of 2000, he was still serving time on
the weapons charge. See POWE, supra note 12, at 411 (discussing Escobedo's subse-
quent charges and claim by a sentencing judge that Escobedo was a "career criminal").
238 See P.A. Agabin, Annotation, Accused's Right to Assistance of Counsel at or Prior to
Arraignment, 5 A.L.R.3D 1269, 1284 (1966) (noting a division of opinion among courts
as to whether the defendant must request counsel, with most holding that a request is
necessary). For a discussion of the various positions taken by the states after Escobedo
but before Miranda, see generally Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note
153, at 57-58.
239 As one New York Times article noted:
So few lawyers ever appear at the precinct house while a suspect is being ques-
tioned-and so few suspects are worldly enough to ask for a lawyer or well-off
enough to afford one-that the effect on police procedures would be negligi-
ble if that was all the court meant when it reversed Escobedo's murder convic-
tion.
Sidney E. Zion, In the Station House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1965, at 33; see also supra note
55 (describing the socioeconomic status of typical criminal defendants).
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publicity,2 40 prompting some law enforcement officials to admit pub-
licly that the third degree was still in use. In New York, for example, a
former deputy police commissioner confided:
"It is hardly news that suspects of serious crimes often get 'worked over'
in the back rooms of station houses. The truth is that most crimes are
not solved by fingerprints and wristwatch radios and the skillful assem-
bling of clues. The suspect confesses, voluntarily or involuntarily."
2 4'
Clearly, the Supreme Court needed a better solution to the problem
of coercive custodial interrogation, one that would protect the poor,
unsophisticated defendants who were most susceptible to abusive po-
lice practices in the first place. With well over 100 certiorari petitions
242
asking the Court to clarify Escobedo's reach by late 1965, the time had
come to try again.
240 That publicity began around May 1965, in the wake of the George Whitmore
case. In 1964, Whitmore confessed to murdering three women; his case was cited by a
Manhattan prosecutor as "'the perfect example of the importance of confessions in law
enforcement"' and an illustration of "how unrealistic and naive the Court [wa]s" in its
Escobedo decision. Sidney E. Zion, The Suspect Confesses-But Who Believes Him?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 16, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 30. By early 1965, the same prosecutor had to
drop all charges against Whitmore (who claimed he only confessed because the police
beat him) because the physical evidence in the case failed to match his confession,
creating a "stink bomb" of adverse publicity. Id. at 30-31, 89-90. Whitmore's case was
reportedly mentioned as much as Escobedo at a National District Attorney's Association
meeting, id. at 90, and was salient enough to be mentioned in the Supreme Court's
Miranda opinion as well. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 n.24 (citing the
Whitmore case as the "most recent conspicuous example" of coercive interrogation re-
sulting in a false confession). March 1965's "Bloody Sunday" in Selma, Alabama,
probably also contributed to the rise in adverse publicity for police in general and con-
fessions in particular. See infra notes 281-82 (discussing Selma and its effect on public
opinion of police). In any event, given the non-salient nature of the Court's 1964 deci-
sion in Escobedo, it is doubtful that the decision was in any way responsible for the pub-
lic attention given to confessions in 1965. See supra note 235 and accompanying text
(noting Escobedo's lack of public impact).
241 The Revolution in Criminal Justice, TIME, July 16, 1965, at 22, 22 (quoting former
New York City Deputy Police Commissioner Richard Dougherty); see also Eric Pace,
Confession Role Asked for Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1965, at 33 (quoting the chairman
of the penal law committee of the New York State Bar Association as saying, "I'm not a
cop fighter. If you'll pardon the expression, some of my best friends are cops, [but] I
know what goes on in a police station").
242 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 457 ("By November, 1965, Earl Warren's clerks had
identified 170 appeals from state prisoners who raised the unanswered issues of the
previous year's Escobedo decision .... ").
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B. Miranda's Holding and Historical Context
When the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Miranda v. Ari-
243zona and a few other "Escobedo cases" in November 1965,44 it was ob-
vious that the Court was going to lay down another bright-line rule for
regulating custodial interrogation; the only question was what that
rule would be. Because the Court had been on the verge of extending
the full Sixth Amendment right to counsel to custodial interrogation
in Escobedo, many feared it would actually take that step in Miranda, ef-
fectively eliminating law enforcement's ability to obtain even so-called
11 245"voluntary" confessions. Others doubted that the Court would go
that far, predicting instead that it would simply require warnings prior
246to custodial interrogation. Importantly, a warnings requirement was
the least the Supreme Court could do to place unsophisticated defen-
dants on equal footing with their more knowledgeable counterparts,
rectifying at least part of the problem with Escobedo's limited hold-
247
lng.
As we all know, the Supreme Court in Miranda chose the latter op-
tion, interpreting the Fifth Amendment to require four warnings that
241are now so famous, anyone who watches television can recite them.
That was a significant step back from where the Court appeared to be
243 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
244 Miranda was a consolidated case involving four appeals: Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 491-93 (1966), Vignera v. New York, 384 U.S. 436, 493-95 (1966), Westover v.
United States, 384 U.S. 436, 494-97 (1966), and California v. Stewart, 384 U.S. 436, 497-99
(1966).
245 See Kamisar, supra note 59, at 120 (discussing the fear of prominent judges, law
enforcement officials, and other members of the bar that the Supreme Court in
Miranda would condition interrogation on the presence of counsel).
246 See, e.g., Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 58 ("So far,
the best guess of Washington lawyers is that the court may simply require police to
warngrme suspects of their tights . ).
2 The other problem was that even among defendants who knew they could have
access to an attorney upon request, many were too poor to afford one. See supra note
239 and accompanying text (noting the poverty of most criminal defendants).
Miranda addressed this problem as well by requiring the state to provide court-
appointed counsel to indigent felony defendants upon request. See infra note 248
(quoting the required warnings).
248 Miranda held:
[A defendant] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of
law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires.
384 U.S. at 479.
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heading in 1964, though only upon closer inspection can one appre-
ciate just how much of a step back Miranda's ruling truly was. Accord-
ing to the Court in Miranda, the central problem with police interro-
gation was the inherently coercive atmosphere in which it took
place.249 Indeed, the Court went to great lengths to document the tac-
tics police used to discourage suspects from enlisting an attorney's aid
250or exercising their right to silence. In light of that fact, it is some-
what surprising that Miranda sanctioned police-provided warnings in
lieu of requiring that they be given by a neutral and detached magis-
trate, as several prominent jurists suggested while the case was pend-
ing.25 ' Equally surprising is the fact that Miranda failed to require that
the warnings be recorded, as others were then advocating, so that
courts could at least monitor what, if anything, the police were doing
to convince defendants to waive their rights.2 ' Given these considera-
tions, it is little wonder that Justice Fortas described Miranda as a
"conservative decision" just after it was issued;253 the Court's ruling did
nothing whatsoever to prevent the coercion police used to make sus-
pects talk from translating to the waiver context.
249 See id. at 445-57 (detailing the coercive conditions of custodial interrogation);
see also id. at 467 (concluding that "the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would
not otherwise do so freely").
250 See id. at 454 (quoting interrogation instructions from FRED E. INBAU &JOHN E.
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 111-112 (1962)).
251 See, e.g., David L. Bazelon, Letter to the Editor, Rights of Suspects, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 20, 1965, at 34 ("My view is that we cannot expect the police to advise a suspect
effectively and disinterestedly of his right to remain silent at the same time as they are
trying to elicit a confession from him."); Pace, supra note 241, at 33 (reporting a New
York State Supreme Court justice's opinion that police were unsuited to inform sus-
pects of their rights and advocating that a neutral magistrate do so instead); see also
Sidney E. Zion, Justice Scorns Confession as Key to Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1965,
at 1 ("Libertarians have long argued that a police station is coercive in itself and that a
lawyer, rather than a detective, should advise a suspect of his rights.").
2 See infra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of American
Law Institute's proposed prearraignment procedures that would require police to
make audio-recordings of both warnings and any subsequent waiver of rights); see also
Sidney E. Zion, Ryan Asks Wide Revisions in Police Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1965,
at 37 (reporting a New York City representative's call for "closed-circuit televising of
the questioning of suspects").
2 At that time, Justice Fortas also predicted that many suspects would waive their
rights. See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 182 (quoting a conversation with Justice Fortas a
few months after Miranda was issued). Given the experience of police departments
that provided pre-interrogation warnings to suspects prior to Miranda, Justice Fortas's
prediction was well-founded. See infra note 298 and accompanying text (discussing the
ability of police to obtain confessions despite having warned suspects of their rights).
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN HERO OR ZERO?
Of course, even if Miranda was a comparatively weak decision in
light of Escobedo and the Court's concerns about custodial interroga-
tion, it still could have been wildly countermajoritarian. It is difficult
to conclude that this was the case, however, given the sociopolitical
context in which Miranda was decided. Admittedly, only three
states-California, Oregon, and Rhode Island-mandated Miranda-
like warnings in 1966, and all three did so only because they inter-
preted Escobedo to implicitly require them.254 Yet the Court's holding
in Miranda did not spring out of thin air. By the time Miranda was de-
cided, a number of legal reform bodies had been studying the prob-
lem of coercive police interrogation for years, with the prestigious
255American Law Institute (ALI) leading the pack. By late 1965, both
the American Bar Association and the National Crime Commission
had agreed to endorse the ALI's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedures ,6 which was thought to represent the views of the nation's
most influential law enforcement and conservative legal figures.2 7
Given the Model Code's endorsements, it is hardly a stretch to
254 See, e.g., People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 371 (Cal. 1965) (holding that defen-
dants confession was inadmissible because the police had focused on the defendant as
a "particular suspect" and subjected him to custodial interrogation without adequately
informing him of his right to counsel and right to remain silent); State v. Neely, 398
P.2d 482, 486-87 (Or. 1965) (holding that "before law enforcement officials can inter-
rogate a person who is the focal suspect of a crime, such person must effectively be in-
formed of his right to assistance of counsel as well as his right to remain silent"); State
v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82, 85 (R.I. 1965) (citing Escobedo in holding that a court must
"consider the validity of the confession in the light of its having been obtained without
the police previously advising defendant of his right to have assistance of counsel").
255 The three main reform bodies involved in that endeavor were the American
Law Institute (ALI), the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Minimum
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, and the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice (commonly known as the National
Crime Commission). See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 174-75 (describing the collabora-
tion of these groups on the creation of the Model Code as "a more-than-coincidental
concert of views on police interrogation ... between the most powerful nonjudicial
legal institutions in the United States"). The ALI was the first of these groups to study
the problem of coercive interrogation, having received a Ford Foundation grant to do
so in April 1963. See BAKER, supra note 189, at 16 (discussing the purpose and scope of
the Ford Foundation grant). The American Bar Association undertook a similar proj-
ect in February 1964, months before Escobedo was decided. See Austin C. Wehrwein, Bar
Will Survey Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1964, at 9 (announcing the ABA's
criminal justice project). Thus, the Court's decision in Escobedo cannot even be cred-
ited for galvanizing other reform groups into action.
256 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1966).
257 See BAKER, supra note 189, at 159 (discussing membership of the Model Code's
Advisory Committee); GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 174-75 (noting that the ABA and Na-
tional Crime Commission both supported the ALI's proposed Model Code).
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conclude, as others have, that the ALI's project "carr[ied] the political
and scholarly weight of virtually the entire American legal establish-
ment.
,258
For the purpose of this analysis, the substance of the ALI's draft
Model Code-published just days after the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Miranda 59-is most revealing. On the subject of custo-
dial interrogation, the draft Model Code proposed that police be re-
quired to warn suspects of their right to silence and right to consult an
attorney, audio-recording both the warnings and any subsequent
waiver.260 The draft Model Code also provided for a maximum four-
hour interrogation period without an attorney's presence or consent,
so that even arrestees who had waived their right to counsel would
find their waiver invalid after a certain period of time.261 Concededly,
the ALI's draft proposal differed from Miranda's holding in that it did
not require the police to advise suspects of their right to court-
appointed counsel; in the draft Model Code, this right did not exist.
Yet, even within the ALl, many thought indigent defendants should
have a right to court-appointed counsel during custodial interroga-
tion, creating a rift that was at least partly responsible for the draft
Model Code's failure to make it to final form.262  In any event,
with one notable exception (and the significance of that exception is
258 BAKER, supra note 189, at 159; see also GRAI-AM, supra note 41, at 175 (noting
that "[I]f the ALl were to approve its plan before the Supreme Court made its confes-
sions decision, the slim Warren majority could find itself declaring a new constitutional
right that the nation's legal establishment had only recently rejected").
259 Miranda was argued from February 28 to March 2, 1966, and the ALI's draft
Model Code was published on March 1. BAKER, supra note 189, at 159. Chief Justice
Warren attended the ALI's annual conference in May 1966, where the proposed code
was debated. Id. at 160.
260 MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 4.01, 4.09 (Tentative Draft
No. 1, 1966).
261 Id. §§ 4.04, 5.08.
262 See BAKER, supra note 189, at 160-61 (noting that the Model Code was not
brought to a vote in part because of disagreement as to its provisions); see also Editorial,
Limits on Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1966, at 26 (criticizing the ALI's draft Model
Code for making the safeguards a defendant enjoys "a matter of purse"); Sidney E.
Zion, Model Crime Code Scored by A. C.L.U., N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1966, at I (reporting that
the ALI's proposed Model Code had already been "hotly condemned by a number of
leading legal experts" including Chief Judge David L. Bazelon of the D.C. Court of
Appeals, who criticized its failure to provide an attorney for indigent defendants as dis-
criminating against the poor). Admittedly, the main reason no vote was taken at the
ALl conference in May was the fact that Miranda was pending, and some ALI members
considered it a matter of professional courtesy to await the Court's ruling before taking
further action. BAKER, supra note 189, at 160-61.
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN HERO OR ZERO?
263
debatable), the ALI's proposed prearraignment procedures af-
forded the same, and in some aspects more, protection to suspects dur-
ing custodial interrogation than Miranda-not bad for a project
thought to represent the views of conservatives and the police.
Elsewhere, too, were significant indications that the Supreme
Court's holding in Miranda was well within the parameters of publicly
acceptable responses to the problem of coercive interrogation. By
the time Miranda was decided, the FBI had been issuing the exact
same warnings for years; indeed, its practice in that regard was de-
scribed by one justice as "'a tremendously important factor, perhaps
the critical factor in the Miranda vote.' 264 Yet the FBI was not the only
law enforcement body to issue warnings before Miranda. Across the
country, police departments in a number of metropolitan areas-in-
cluding Denver, Detroit, Minneapolis, and Philadelphia-had also
begun warning suspects of their rights well before the Supreme Court
265forced them to do So, in part because state courts had themselves
become increasingly interested in warnings when determining the
voluntariness of a confession. 266 News articles written while Miranda
263 See infra notes 317-19 and accompanying text (arguing that the Supreme Court
in Miranda never envisioned the police actually providing indigent defendants with
counsel).
264 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 458 (quoting an unnamed Justice). The Court's
Miranda opinion relied heavily on this fact. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483-86
(1966) (using the FBI's "present pattern of warnings and respect for the rights of the
individual" as support for requiring "state and local agencies" to adopt similar proce-
dures).
265 See Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 65 (describing
the use of warnings by police in Denver, Miami Beach, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Seat-
tle); Fred P. Graham, General Reaction is Mild-Crime Unit Aide Sees No Major Changes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1966, at 1 (noting that police in Oklahoma City, Minneapolis, Al-
buquerque, Denver, and Sacramento said their practices already followed the new
guidelines); see also Zion, supra note 251, at 70 (reporting that at least two Eastern
prosecutors had voluntarily ordered police to warn suspects of their rights prior to in-
terrogation).
266 As Professor LaFave noted in 1962:
If any trend at all is to be discerned in the state confession cases, it would be
increased concern over lack of warning and denial of counsel.... [M]ore and
more courts have indicated by dicta a possible willingness to strike down any
statement received when a suspect was not warned or when he was not allowed
to contact counsel.
Wayne R. LaFave, Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices,
1962 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 388 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court's confession
cases under the voluntariness standard had likewise come to consider warnings as an
important factor in determining whether a defendant's confession was admissible. See,
e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 517 (1963) (recognizing warnings as an ap-
propriate circumstance to be considered in voluntariness inquiry). Likewise, Escobedo's
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was pending likewise supported the Court's forthcoming ruling, por-
traying warnings as an almost muted response to the enormous prob-
267lem that abusive police interrogation had become. Indeed, by early
1966, the idea of warning suspects of their rights before custodial in-
terrogation had become so publicly acceptable that in New York, a bill
requiring preinterrogation warnings passed in the legislative assembly
by a vote of 100 to 31268-with the strong endorsement of the Brooklyn
and Manhattan district attorneys.269 Given these historical facts, it is
difficult to conclude that Miranda was anything other than a reflection
of what criminal justice reformers were championing at the time.
Just the same, the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda makes all
the more sense when considered in light of the prevailing social and
political movements of its time. By 1966, when Miranda was decided,
the nation had committed itself to a war on poverty.27° Even the gov-
ernment's brief in Miranda candidly conceded that it was virtually im-
possible to pick up a paper or listen to a public address without being
271reminded of the country's concern for its downtrodden and poor.
narrowly tailored holding relied, in part, on the fact that the police had not warned
the defendant of his right to silence. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491-92
(1964) (noting lack of warnings among facts relevant to narrow holding).
267 See, e.g., Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 58 (noting
that the presence of lawyers would bolster public faith in police interrogation but pre-
dicting that the Supreme Court "may simply require police to warn prime suspects of
their rights" instead); Graham, supra note 221, at E6 (concluding that the only way to
solve the problem of coerced confessions is to prohibit interrogation outside of an at-
torney's presence, but predicting that the Supreme Court instead will take "another
measured step" toward that rule by requiring warnings first and then waiting a while
before proceeding).
268 Sydney H. Schanberg, Assembly Backs Suspects' Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1966,
at 35 (reporting passage of bill and its contents).
269 See Sidney E. Zion, Access to Lauyer Is Urged By Koota, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1965,
at 39 (reporting position of Brooklyn district attorney that confessions should not be
admissible absent evidence that suspects understood they could have a lawyer, includ-
ing a court-appointed one); Zion, supra note 252, at 37 (noting that both the Manhat-
tan District Attorney and the Democratic candidate for Mayor of New York recom-
mended that police warn suspects of their rights to silence and counsel before
interrogation).
270 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing President Johnson's dec-
laration of the war on poverty in 1964).
271 The brief stated:
[P]oor, motherless, unloved, downtrodden, culturally deprived, misguided,
unguided, harassed, ad infinitum. It is practically impossible to pick up a na-
tional magazine, professional journal, or listen to an address without some
dramatic usage of these descriptive adjectives to characterize some greater or
lesser portion of the American population.
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN HERO OR ZERO?
That being the case, we should hardly be surprised to see the Court in
Miranda take steps to protect indigent suspects subject to custodial in-
terrogation; those steps mirrored perfectly the economic egalitarian-
isin of the mid-1960s that marked the national mood. After all, the
rich had Escobedo. It was the poor who needed Miranda, just as they
272had needed Gideon three years before. And no matter what people
thought about greater protections for accused criminals generally, no
one in 1966 was willing to argue that rich criminal defendants de-
273served more protection than their poor counterparts.
Naturally, the civil rights movement also played a role in Miranda's
outcome, though perhaps not in the way casual observers might sup-
pose. By 1966, the nation had already been convinced of the need for
racial equality; that much was clear from the 1964 Civil Rights Act74
and 1965 Voting Rights Act. 27" One would think this national consen-
sus on racial equality would have made the Supreme Court even more
solicitous of minority rights in the criminal procedure context than it
had been in years past, and, in part, that was true. According to an
early draft of the Miranda opinion, the majority initially saw the case
as an opportunity to protect black defendants, rather than poor
ones.276 Yet the civil rights movement did something else that affected
the Supreme Court's attitude toward police interrogation as well-
Brief for Respondent at 10, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), re-
printed in 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 674, 683.
272 See, e.g., The Revolution in Criminal Justice, supra note 241, at 22 (contending that
interrogation is not a problem "for the big-Lime crook with an attorney," just the sus-
pect without a lawyer-and that 60% of criminal suspects cannot afford one).
273 See, e.g., Sidney E. Zion, Koota Says New Court Rulings Have 'Shackled' Police Offi-
cials: A Detective's View, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1966, at 1 (quoting New York City com-
mander of detectives as saying, "[I]n some ways I favor the decision [in Miranda], be-
cause at least it gives the poor, unfortunate suspect, the guy you have to protect, the
same rights as the hardened criminal, who has the money for a lawyer and would never
talk anyway").
274 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (establishing uniform standards for the right to
vote).
275Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (2000)) (removing the right of states
to irmpose voting qualification restrictions).
6 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 459 (discussing and quoting an early Miranda draft
that couched the problem of coercive interrogation in terms of brutality against black
defendants). It was Justice Brennan who suggested that the Court's Miranda opinion
shift its focus. See id. (notingJustice Brennan's position that poverty, rather than race,
better characterized the victims of police brutality).
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it created a "crisis of confidence" in the country's law enforcement es-
tablishment.
2 17
Most likely, the seeds of that crisis were planted in May of 1963,
when the entire nation watched Birmingham's Commissioner of Pub-
lic Safety, Bull Connor, unleash his police department on over one
thousand schoolchildren who were peacefully protesting the city's
segregationist practices. Now-legendary pictures of white policemen
using dogs, clubs, and firehoses to brutally suppress black children
shocked the nation's conscience and, for the first time, forced it to
confront the fact that police power was being used for illegitimate
278
purposes. In 1964, national attention again focused on lawless po-
lice practices when an FBI investigation dubbed "Mississippi Burning"
resulted in federal conspiracy charges against a local Mississippi sher-
iff and his deputies for the murder of three civil rights workers. 279 And
if that was not enough, March 1965 witnessed "Bloody Sunday" in
Selma, Alabama. Selma was the starting point of a fifty-four-mile pro-
test march for voting rights that would have ended in the state capital
277 Zion, supra note 252, at 37 (quoting Representative William F. Ryan, Demo-
cratic candidate for Mayor of New York City).
278 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 87 ("Connor... set upon the marchers with
dogs, clubs, and firehoses, making martyrs of his victims and assuring their triumph.");
PowE, supra note 12, at 224-25 (discussing Birmingham's importance to the civil fights
movement); WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at 190-92 (same). By all accounts, Birmingham
created an immediate mass constituency for the civil rights movement and meaningful
civil rights legislation. See Klarman, supra note 130, at 130-49 (linking Birmingham
and other violent civil rights confrontations of the early- to mid-1960s with the civil
rights legislation that followed); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE
WARREN COURT 94 (1965) (noting that Birmingham was not the first time police had
used power to suppress blacks, but it was "one of those events which seem[ed] to turn
the course of history").
279 See, e.g., James Atwater, If We Can Crack Mississippi, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
July 25, 1964, at 15, 15-16 (describing the search for three murdered civil rights work-
ers); M.S. Handler, Author Describes Slaying of 3 Rights Workers in Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 26, 1964, at 20 (describing Louis Lomax's account of the murders of the civil
rights workers); John Herbers, 5 Mississippians Arrested by F.B.L on Rights Charge, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1964, at I (reporting the arrest of Mississippi law enforcement officers
on federal civil rights charges for the death of the civil rights workers); David Nevin, A
Strange, Tight Little Town, Loath to Admit Complicity, LIFE, Dec. 18, 1964, at 38, 38 (dis-
cussing the return to work of accused murderers Sheriff Lawrence Rainey and Deputy
Cecil Price after dismissal of their federal indictments); Richard Woodley, A Recollection
of Michael Schwerner, REPORTER, July 16, 1964, at 23, 23-24 (documenting the events
preceding the disappearance and death of the three civil rights workers). A number
of books on the event soon followed, see, e.g., WILLIAM BRADFORD HUIE, THREE
LIVES FOR MISSISSIPPI (1965); WILLIAM MCCORD, MISSISSIPPI: THE LONG HOT SUMMER
(1965);JACK MENDELSOHN, THE MARTYRS (1966), and eventually the incident became
the subject of a major motion picture, MISSISSIPPI BURNING (Orion Pictures 1988).
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of Montgomery.8 ° Just outside of town, however, state troopers de-
scended upon the marchers with tear gas and billy clubs, while a
mounted posse of officers led by local Sheriff Jim Clark assaulted
them with bullwhips and rubber hoses covered with barbed wire. 28 ' All
three major television networks broadcasted the carnage, appalling
the nation and creating a massive constituency for voting rights legis-
lation almost overnight.28 2 Understandably, then, when Americans of
the mid-1960s pictured racism and minority oppression, the face they
saw was that of a white policeman.
Fair or not, the brutality and lawlessness exhibited by Southern
police in response to the civil rights movement had a devastating ef-
fect on the public's perception of law enforcement as a whole. As
early as 1964, Northern police complained about their "distorted and
smeared" public image, portraying themselves as victims of misdi-
rected frustration with a few Southern racist regimes. 84 By early 1966,
a police spokesman was quoted in the New York Times as saying:
"Never before in the 150-year history of law enforcement has the police
'stock' been at a lower point. Never before have the police been under
such constant-and largely undeserved-criticism. Never before have
public expressions of confidence in police been so meager.
285
280 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 182 (describing the planned protest march
from Selma to Montgomery); PowE, supra note 12, at 258 (same).
281 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 183 (detailing the events of "Bloody Sunday"
in Selma, Alabama); POWE, supra note 12, at 258 (same); WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at
269, 273 (same).
282 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 183 ("Bloody Sunday, filmed for the evening
news, appalled the North and created an instant constituency for a new voting law.");
POWE, supra note 12, at 258-59 (noting that President's Johnson's biographer, Robert
Dallek, stated that "'the national reaction to what the press called 'Bloody Sunday' was
everything advocates of a voting rights law could have wished. Television provided
graphic descriptions of the police actions, and newspapers all over the country fea-
tured the story on their front pages."' (quoting ROBERT DALLEK, FLAWED GIANT 198-99
(1998))); WILLIAMS, supra note 131, at 273 (quoting Selma Mayor Joe Smitherman as
stating that "'it looked like war .... [a]nd the people, the wrath of the nation came
down on us"'). For an excellent exposition of Selma and its political ramifications, see
DAVIDJ. GARROW, PROTEST AT SELMA (1978).283 See WALKER, supra note 108, at 222 (discussing Birmingham and noting that
"[t] he police became the symbol of an unjust society").
284 Emanuel Permutter, Murphy Assails Critics of Police, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1964, at
48; see also Margaret Mead, Letter to the Editor, Urban Violence Discussed, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 1964, at 32 (noting the perception of police "as the natural enemies of law-
abiding citizens and lawbreakers alike").285
Support for Police Seen at Low Point, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1966, at 38; see also Her-
bert Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 238,
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The problem, the spokesman went on to explain, was that police were
"'automatically equated with the 'red-necked sheriff, 2 86 and he was
right. What most people knew about police came from the likes of
Bull Connor and Jim Clark-and that was a public relations night-
287mare.
By 1966, when the Supreme Court decided Miranda, the public's
distrust of law enforcement was manifest. Much to the law enforce-
ment community's chagrin, major metropolitan areas throughout the
country had established civilian review boards to hear complaints of
police brutality, 2ss and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights had rec-
ommended to Congress and the President that local governments be• 289
made liable to victims of police misconduct. The Supreme Court
was not oblivious to these developments. Indeed, its own docket
made ignoring police brutality virtually impossible. In November
1965, just two weeks before it granted certiorari in Miranda, the Court
heard oral arguments in the Mississippi Burning case. In March 1966,
the same month Miranda was argued, the Court unanimously reversed
the lower court's dismissal of charges against law enforcement co-
conspirators in that case.29° With police brutality and lawlessness on
everyone's mind-including the Justices'-it is hardly surprising that
the Court acted to curb coercive police interrogation when it did.
Distrust of law enforcement had prompted the press to attack police
241 (1966) ("It is widely recognized that community relations is a major problem fac-
ing the police today.").
286 Support for Police Seen at Low Point, supra note 285, at 38.
287 See Trigger of Hate, TIME, Aug. 20, 1965, at 13, 13 (reporting a judge's comment
that "[w]hat [people] know about sheriffs and police is Bull Connor and Jim
Clark .... The people distrust the police and the police distrust the people").
288 See Thomas R. Brooks, Necessary Force---or Police Brutality ?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 60, 68 (noting the use of civilian review boards in thirty-seven
police departments across the nation to hear charges of police misbehavior); Police
Chiefs'Head Urging Resistance to Review Boards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1964, at 27 (report-
ing speech by the President of the International Association of Chiefs of Police urging
precincts to resist demands for civilian review boards and noting the existence of such
boards in New York City, Philadelphia, and Rochester); see also Police-Review Units De-
plored by Hoover, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1964, at 42 (reporting FBI DirectorJ. Edgar Hoo-
ver's criticism of civilian review boards then being championed in some localities).
289 See John Herbers, Rights Board Asks Quick U.S. Arrests in Race Offenses, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1965, at 1 (discussing the U.S. Civil Rights Commission's recommenda-
tions).
29 See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 242
to include murderous conduct by civilians acting in conformity with the sheriff, deputy
sheriff, and patrolmen involved in that case). Price was argued on November 9, 1965.
Id. Certiorari was granted in Miranda on November 22, 1965. Miranda v. Arizona, 382
U.S. 925 (1965).
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interrogation for a good year before Miranda was decided.29' It is hard
to imagine that the Court would not eventually make the connection
too.
Granted, there was another aspect of Miranda's historical context
that seemingly cut against the Court's holding, and that was the na-
tion's growing concern over crime. In 1966, the crime rate rose 10%
over the previous year, a figure ten times higher than the country's
1% rate of population growth.292 That year, President Johnson even
issued a special message to Congress on the subject, accompanied by
legislative proposals and appropriations requests. To be sure, crime
was becoming a major domestic issue when Miranda was decided, but
it was not as salient as one might think. Gallup Poll results revealed
that no one was listing crime among the country's most important
problems in 1966; that year, the public was fixated on Vietnam, civil
294rights, and inflation instead. Perhaps the best explanation for the
public's failure to focus on crime is the fact that in 1966, a 10% rise in
291 See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 288, at 60 (relaying the account of a young man
who died as the result of excessive force by a police officer and the lack of action sub-
sequently taken against the officer); Graham, supra note 221, at E6 (noting the argu-
ments for and against an automatic bar to confessions from police interrogation);
Zion, supra note 269, at 39 (reporting the Brooklyn District Attorney's position that all
people should have access to a lawyer "'at the moment [they come] into contact with
the law"' to guard against improperly solicited confessions); Zion, supra note 239, at 33
(discussing the merits of extending Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections to custo-
dial interrogation); Zion, supra note 251, at 1 (reporting the view of a state trial court
judge that confessions are not the "backbone" of criminal justice, as some in law en-
forcement claim); Zion, supra note 252, at 37 (reporting on suggestions made to
change police interrogation methods); Zion, supra note 240, at 30 (discussing the case
of a false confession to a rape and two homicides); Limits on Confessions, supra note 262,
at 26 (discussing the need for procedural safeguards on obtaining confessions); The
Revolution in Criminal Justice, supra note 241, at 22 (describing the impact of heavy-
handed police interrogation practices and their disproportionate effect on indigent
defendants).
292 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1966, at 4 (1967) (reporting that population rose
1.1%, while the crime rate from 1965 to 1966 rose 10%).
293 See POWE, supra note 12, at 399 (describing crime as an important domestic is-
sue in 1966 and noting President Johnson's special message to Congress on the sub-
ject).
294 On May 27, 1966, Gallup asked the public what it considered to be "the most
important problem facing the country today." 3 GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP
POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1971, at 2009 (1972). The top three answers to that ques-
tion were Vietnam (45%), the high cost of living (16%), and civil rights (9%). Of the
seven remaining answers, crime was not separately listed. Id. On September 11, 1966,
and October 19, 1966, Gallup asked the same question, with similar results. See id. at
2026, 2034 (reporting that the Vietnam conflict, civil rights, and inflation were the
three most important problems mentioned by survey respondents).
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the crime rate was nothing new. For the previous five years, the crime
rate had risen from 5% to 11% per year, and 1966 was no different in
295that regard . This is not to deny that the crime problem was starting
to grab the nation's attention when Miranda was decided. It was, but
it was not the concern that civil rights and police brutality were, nor
was it the concern it would become in 1967 and 1968, when crime
rates did soar and the nation took note of 
it. 296
Even so, the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda was almost un-
canny in the way it dovetailed with the nation's emerging crime-
control concerns. As already noted, Miranda's holding was a step back
from the direction Escobedo had pointed in 1964,97 a move that makes
sense with crime starting to garner public attention. What has not yet
been noted is that the Court knew warnings would not hinder police
investigative activities one whit. While Miranda was pending, precincts
across the country reported that warnings had no effect whatsoever on
the ability of police to obtain confessions, a discovery given ample
press coverage and buttressed by the FBI's experience.29 8 Equally sig-
nificant is the fact that the Supreme Court refused to apply Miranda
retroactively, an "unprecedented limitation" in its criminal procedure
jurisprudence that prevented defendants in the exact same position as
295 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATEs-1962, at 3 (1963) (reporting 1962's 5% rise in the
crime rate); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES--1963, at 3 (1964) (reporting 1963's 9% rise in the
crime rate); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1964, at 3 (1965) (reporting 1964's 11% rise in the
crime rate); FED. BUREAu OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES--1965, at 3 (1966) (reporting 1965's 5% rise in the
crime rate).
296 See infra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing 1967's rise in crime rate
compared to 1966); infra note 424 and accompanying text (discussing 1968's rise in
crime rate compared to 1967).
297 See supra text accompanying notes 245-53 (discussing Miranda's holding against
the backdrop of the Escobedo decision).
298 See Criminal Justice: Concern About Confessions, supra note 153, at 65 ("For police,
at least, perhaps the most interesting news is that warnings by no means stop confes-
sions."); Zion, supra note 239, at 3 ("Thus, although the police have contended that a
suspect will refuse to talk if they must tell him he has the right to remain silent and to
have a lawyer, there is important evidence that this is not necessarily so."); Zion, supra
note 251, at 70 (quoting a prosecutor who ordered police in his jurisdiction to warn
suspects as saying, "'I hate to admit it, but on the basis of our early reports, we haven't
lost a single confession except to racket men and hardened criminals who never talk
anyway."'); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 483 (1966) (noting the FBI's use
of warnings without a loss in law enforcement effectiveness).
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Ernesto Miranda from benefiting from the Court's ruling.299 Even the
facts of Miranda and its companion cases reveal the Court's keen
awareness of the debate over confessions then raging in the legal
community. Although the police conduct in Miranda was, as others
have noted, as benign as it had been egregious in prior confession
cases,30 0 it is worth noting that in 1965, there was a substantial question
as to whether confessions were necessary at all 301-and Miranda's facts
played into that perfectly. Indeed, the Supreme Court went out of its
way to note in the Miranda opinion that "the cases before us present
graphic examples of the overstatement of the 'need' for confes-
sions. 102 In a number of ways, then, the Supreme Court's decision in
Miranda showed a remarkable sensitivity to crime control concerns-
29 John P. MacKenzie, The Warren Court and the Press, in THE WARREN COURT: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 112, 120-21 (Richard H. Sayler et al. eds. 1969) (discussing Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966)). Commentators have viewed the Supreme
Court's retroactivity ruling in Johnson as clearly political, evidencing the Court's will-
ingness to retreat when the implications of a ruling were more than the nation could
bear. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 12, at 428 (characterizing the Court's decisions as rec-
ognizing that if Miranda meant emptying jails, "then Miranda, not the prisoners, would
have.., to go"); WASBY, supra note 12, at 189 (interpreting the Court's refusal to apply
Miranda retroactively as signifying that it was "willing to retreat or modify the thrust of
its opinions when its liberalism was more than the public (and particularly important
publics like the law enforcement community) could take"); Anthony Lewis, Earl War-
ren, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 1, 25 (describing the
Court's nonretroactivity ruling as reflecting its "desire to lay down a broad new rule
without worrying the public about emptying the jails").
300 See Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1427 n.50
(1985) (noting that the facts of the Court's earlier confession cases were "as appall-
ing.., as [those in] Miranda were benign"). Indeed, Miranda's attorney conceded at
oral argument that the police conduct at issue met the Court's voluntariness standard.
See Oral Argument, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), reprinted in 63
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 853 ("We have raised no question that he was
compelled to give this statement, in the sense that anyone forced him to do it by coer-
cion, by threats, by promises, or compulsion of that kind.").
301 See, e.g., Steven V. Roberts, Confessions Held Crucial By Hogan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2,
1965, at I (reporting the Manhattan district attorney's claim that confessions were cru-
cial in 27% of his homicide cases, while noting that this figure was "considerably be-
low" the 50% figure usually cited by law enforcement officials); Zion, supra note 251, at
I (reporting a study by New York State Supreme Court Justice Nathan Sobel conclud-
ing that fewer than 10% of indictments involved confessions, rendering law enforce-
ment claims as to the necessity of confessions "carelessly nurtured nonsense"); Sidney
E. Zion, So They Don't Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1966, at B13 (noting that Detroit's
chief of detectives had "produced statistics showing that the need for confessions had
been vastly overestimated"); Zion, supra note 240, at 90 (noting that "district attorneys
have no statistics to back up their claim that most murderers and rapists would walk
out of the police stations, thumb to nose, if confessions were banned").
302 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481.
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so much so that Justice Clark almost made the Court's ruling six to
three, rather than five to four.
3
3
C. A Closer Look at Evidence of Miranda's Countermajoritarian Nature
In light of the above discussion, the evidence commonly cited as
proof of Miranda's countermajoritarian nature is perplexing to say the
least. After all, if the Court's ruling was truly in keeping with contem-
porary notions of acceptable law enforcement reform, how could it
have been so unpopular? In part, the answer is that Miranda was not
as unpopular as we have tended to think. The amicus brief signed by
twenty-six state attorneys general, for example, voiced no opposition
whatsoever to a general warning requirement prior to custodial inter-
rogation.0 4 Instead, the brief opposed extending the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to the custodial interrogation stage (a well-
founded fear given Escobedo two years earlier) and urged the Court to
leave reform in the area of police interrogation to non-constitutional
decision-making bodies like the ALI. 5 Given the ALI's position on
306
custodial interrogation at that time, there is no reason to believe the
attorneys general would have opposed even constitutional adjudica-
tion of the issues in Miranda, had they known where the Court was ac-
tually heading.
Even more intriguing was the law enforcement community's im-
mediate reaction to Miranda. Given the hostile tenor of the Court's
opinion and the additional protections for criminal defendants that
the decision imposed, it was entirely predictable that police would
303 Justice Clark initially voted with the majority in conference, agreeing on the
necessity of the same four warnings ultimately imposed in the case. THE SUPREME
COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 516-17. Ultimately, he wrote a separate dis-
sent in the case because he decided that the Court's decision in Miranda went "too far,
too fast," while the dissenters' position was also unsatisfying. Id. at 518; see also
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 499 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("I am unable to join the majority be-
cause its opinion goes too far on too little, while my dissenting brethren do not go
quite far enough.").
304 Brief of Amici Curiae State of New York et al. at 4-5, Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (No. 759), reprinted in 63 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 788, 791-
92.
305 See id. at 5 (arguing that "[p]rocedural developments in th[e] area [of confes-
sions] should take place in non-constitutional terms" through state courts, legislatures,
professional organizations, and reform organizations such as the American Law Insti-
tute).
306 See supra note 260 and accompanying text (discussing warnings requirement in
ALI's draft Model Code).
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complain bitterly about Miranda-and many did.Y What is surprising
is just how muted their response generally was. As reported on the
front page of the New York Times, the law enforcement community's
initial reaction to Miranda was "mild;" in fact, police spokesmen across
the country stated they could "learn to live with" the new warnings re-
quirement.30 8  Perhaps the surprisingly muted response from these
spokesmen was due to the fact that they, like the attorneys general,
had anticipated a much stronger ruling from the Court. Just as likely,
however, was the fact that, as the New York Times pointed out, many
precincts had already employed warnings and thus knew suspects
309would frequently waive their rights. Indeed, James Vorenberg, then-
executive director of the National Crime Commission, told the press
that Miranda would have little, if any, negative effect on law enforce-
ment because it merely moved the voluntariness inquiry from the con-
fession to the waiver context and "the police have done pretty well
with these swearing contests over the years."310 In short, many in law
enforcement breathed a sigh of relief when Miranda was decided,
though their opinion one way or the other was hardly an indication of
what the public at large thought of the decision.
The public opinion poll data on Miranda, which at least purported
to measure the average citizen's views of the decision, is a different
matter altogether. Concededly, the 1966 Harris and Gallup polls ap-
pear to provide powerful evidence of Miranda's countermajoritarian
nature, though upon closer inspection, there is reason to question
whether either should be given much weight. In November 1966,
four months after Miranda was decided, a nationwide Harris poll
307 See, e.g., Crime and the Law: The Court on Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1966,
D1, at 1 (quoting a police chief as saying, "[w]e might as well close up shop"); Rewriting
the Rules, NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1966, at 21, 22 (noting executive director of the Interna-
tional Association of Chiefs of Police's statement that "I guess now we'll have to supply
all squad cars with attorneys"); Zion, supra note 273, at Al (reporting Brooklyn district
attorney's comment that Miranda had "effectively shackled" law enforcement, while
noting his remarkably different position on the issue the previous fall); Zion, supra
note 301, at E13 (commenting that Miranda caused most law enforcement officials to
sing the "[w]e've got the handcuffed, hamstrung, might-as-well-close-up-shop blues").
308 Graham, supra note 265, at I ("The nation's police can learn to live with the
new confessions limitations set by the Supreme Court, a check of law enforcement offi-
cials indicated today. Reaction across the nation to yesterday's decision was regarded
in legal circles here as mild."); see also Crime and the Law, supra note 307, at Al (noting
that the law enforcement response to Miranda was "more muted than usual" and that
some in law enforcement were saying that the Supreme Court's ruling had little mean-
ing because they had been warning suspects prior to custodial interrogation all along).
309 Crime and the Law, supra note 307, at 1; Graham, supra note 265, at 1.
310 Graham, supra note 265, at 28.
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asked: "Another decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was to... rule
that the police could not question a criminal unless he had a lawyer
with him. Do you personally think that decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court was right or wrong?",3 1 Answering that question, 35% of those
surveyed said they believed the decision was right, while 65% believed
it was wrongS12 -a result others have cited as proof of the public's
313
overwhelming disapproval of Miranda's holding. Thus far over-
looked, however, is the fact that the Harris Poll's question inaccurately
represented what the Court in Miranda actually held. Setting aside its
reference to interrogation suspects as "criminals," the question incor-
rectly portrayed Miranda's ruling as requiring counsel during custodial
interrogation, a move that not even the Court in Escobedo had con-
templated.3 4 That being the case, the most revealing aspect of the
Harris Poll's question on Miranda may be that even after misrepre-
senting the Court's ruling as more aggressively protective than it was,
35% of those surveyed still agreed with it-an impressive figure, but
not as evidence of Miranda's dearth of public support.
Although the 1966 Gallup Poll's question on Miranda was at least
technically correct (or close), its results are likewise questionable as
evidence of Miranda's countermajoritarian nature. In July 1966,just a
month after the Supreme Court decided Miranda, Gallup asked the
following in a nationwide survey:
The Supreme Court has ruled that as soon as the police arrest a suspect,
he must be warned of his right to remain silent and to have a lawyer.
Only if he voluntarily waives these rights may the police question him.
If he wants a lawyer, but cannot afford one, the State must pay the fee.
The lawyer has a right to be present during the questioning and advise
the suspect to say nothing. The following question was asked of those
who said they followed the issue (about four persons in ten in the
311 Louis Harris and Associates, Harris Survey, Nov. 14, 1966, Question ID
USHARRIS.111466 R2E. The ellipsis is in the original text, reflecting the survey's in-
corporation of several different Supreme Court rulings into one question. Id.
312 Id.
313 See, e.g., CRAY, supra note 59, at 480 (discussing the Harris Poll results); G.
THEODORE MITAU, DECADE OF DECISION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL REVOLUTION 1954-1964, at 7 (1967) (same).
314 At most, Escobedo contemplated extending Gideon's right to an attorney to the
custodial interrogation setting. See supra text accompanying note 233 (discussing the
broad implications of the Escobedo holding). Yet not even Gideon required defendants to
have an attorney; it just entitled them to one upon request. See Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 340, 342-45 (1963) (explaining that "in federal courts counsel must be
provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently and
intelligently waived," and extending that requirement to state criminal cases under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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sample): Do you think the Supreme Court's ruling on confession was
good or bad?
In response, 30% of those surveyed said they had no opinion on the
Court's ruling, 24% said they thought the ruling was good, and 46%
said they thought the ruling was bad.3 16 By comparison, Gallup's re-
sults were weaker than those reported by Harris-only 40% of those
surveyed actually followed the issue, and of those who did, 54% either
had no opinion or actually approved of the Miranda decision. Yet
Gallup's phraseology was misleading too. Although the question cor-
rectly noted that states would have to pay for attorneys provided to in-
digent suspects during custodial interrogation and that those attor-
neys could advise their clients to say nothing, not even the Miranda
majority had envisioned its ruling working out that way in practice. As
the Miranda opinion made clear, police were not constitutionally re-
quired to provide indigent suspects with lawyers upon request so long
317as they stopped questioning them. Because lawyers would presuma-
bly tell their clients to say nothing,3 s18 halting the interrogation process
was the only course of action that made sense when suspects invoked
their right to counsel-and the FBI's experience showed that is ex-
actly what interrogators did.' 9 Thus, although Gallup's portrayal of
Miranda may not have been inaccurate, neither was it realistic or even
neutral in presenting the decision for public approval.
That said, there was another public opinion poll on Miranda in
the summer of 1966 that has yet to receive scholarly recognition, but
should. Just after Miranda was decided, the National Opinion Re-
search Center (NORC) told participants in its nationwide survey:
"The Supreme Court has recently ruled that in criminal cases the
police may not question a suspect without his lawyer being present,
315 3 GALLUP, supra note 294, at 2021.
316 Id.
317 The Court stated:
This does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must
have a 'station house lawyer' present at all times to advise prisoners.... If
authorities conclude that they will not provide counsel during a reasonable
period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may re-
frain from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment privilege
so long as they do not question him during that time.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
3,8 See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain
terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.").
319 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485-86 (noting the FBI's practice of halting interroga-
tion upon a defendant's request for the advice of counsel).
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unless the suspect agrees to be questioned without a lawyer. Are you
in favor of this Supreme Court decision or opposed to it?"3 20 For those
still firmly convinced that Miranda was countermajoritarian, the re-
sults may be surprising: 65% of those surveyed said they were in favor
of the Court's ruling, while 35% opposed it.32 ' Granted, even the
NORC's question failed to provide a fully accurate depiction of the
Court's ruling in Miranda; like the Harris Poll, it focused exclusively
on the right-to-counsel aspect of the decision, ignoring the warnings
component altogether. Yet what the question did say, it said in an ac-
curate and neutrally phrased manner, which is more than the Harris
Poll and Gallup Poll questions were able to accomplish. In my mind,
the NORC Poll provides powerful evidence that the Supreme Court's
decision in Miranda was more majoritarian than not. The point, how-
ever, is a smaller one. Taken as a whole, the public opinion poll data
on Miranda falls substantially short of proving that the decision was
countermajoritarian, at least at the time it was rendered.
Nothing stated so far is meant to suggest that Miranda remained a
publicly acceptable decision for long. By 1968, Miranda was undenia-
bly unpopular, though the results of the presidential election that year
322are less probative of that fact than others have made them out to be.
Granted, in 1968, Richard Nixon ran for president-and won--on a
"law and order" campaign that specifically targeted the Supreme
Court's criminal procedure decisions as the cause of the nation's
323crime control problems. In 1968, however, "law and order" meant
320 NAT'L OPINION RESEARCH CTR., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 65 (1966).
321 Id.
322 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 199, at 198 (crediting the election of Richard Nixon,
an outspoken critic of Miranda, as evidence of the decision's unpopularity); AL-
EXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 93 (1970)
(characterizing the 1968 election as "something of a vote of repudiation" of the War-
ren Court's criminal procedure decisions); Garcia, supra note 203, at 478 (connecting
Miranda with Nixon's successful exploitation of fear of crime in the 1968 presidential
election); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The now and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in
the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 209 (1980) (attributing much of Nixon's
support in the 1968 presidential campaign to his criticism of the Supreme Court's
criminal procedure decisions).
323 In May 1968, Nixon wrote a position paper on crime in which he blamed most
of the country's woes on the Supreme Court. In that paper, he stated that the Court's
decisions in Miranda and Escobedo "had the effect of seriously hamstringing the peace
forces in our society and strengthening the criminal forces," concluding that "the
cumulative impact of these decisions has been to set free patently guilty individuals on
the basis of legal technicalities." BAKER, supra note 199, at 211 (quoting and discussing
portions of Nixon's position paper). Nixon's position paper reiterated comments
he had made in a November 1967 Reader's Digest article in which he blamed recent
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different things to different people. To some, "law and order" repre-
sented a backlash against skyrocketing crime rates; to others, it was a
backlash against blacks rioting in the streets; and to others still, it was__ • 324
a backlash against blacks period. Even so, the 1968 election results
had as much to do with Vietnam as they did "law and order," and
Nixon barely won . In fact, his margin of victory was just 0.6% of the
popular vote, one of the lowest ever recorded in a presidential race.326
Given those considerations, treating the 1968 presidential election as
a referendum on Miranda is problematic to say the least.
The same cannot be said for the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968,327 which purported to legislatively overrule
Supreme Court decisions for "weakening the peace forces as against the criminal
forces." Richard M. Nixon, What Has Happened to America?, READER'S DIG., Oct. 1967,
at 49, 50; see also CRAY, supra note 59, at 497 (discussing portions of the Reader's Digest
article). This phrase would become the backbone of Nixon's standard stump speech
in the 1968 campaign. See MATuSOW, supra note 133, at 401 (noting Nixon's compari-
son of "peace forces" and "criminal forces"); POWE, supra note 12, at 410 (same); see
also Hall, supra note 127, at 293 (noting Nixon's promise during the 1968 campaign to
appoint only "strict constructionists" to the Supreme Court, justices who would not
coddle criminals); Nixon Links Court to Rise in Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1968, at A18
(reporting Nixon's accusation that the Supreme Court has "giv[en] the 'green light' to
'the criminal elements' in this country").
324 See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 401 ("A phrase splendid in its imprecision, law
and order might intend as its targets students, blacks, criminals, or maybe all three.
Let the hearer take his pick."); Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpre-
tation, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 19 (Mark
Tushnet ed., 1993) ("As [Nixon] understood, the issue of 'crime in the streets' was a
convenient vehicle for mobilizing white urban fears of African Americans; and by
packaging the issue... [as] attacks on the Warren Court's criminal procedure deci-
sions, Republicans could capitalize on those fears without openly appealing to ra-
cism."); see also Russell Baker, Observer: Crime in the Whats, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 28, 1968, at
E12 ("'[C]rime in the streets' is a white man's code phrase meaning 'niggers."');
Homer Bigart, Agnew Deplores Demonstrations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1968, at 16 (noting a
caution from Nixon's supporters that "the phrase 'law and order' had taken on a con-
notation of racial repression"); Murray Schumach, Crime Statistics: A Numbers Game,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1968, at I (reporting the view that "'there is a tendency to make
crime in the streets synonymous with racial threats or the need to control the urban
Negro problem"' (quoting Dr. Kenneth B. Clarke)).
See, e.g., MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 397 (describing Vietnam as "the issue
which, more than any other, caused the bitter national mood in 1968").
326 BAKER, supra note 199, at 257; THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE
PRESIDENT: 1968, at 396 (1969). By comparison, the 2000 presidential race had a
popular vote margin of 0.5%-in favor of losing candidate A] Gore. See David Stout,
Gore's Lead in the Popular Vote Now Exceeds 500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at All
(noting that Gore received a plurality of about 500,000 votes nationwide, roughly 0.5%
of the approximately 100 million votes cast).
327 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2000)).
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Miranda and was passed by overwhelming margins in both the House
and Senate. Granted, the Act provides significant proof that
Miranda was unpopular in 1968-but that was 1968. Even in 1967,
when the public's focus was turning away from civil rights and toward
crime,329 the Southern-sponsored anti-Miranda measure had so little
backing that it died without ever reaching the Senate floor.30 By the
time the measure was resurrected and tacked onto the omnibus fund-
ing bill in the spring of 1968, crime and lawlessness had become the
nation's top domestic problem, and no one (least of all politicians in
an election year) was willing to go on record against any measure
promoting "law and order."331 In short, the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act may prove that Miranda was countermajoritarian
in 1968, but it says nothing about Miranda as an example of the
Court's inclination for countermajoritarian decision making. For
that, one must return to 1966 and the historical context in which
Miranda was decided.
In light of the discussion above, one point should be clear:
Miranda was not the aggressively countermajoritarian decision scholars
have thus far portrayed it to be. Granted, the decision was controver-
sial; the nation's emerging crime-control concerns made that much a
given. And granted, the Supreme Court in Miranda did act in a some-
what countermajoritarian fashion by imposing upon the states a
328 See PowE, supra note 12, at 408 (noting that the Act passed in the House by a
vote of 369 to 17 and in the Senate by a vote of 72 to 4). The Act provided that confes-
sions were admissible so long as they were voluntarily given, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 (a) (2000). Nearly thirty years later, the Supreme Court finally found the Act to
be ineffectual in its aim. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000)
(holding that the 1968 Act could not overrule Miranda).
329 See Clark, Confirmed, Plans a New Price Fixing Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1967, at 1
(quoting Attorney General Ramsey Clark as stating that "there may be a little more
public concern and interest in crime today, particularly 'crime in the streets' as we call
it, than there has been in the past"); see also infra notes 333-45 and accompanying text
(discussing rising salience of crime in 1967, particularly in latter half of year).
330 See BAKER, supra note 199, at 206 (discussing the fate of the anti-Miranda meas-
ure in the 1967 congressional term).
331 See id. at 208 ("A number of congressmen were rumored to have voted for [the
1968 Act], although they privately disapproved of it, because they could not afford to
seem soft on crime in an election year ..."); see also Editorial, "Cruel Hoax ": Veto Called
For, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1968, at 38 (arguing that the vote on the omnibus bill was
more about putting politicians on the record in favor of law and order than an en-
dorsement of its substantive measures); Editorial, Flawed Anti-Crime Law, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1968, at 40 ("President Johnson's signature of the [Omnibus Crime Control
Act] is more a surrender to public hysteria over crime in the streets than it is an ex-
pression of conviction that the bill represents a sound contribution to the defense of
law and order.").
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requirement that few had espoused on their own. Even here, how-
ever, one can see the limitations in the Court's willingness to evoke
countermajoritarian change. Though few states supported Miranda's
mandate, elite legal opinion did-and popular opinion may have as
well. Thus, to the extent Miranda presents an example of the Court
acting in even a limited countermajoritarian fashion, it is the excep-
tion that proves the rule. Like the other decisions discussed in this
Article, Miranda first and foremost exemplifies the Court's tendency
to reflect the prevailing policy positions and socioeconomic currents
of its time. That said, times change, and so did the tenor of the War-
ren Court's later landmark criminal procedure decisions.
III. THE LATER YEARS
To fully appreciate the Warren Court's later landmark criminal
procedure decisions, it is important to note at the outset two points
about the setting in which those decisions were made. First, the com-
position of the Warren Court reached its liberal height in June of
1967, when civil rights activist Thurgood Marshall replaced the more
police-oriented Tom Clark. 32 Though that change still left the War-
ren Court with three conservatives (Justices Harlan, Stewart, and
White), its six liberal members at least positioned the Court for a pre-
dictably liberal outcome in any given criminal procedure case.
Second, the American public in 1967 became increasingly con-
cerned about crime. As early as March of that year, papers noted the
common perception, if not fact, that crime was a serious problem and
growing steadily worse.333 By the fall of 1967, crime had so completely
captured the public's attention that President Johnson's advisors were
urging him to have his picture taken with police officers just to associ-
334ate himself with "law and order," which he did . That fall also saw
332 See UROFSKY, supra note 34, at 73 (discussing justice Marshall's NAACP leader-
ship and noting that "thanks to his own knowledge of how blacks had been treated by
the criminaljustice system, he became one of the strongest advocates of rights for the
accused"); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?), the Burger
Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T, supra note 173, at 62, 67 (noting
Justice Marshall's 1967 replacement of "the more prosecution-oriented [Justice]
Clark").
333 See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, The Law: Hawks vs. Doves on Crime and the Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 1967, at E8 (noting "[t]he belief, if not the fact, that the crime prob-
lem is getting steadily worse" and that "the crime problem is very real, at least in the
minds of many people").
334 MATUsOw, supra note 133, at 215.
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prominent politicians like California Governor Ronald Reagan pre-
dicting that crime would be a major issue in the 1968 presidential
election, 3 3 and for good reason. As it turned out, the crime rate in
1967 rose 15% as compared to 1966-an all-time high for the decade,
at least until 1968.336 With 1967's rise in the crime rate at a level 50%
higher than 1966's 10%,337 it is hardly surprising that major periodicals
like U.S. News & World Report were headlining America's "growing law-
338lessness" by the end of the year. Indeed, by early 1968, crime had
eclipsed civil rights as America's top domestic problem-a first since
public opinion polling began in the 1930s.3 9
Much of the public's focus on crime, at least in the latter half of
1967, almost certainly stemmed from the race riots that occurred that
summer. Although the Watts riot in Los Angeles had shocked every-
one in the summer of 1965, and 1966 had seen a spate of smaller ra-
cial disorders,34 ° nothing the public had previously experienced could
prepare it for the "long hot summer" of 1967. In 1967 alone, there
were 164 racial disturbances, eight of which were bona fide riots seri-
ous enough to require calling in the National Guard."' Much of the
335 See Gladwin Hill, Reagan Says War is Election Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1967, at
25 (reporting California Governor Ronald Reagan's prediction that crime would be
the number one issue in the 1968 election).
336 See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1967, at 4 (1968) (reporting a 15% increase in the
crime rate for 1967); see also infra note 424 and accompanying text (reporting a 16%
rise in the crime rate for 1968).
337 See supra note 292 and accompanying text (discussing the 1966 crime rate).
338 More Protests... Growing Lawlessness-How Far Will it Go, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 18, 1967, at 6.
339 See 3 GALLUP, supra note 294, at 2107 (indicating that crime and lawlessness
were mentioned almost twice as often as any other local problem); Poll Finds Crime Top
Fear at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1968, at 29 (reporting that "[c] rime and lawlessness
are viewed by the public as the top domestic problem facing the nation for the first
time since the beginning of scientific polling in the mid-thirties, according to the latest
Gallup Poll"); see also Baker, supra note 324, at E12 (noting that "[a]t a time when
Americans agree upon so few issues, it is odd that there should be such unity of loath-
ing for crime in the streets.");John Herbers, Crime: Rights Take a Back Seat, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 1968, at E3 (observing "the decisive, almost sudden, shift that has taken place
in two political issues-crime and civil rights" and remarking that "[a]s crime has gone
up as an issue civil rights have gone down, in almost direct proportion"); Schumach,
supra note 324, at 1 (noting that President Johnson's attack on "'rising crime and law-
lessness' was the most strongly cheered point" in his State of the Union address).
See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 12, at 51 (discussing Watts and other urban
riots).
341 See id. (characterizing eight of the 164 disorders in 1967 as "major" on the
grounds that they involved "'multiple fires, intensive looting, and reports of sniping;
violence lasting more than two days; sizeable crowds; and use of National Guard"').
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violence that year occurred in June and July, with July being the far
more turbulent month of the two. In mid-July, rioting in Newark
killed twenty-three people. Ten days later, Detroit set a record for the
worst riot of the century, necessitating the state police, the National
Guard, and, finally, the United States Army to restore order.12 De-
troit's riot lasted six days and covered fourteen square miles of ghetto,
leaving forty-three people dead and causing approximately forty-five
million dollars in property damage.343 With so much death and de-
struction, it was only natural for the public, press, and politicians to
become alarmed that the country was "rapidly approaching a state of
anarchy" in the second half of 1967.3 4 That is not to say that 1967's
urban riots were wholly responsible for the nation's growing concern
over crime, for President Johnson had focused on the problem before
then. 45 One can say, however, that the violence the nation witnessed
in the summer of 1967 almost certainly factored into crime's rising sa-
lience over the course of that year.
If, as I have argued, the Supreme Court is moved by the same so-
cial and political currents that move the rest of society, one would ex-
pect the nation's focus on crime in the late 1960s to have produced
more conservative rulings from the Court on criminal justice issues,
despite its stronger than ever liberal membership. In fact, that is ex-
actly what happened. Although the Warren Court's decisions in the
346late 1960s were particularly liberal in some areas, its rulings on
criminal procedure became remarkably conservative-so much so that
Yale Kamisar has claimed in jest that there was not one Warren Court,
but two. 347  Whether the change in the Warren Court's criminal
342 See WHITE, supra note 326, at 202 (1969) (discussing the Detroit riot).
343 See id. (detailing the destruction wrought by the Detroit riot); MATUSOw, supra
note 133, at 363 (same). By comparison, Watts left thirty-four people dead and caused
property destruction of approximately forty million dollars. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N
ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OFJUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS
IMPACT-AN ASSESSMENT 119 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT ON CRIME].
344 Max Frankel, Johnson Accused by G.O.P. in Rioting, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1967, at 1.
345 See WALKER, supra note 108, at 202-04 (discussing PresidentJohnson's efforts to
combat crime in the mid-1960s); supra text accompanying note 293 (noting President
Johnson's special message to Congress on crime in 1966).
346 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (per curiam) (in-
terpreting the First Amendment in an unprecedented fashion to protect rights of free
speech and press in context of subversive activities); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 638 (1969) (striking down waiting periods for welfare benefits).
37 Kamisar, supra note 332, at 67 ("One might say there were two Warren
Courts .... ); see Kamisar, supra note 59, at 116 ("In its final years, the Warren Court
was not the same Court that had handed down Mapp or Miranda."). I tend to agree
with Professor Kamisar's sentiment, though I believe Miranda was a part of the Court's
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procedure jurisprudence of the late 1960s was that stark is certainly
debatable, but his point is well taken, and no decisions demonstrate it
better than the last two landmarks of the criminal procedure revolu-
tion, Katz v. United States
3 4
' and Teny v. Ohio.
3 49
A. Katz v. United States: A Sign of Concession
When the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States in Decem-
ber 1967, Chief Justice Warren predicted it would be a "'milestone de-
cision,"' 350 and he was right. Today, we think of Katz as the touchstone
of modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence; no discussion of the
criminal procedure revolution would be complete without it. Yet Katz
deserves a place in the present analysis for another reason as well-it,
too, presents a seemingly strong example of the Warren Court playing
the role of countermajoritarian hero. In Katz, the Supreme Court
abandoned its restrictive property-rights approach to the Fourth
Amendment in favor of a more malleable and broader conception of
Fourth Amendment rights based on an individual's "reasonable
expectation of privacy."3 1 Presumably, that required some courage in
late 1967, when crime control was all the public could think about.
After all, when the Court in Katz uttered those famous words,
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, '0 52 it was talk-
ing primarily about guilty people, and guilty people had never been
more unpopular. At the very least, then, Katz's expansion of Fourth
conservative turn. In my mind, Escobedo, rather than Miranda, marks the height of the
Court's liberalism on criminal justice matters. See supra notes 243-53 and accompany-
ing text (describing Miranda as a step back from where the Court appeared to be
heading in Escobedo two years earlier).
348 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
349 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
350 See ScHWARTZ, supra note 62, at 718 (discussing the Katz decision).
351 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. Ironically, the "reasonable expectation of privacy" termi-
nology came from Justice Harlan's concurrence, not from the Court's opinion. See
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,J., concurring) ("My understanding of the rule that has
emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the ex-
pectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'). Within a year
after Katz was decided, the Court recognized the term "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" as fairly characterizing the Fourth Amendment protection it had recognized in
Katz. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ("We have recently held that 'the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places,' and wherever an individual may harbor a
reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' he is entitled to be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion." (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (Harlan,J., concurring))).
352 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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Amendment protections appears to be a bold, liberal move against the
backdrop of 1967's increasingly conservative times.
Surprisingly enough, however, Katz was anything but the bold, lib-
eral decision it appears to be at first blush. All three of the Warren
Court's conservatives joined in the Court's ruling, and one of them,
Justice Stewart, wrote the majority opinion. Indeed, Katz would have
been unanimous if Justice Black had not stubbornly refused to ac-
knowledge that intangible objects like a conversation could receive
Fourth Amendment protection, a stance the Court had rejected years
before35 3 and one that others would later point to as exemplifying Jus-
tice Black's overly rigid interpretive style. 54 Thus, while we might like
to think of Katz as a decision that moved against the prevailing cur-
rents of its time, in fact it was sufficiently mainstream to garner the
support of the Warren Court's liberals and conservatives alike.
In part, understanding Katz's broad-based appeal requires under-
standing the doctrinal background against which it was decided.
Though the Supreme Court in Katz abandoned nearly forty years of
precedent when it overruled Olmstead v. United States, 355 its shift from
property rights to privacy as the basis of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion was not the monumental change one might think. As early as
1886, the Court referred to the Fourth Amendment's purpose as pro-
tecting "the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life, ' ' 6 a
view that became popular several years later when Louis Brandeis co-
authored an influential law review article on the subject.35' By the
353 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 480-84 (1963) (applying a Fourth
Amendment analysis to the search and seizure of an intangible object); see also Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967) (noting that the idea that only tangible objects can
come within the Fourth Amendment's reach "ha[s] been negated by our subsequent
cases").
354 See, e.g., UROFSKY, supra note 34, at 38 (criticizingJustice Black's position on the
Fourth Amendment in Katz as "rigidly literal" and "absurd"); see also POWE, supra note
12, at 404 (explaining that Justice Black's dissent in Katz was a result of the fact that
"[h]e always eschewed the Fourth[ Amendment]'s rich history, owned no books dis-
cussing it, and focused instead on its use of that detested word 'reasonable' in its text."
Roger Newman, Black's sympathetic biographer, noted that "'[Justice Black] became
fixated with [the Fourth Amendment's] wording, not its significance."' Id. (footnote
omitted) (quoting ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLAcK: A BIOGRAPtHY 554 (2d ed.
1997))).
355 277 US. 438 (1928) (basing Fourth Amendment holding on whether physical
intrusion occurred).
356 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
357 See Samuel D. Warren, Jr. & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193 (1890); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.1 (1965) (Black,
J., dissenting) (crediting Brandeis and Warren's article for giving the phrase "right to
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time the Court decided Wolf v. Colorado3 51 in 1949, the notion that pri-
vacy interests lay at the core of the Fourth Amendment was so widely
accepted that even the Court's conservative opinion in that case ac-
knowledged it.3 59 By 1961, the Court's opinion in Mapp v. Ohio?60 was
replete with references to the Fourth Amendment's "right to pri-
vacy,''361 which other prominent decisions in the 1960s likewise recog-
362
nized. In short, Katz was accepted in principle long before it was ac-
tually decided; the Court's property-rights approach had simply been
a way of effectuating the Fourth Amendment's more nebulous privacy
guarantee.
By 1967, however, it was clear that the Court's property rights
approach to the Fourth Amendment had become outdated. In the
late 1950s, technological advances in eavesdropping equipment made
it possible to overhear the most intimate of conversations without
363
actually trespassing onto a person's property, and that led to Fourth
Amendment decisions in the early- to mid-1960s that bordered on the
absurd. Because Olmstead required a physical trespass to implicate
the Fourth Amendment,364 the Court affirmed convictions where
the police obtained evidence by attaching a listening device to the
privacy" currency);John D. Pomfret, On Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1965, § 6 (Maga-
zine) at E7 (noting that the privacy doctrine is grounded in an article by Warren and
Brandeis).
358 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
359 See id. at 27 ("The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the
police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society.").
36 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
361 Id. at 655-57.
3 See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (referring to "the Fourth
Amendment's right of privacy"); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)
(recognizing the basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment as safeguarding the privacy
of individuals against arbitrary invasion by the government); Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (recognizing that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment
is the protection of privacy rather than property"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-85 (1965) (citing Mapp for the proposition that the Fourth Amendment em-
bodies a "right to privacy").
33 See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 466-67 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that the electronic surveillance problem has "grown enormously in recent
years" and citing congressional hearings from the late 1950s in support of that proposi-
tion); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1961) (discussing recent devel-
opments in the technology of eavesdropping equipment not involving physical inva-
sions).
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (requiring "an actual
physical invasion of [a defendant's] house 'or curtilage"' for a Fourth Amendment vio-
lation); see also Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438-39 (noting that the Court's prior Fourth Amend-
ment cases have "insisted only that the electronic device not be planted by an unlawful
physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area.").
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defendant's outer wall, and reversed where the evidence was obtained
by a device that penetrated it.165 In one case, the Court even found a
Fourth Amendment violation where the police had used a "spike
mike" that breached the outer wall of a defendant's home by a frac-
tion of an inch," 6 allowing critics to claim (and rightly so) that the dif-
ference between Fourth Amendment protection and none was a
thumb-tack's length. 67 Of course, such distinctions were absolutely
irrelevant to the real point of the Fourth Amendment, which was and
always had been the protection of privacy.
Clearly, Olmsteads property rights approach no longer made sense
as a means of effectuating the Fourth Amendment's privacy guaran-
tee, and (almost) everyone on the Supreme Court knew it. In the
years before Katz was decided, the Court repeatedly denounced the
use of property rights to define Fourth Amendment protections, even
while its rulings continued to conform to that result.3 68 Indeed, the
Court's repudiation of Olmstead was so complete that at least two
Justices believed the 1928 decision had been overruled sub silentio
365 Compare Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) (finding no
Fourth Amendment violation where police obtained evidence by pressing a "detecta-
phone" against the outside wall of the defendant's room), with Silverman, 365 U.S. at
506-07, 512 (finding a Fourth Amendment violation where a "spike mike" extended
several inches into defendant's side of wall). See also Fred P. Graham, High Court Eases
Curbs on Bugging; Adds Safeguard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1967, at Al (noting the ironic
results in the Court's prior eavesdropping cases due to technological advances).
366 See Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (Clark, J., concurring) (joining the
decision because the "'spiked' mike used by the police officers penetrated petitioner's
premises sufficiently to be an actual trespass thereof'), summarily rev k Clinton v. Com-
monwealth, 130 S.E.2d 437, 442 (Va. 1963) (noting the "very slight" penetration of the
device in the wall, "such as one made by a thumb tack").
367 See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 255 ("[A] thumb-tack's length could separate an
individual from the protection of the Bill of Rights.").
368 For example, in Silverman, the Court said:
Inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of
ancient niceties of tort or real property law.... But decision here does not
turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party wall as a matter of local
law. It is based upon the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area.
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511-12 (citations and footnotes omitted); see also Warden v. Hay-
den, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("The premise that property interests control the right
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited."); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 458-
59 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I think it is demonstrable that Olmstead was erroneously
decided, that its authority has been steadily sapped by subsequent decisions of the
Court, and that it and the cases following it are sports in our jurisprudence which
ought to be eliminated.").
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369
before Katz was even decided. When Katz finally did overrule Ol-
stead, the Court's rationale was both predictable and difficult to dis-
pute: Olmsteadcs authority had been "so eroded" by subsequent deci-S 370
sions that it could no longer be recognized as controlling. It would
appear, then, that Justice Fortas was exactly right when he claimed a
few years later that "Katz [wa] s not responsible for killing Olmstead.",
3 7
By the time Katz was decided, Olmstead was already dead.
Even so, Olmstead's much anticipated demise provides only half of
the reason police-oriented conservatives would have supported Katz in
1967; the rest involves contemporary expectations of how electronic
eavesdropping would fare if subjected to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
Prior to Katz, the prevailing view was that if the Fourth Amendment
applied to electronic eavesdropping, the practice would never pass
constitutional muster because it could never meet the Warrant
Clause's particularity requirement.3 72 That requirement provides that
369 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("I join the opinion of the Court because at long last it overrules sub silentio Olmstead v.
United States and its offspring and brings wiretapping and other electronic eavesdrop-
ping fully within the purview of the Fourth Amendment." (citation omitted)). As
Justice Black asserted in his dissent:
[T] he Court's opinion leaves the definite impression that all eavesdropping is
governed by the Fourth Amendment. Such a step would require overruling of
almost every opinion ... on the subject.... [I]t does not take too much in-
sight to see that the Court is about ready to do, if it has not today done, just
that.
Id. at 82 (Black, J., dissenting).
370 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
371 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 275 (1969) (FortasJ., dissenting) ("In any
event, there is no doubt that Olmstead was thoroughly repudiated by this Court long
before ... Katz was decided. Katz is not responsible for killing Olmstead. Prior cases
had left the physical-trespass requirement of Olmstead virtually lifeless and merely await-
ing the death certificate that Katz gave it."); see also id. at 273 ("Katz did no more than
administer the coup de grace to [Olmsteadfs] moribund doctrine.").
372 Justice Brennan's 1963 dissent in Lopez recognized the point when he argued
that the unarticulated reason for the property rights approach
is the pervasive fear that if electronic surveillance were deemed to be within
the reach of the Fourth Amendment, a useful technique of law enforcement
would be wholly destroyed, because an electronic 'search' could never be rea-
sonable within the meaning of the Amendment. For one thing, electronic
surveillance is almost inherently indiscriminate, so that compliance with the
requirement of particularity in the Fourth Amendment would be difficult ....
Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted); see also GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 253 (noting that "the rules for warrants
were so strict that they seemed to preclude a valid warrant to wiretap" and discussing
the Warrant Clause's particularity requirement); Herman Schwartz, The Legitimation of
Electronic Eavesdropping: The Politics of "Law and Order", 67 MICH. L. REv. 455, 457
(1969) (noting that "[t]he chief argument against the constitutionality of most kinds
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all warrants must "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized,''3" a virtually impossible task
when it comes to electronic eavesdropping because the conversation
to be seized had not yet occurred. At best, police can articulate what
they hope to hear, but the fact of the matter is that electronic eaves-
dropping indiscriminately "seizes" every word spoken, whether or not
it is relevant to the investigation underway.374 Arguably recognizing
the point, the Court's mid-1967 decision in Berger v. United State3 7 in-
validated a New York statute that authorized court-approved wiretap-
ping because its provisions were insufficient to satisfy the Warrant
376Clause's particularity demands. Thus, prior to Katz, there was rea-
son to believe that if the basis of the Court's Fourth Amendment ju-
risprudence shifted from property rights to privacy, electronic eaves-
dropping would become unconstitutional per se.
Even in 1966, before Berger was decided, commentators consider-
ing the Warren Court's concern for protecting individual liberties
predicted that the Justices would eventually declare the so-called "dirty
business" of electronic eavesdropping unconstitutional.377  What is
of eavesdropping is that the resulting search and seizure is unavoidably too sweeping
to comply with the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment" (footnote
omitted)). This is not to say that the particularity requirement was the only problem
with applying the Fourth Amendment to electronic eavesdropping, for the prohibition
against searches for "mere evidence" would have prohibited the practice as well. That
obstacle, however, was removed by the Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden several
months before Katz was decided. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306-07 (1967)
("The requirements of the Fourth Amendment can secure the same protection of pri-
vacy whether the search is for 'mere evidence' or for fruits, instrumentalities or con-
traband.").
373 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
374 See Schwartz, supra note 372, at 457 (noting that electronic surveillance tech-
niques are incapable of separating irrelevant or privileged information from the in-
formation actually sought).
375 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
376 See id. at 56-58 (invalidating the New York statute, but suggesting that a more
carefully drawn provision might pass constitutional scrutiny); see also Graham, supra
note 365, at Al (noting that Berger had created the impression that the Court would
impose "impossible restrictions" on police eavesdropping); Fred P. Graham, A Plug in
the 'Big Ear, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1967, at El0 [hereinafter Graham, 'Big Ear] (noting
that after Berger, many assumed the Court would limit bugging with so many legal
technicalities that "almost any useful eavesdropping would be deemed unconstitu-
tional"). But see Curb on Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES,June 21, 1967, at 46 (noting that the
Court's decision in Berger "stops far short of a total ban on the use of electronic devices
in the war against crime" and "leaves the door open for passage of a more carefully
drawn statute").
377 See, e.g., HAROLDJ. SPAETH, THE WARREN COURT: CASES AND COMMENTARY 299
(1966) ("[G]iven the Warren Court's concern to protect civil liberty, it is not unlikely
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intriguing about Katz, and what made the decision eminently appeal-
ing to the Court's conservatives, was that the Supreme Court did just
the opposite. After reversing Katz's conviction because the police in-
truded upon his reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed tele-
phone booth, the Court added what the press would call "a surprising
postscript: 3 8 if the officers had simply obtained a warrant first, their
actions would have been constitutionally permissible. 9 In one short
paragraph, the Court erased years of unease with the notion of sub-
jecting electronic eavesdropping to Fourth Amendment scrutiny by
reassuring all concerned that the practice could nevertheless survive
it-and that was major news. In fact, the headline of the front page
New York Times article on Katz read "High Court Eases Curbs on Bug-
ging; Adds Safeguard," while the subheadline declared, "Insists Police
Must Obtain Warrant to Act-Doesn't Forbid Eavesdropping."38
Granted, on page thirty, the Times also mentioned that the Court had
"upheld" privacy rights,-' but in 1967, the significance of Katz was
clearly not the same as it is today. In 1967, Katz was a pro-law en-
forcement decision that surprised everyone by giving the Court's
blessing to judicially authorized electronic eavesdropping.
Given the sociopolitical context in which Katz was decided, the
Warren Court's approval of court-ordered electronic eavesdropping
was, at least in retrospect, not so surprising after all. In early 1967, the
that wiretap evidence will eventually be ruled inadmissible."); see also Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes,J., dissenting) (referring to wiretap-
ping as "dirty business").
378 Graham, 'BigEar" supra note 376, at El0.
The Katz opinion stated:
[I]t is clear that this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly
authorized magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation,
specifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly ap-
prised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitutionally have
authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited search and seizure
that the Government asserts in fact took place.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
M0 Graham, supra note 365, at 1. The article's first sentence read "[t]he Supreme
Court made it clear today that the Constitution does not forbid electronic bugging by
law enforcement officers if they first obtain warrants authorizing the eavesdropping."
Id. Of course, the press's interpretation of Katz was completely beyond the Supreme
Court's control, but the Court knew full well (and had for years) that the real question
in moving from a property-rights to a privacy rationale for Fourth Amendment protec-
tion was how that move would affect the constitutionality of electronic eavesdropping.
See supra notes 372-76 and accompanying text (discussing fear that adopting a privacy
approach to the Fourth Amendment would render eavesdropping unconstitutional
per se).
381 Graham, supra note 365, at 30.
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National Crime Commission issued a report addressing the inherent
difficulties associated with investigating and prosecuting organized
crime, noting that electronic eavesdropping was considered "'the sin-
gle most valuable weapon"' police had. s Though the problem of or-
ganized crime had received considerable attention from the federal
government and the press throughout the 1960s,3s 3 the National
Crime Commission's report was particularly important for three rea-
sons. First, it was the government's first attempt to examine the prob-
lem and possible solutions in a comprehensive manner. Second, it
came at a time when the country as a whole was becoming preoccu-
pied with crime. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it came just
as the Court's property rights approach to the Fourth Amendment
had proven itself incapable of dealing with advances in electronic
eavesdropping equipment. Given the National Crime Commission's
1967 findings and the crime-conscious tenor of the times, it is hard to
fathom the Supreme Court rendering a decision that would have ef-
fectively outlawed electronic eavesdropping altogether. 4
382 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201 (1967) [hereinafter NAT'L CRIME
COMM'N REPORT] (quoting the testimony of a New York County District Attorney). In
part, the importance of electronic eavesdropping stemmed from the fact that high-
echelon Mafia leaders participated in crimes only by orally ordering others to commit
them. See id. ("High-ranking organized crime figures are protected by layers of insula-
tion from direct participation in criminal acts ...."). In part, the importance of elec-
tronic eavesdropping had to do with the unique dynamics of investigating organized
crime. Ordinarily, police investigations start with a known crime and work back to an
unknown criminal, but in organized crime investigations the reverse is often true-po-
lice start with a known criminal and work back (or forward) to an unknown crime. See
Schwartz, supra note 372, at 469 (discussing unique challenges of investigating and
prosecuting organized crime).
3 President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to Congress on Crime and Law
Enforcement (Mar. 9, 1966), in I PUB. PAPERS 291, 294 (reprinting President John-
son's claim in his 1966 special message on crime that "[t]he most flagrant manifesta-
tion of crime in America is organized crime"); GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 249 (noting
the Kennedy Administration's "strong prosecutorial interest" in the nationwide activi-
ties of organized crime); POWE, supra note 12, at 402 (discussing Attorney General
Robert Kennedy's "Get Hoffa Squad" in the early 1960s); Charles Grutzner, Mafia Steps
Up Infiltration and Looting of Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1965, at 1 (reporting a Sen-
ate subcommittee's probe into the Mafia's widespread infiltration of American busi-
nesses and industry); Emanuel Perlmutter, Robert Kennedy Cites Rise in Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1963, at 1 (reporting Attorney General Robert Kennedy's description
of syndicated crime as a "grave national problem").
384 Even the Court's decision in Berger hinted in dicta that other laws might be suf-
ficiently exacting to meet the Fourth Amendment's demands. See Berger, 388 U.S. at
56-58 (suggesting that a statute containing precise requirements for the use of elec-
tronic eavesdropping might meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement of particular-
ity); see also supra note 376 (noting mixed perceptions of Berger's significance).
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Interestingly enough, the National Crime Commission's 1967 re-
port was salient (and convincing) enough to spawn legislative efforts
to do exactly what the Supreme Court did in Katz: authorize court-
approved wiretapping. In 1934, Congress outlawed the practice of
wiretapping, which at the time was considered outside the purview of
the Fourth Amendment because it required no physical trespass to ef-
3815fectuate . Over time, technological advances in electronic eaves-
dropping equipment outflanked the 1934 wiretapping statute just as
they had the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, resulting in a
host of surveillance techniques not prohibited by the statute because
they were technically not wiretapping practices at all . 6 Based on the
National Crime Commission's 1967 report, Congress was in the pro-
cess of closing that loophole while relaxing its wiretapping ban when
the Supreme Court decided Katz. Legislation pending when Katz was
decided proposed expanding the 1934 statute's reach to other consti-
tutionally permissible electronic eavesdropping practices while mak-
ing all of them (including wiretapping) permissible only if police first
obtained a warrant.3f In short, the Supreme Court's decision in Katz
imposed the exact same restrictions on electronic eavesdropping that
Congress was then contemplating, and in fact imposed a mere six
months later.Y
It is difficult to say whether the Supreme Court's decision in Katz
was a conscious response to the nation's needs at that time or an
385 See 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1934) (defining wiretapping and barring use of evidence
obtained thereby in federal courts).
386 See NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 382, at 202-03 (concluding that
"[a]t the present time there is no Federal legislation explicitly dealing with bugging");
GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 254-55 (noting that new electronic surveillance techniques
"were largely outside the reach of the law").
387 See NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note 382, at 203 ("A majority of the
members of the Commission believe that legislation should be enacted granting care-
fully circumscribed authority for electronic surveillance to law enforcement officers to
the extent it may be consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in People v.
Berger.
388 See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 267-69 (discussing the political context in which
Katz was decided, including the proposed amendments to the 1934 wiretapping statute
then pending in Congress); Graham, supra note 376, at 10E (reporting the Katz deci-
sion while noting that "[a] bill to authorize court-supervised police eavesdropping is
already before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the Katz decision is certain to help
it along.").
389 See GRAHAM, supra note 41, at 268 (noting that the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 authorized for the first time "court-approved wiretapping
and bugging to gather evidence").
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unconscious reflection of the national mood.390 With Congress con-
templating legislation on electronic eavesdropping and newspapers
characterizing the Court's earlier decision in Berger as "politically haz-
ardous,, 39'1 the Justices were undoubtedly under pressure to avoid what
seemed to be an impending constitutional ban on electronic eaves-
dropping altogether. On the other hand, the "law and order" mood
of late 1967 may well have subconsciously pulled the Court toward the
result in Katz anyway. Whatever the reason, the same Supreme Court
known for taking a dim view of police practices that impinged upon
individual liberties went out of its way to make an important conces-
sion to the police when that was what the nation wanted. No doubt,
the Court's 1967 decision in Katz "tapped into" dominant public opin-
ion at the time, even while liberalizing the Fourth Amendment's
foundational precepts. Even more in keeping with the times, how-
ever, was the last major landmark decision to come, Terry v. Ohio.
392
B. Terry v. Ohio: The Capitulation is Complete
The Warren Court's June 1968 decision in Terry was without a
doubt one of the most doctrinally significant developments of the en-
tire criminal procedure revolution. Prior to Tery, the Supreme Court
had steadfastly interpreted the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
and warrant clauses in pari materia; that is, in determining whether a
search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the
Court would ask whether the state action at issue was supported by
probable cause and a warrant.393 Although the Court's decisions prior
to Terry made clear that the Fourth Amendment's warrant require-
ment was subject to exception in limited circumstances, never before
in the criminal context had the Court recognized an exception to the
probable cause requirement.394 In fact, the Court's prior decisions
390 Even conservatives like Richard Nixon agreed that wiretapping should proceed
only with prior judicial approval (though at some point he obviously had a change of
heart). See Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Decries 'Lawless Society' and Urges Limited Wire-
tapping, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1968, at 1 ("Mr. Nixon strongly endorsed a limited use of
wiretapping after a court order showing probable cause.").
392 Graham, supra note 345, at 32.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
393 See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren Court, and the Fourth Amend-
ment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 891, 894 (1998) ("The Warrant
Clause's standard of 'probable cause' had been taken to define the 'reasonableness' of
a search and seizure, even where obtaining a warrant was excused as impracticable.").
394 See Tery, 392 U.S. at 37 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[P]olice officers up to today
have been permitted to effect arrests or searches without warrants only when the facts
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had gone the opposite way, stressing the importance of "strictly en-
forc[ing]" the Warrant Clause's probable cause mandate.9 5 Terry
changed all that. In one fell swoop, the Court decoupled the Fourth
Amendment's two clauses, recognizing for the first time ever that a
search and seizure in the criminal context could be reasonable
though based on less than probable cause. If any decision deserves a
place among the giants of the criminal procedure revolution, it is
Terry v. Ohio.
Traditionally, we in the academy have tended to view Terry as a
compromise, a decision that was at least partly responsive to minority
concerns at the time. 96 I myself have taught the case that way, and the
within their personal knowledge would satisfy the constitutional standard of probable
cause."). The Court had, however, recognized an exception to the probable cause re-
quirement in the administrative search context in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523, 538 (1967), a case on which the Terry decision heavily relied. See Terry, 392 U.S. at
20-21 (extending Camera's balancing approach to the criminal context).
395 In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), for example, the Court stated:
It is important, we think, that this requirement be strictly enforced, for the
standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen....
And while a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident
to a lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental
search, it must be made with probable cause.
Id. at 102 (citation omitted).
396 See, e.g., Michael R. Cogan, The Drug Enforcement Agency's Use of Drug Courier Pro-
files: One Size Fits All 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 943,949 (1992) ("The resulting compromise
between the needs of law enforcement and the rights of the individual permits the po-
lice to make what is commonly referred to as a 'Terry stop."'); David A. Harris, Frisking
Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1994) ("Terry
surely represents the Court's best effort to engineer a series of compromises .... On
the one hand, police may stop and frisk individuals... without probable cause. How-
ever, an officer must be able to articulate the reasons that she thought that crime was
afoot and that the suspect was dangerous."); Scott E. Sunby, A Return to Fourth Amend-
ment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 422 (1988)
("Instead of operating as a general compromise standard as it did in Terry, reasonable
suspicion now operates only as a narrow exception to traditional probable cause.");
Gregory Howard Williams, The Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative Proposal, 23 CAP. U. L.
REV. 229, 234 (1994) ("In Terry, the Supreme Court carved out a very careful compro-
mise which weighed the needs of law enforcement against the right of citizens to be
free of undue harassment by the police."); Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme
Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual But Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How.
L.J. 567, 577 (1991) ("The general principles of Terry, explicitly the compromise of
balancing relative interests of law enforcement and individual privacy .. "); see also
Susan Bandes, Terry v. Ohio in Hindsight: The Perils of Predicting the Past, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 491, 492 (1999) ("But before reviewing all the possible interactions, let's
examine the choices before the Supreme Court in 1968. Terry v. Ohio was widely
viewed as a compromise."). This is not to deny that many commentators see Terry as a
distinctly pro-law enforcement decision as well. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 12, at 406
(arguing that "Terry was at least as significant a victory for the police as Miranda had
been for the accused"); UROFSKY, supra note 34, at 164 (describing Terry as "[o]ne of
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Court's opinion in Terry easily lends itself to such an interpretation.39 7
According to this "compromise view," the Supreme Court in Terry was
faced with two diametrically opposed views of the so-called "stop and
frisk" practice at issue in that case. On one hand, police were claim-
ing that a stop was not a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and a
frisk was not a search, the result being that the Fourth Amendment
did not speak to the practice of stop and frisk at all-i.e., police could
do as they liked. On the other hand, the defendant and various civil
liberties advocates were claiming that a stop was a seizure and a frisk
was a search, the result being that the Fourth Amendment's Reason-
ableness Clause required both to be supported by no less than prob-
able cause. Given those alternatives, the theory goes, the Supreme
Court's decision in Terry split the baby and gave a little something to
everyone: the Fourth Amendment did apply to stop and frisk prac-
tices, but the probable cause standard did not. Because a stop was not
an arrest and a frisk was not a full-blown search, both were constitu-
tionally permissible so long as they were supported by a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and the suspect
could be armed and dangerous.9
As a theoretical proposition, the Supreme Court in Terry did in
fact have both options presented by the compromise view of the deci-
sion. Conceivably, the Court could have found the Fourth Amend-
ment inapplicable to stop and frisk practices or applied it with full
force. In reality, however, Terry was not the compromise decision we
the most 'pro[-]police' decisions of the Warren Court"); G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL
WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 277 (1982) (describing Warren's vote to affirm in Teny as "a
considerable bow in the direction of law enforcement"); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's
Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271,
1309 (1998) (describing Tery as "a victory for the police").
997 See Teny, 392 U.S. at 16 ("There is some suggestion in the use of such terms as
'stop' and 'frisk' that such police conduct is outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment because neither action rises to the level of a 'search' or 'seizure' within
the meaning of the Constitution."); see also Scott E. Sunby, "Everyman"s Fourth Amend-
ment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751,
1770 n.62 (1994) ("Both Camara and Terry, the cases that opened the door to the rea-
sonableness test, were themselves carefully portrayed as compromise decisions between
the government's argument that the Fourth Amendment did not apply at all and the
petitioner's argument that a warrant based on traditional probable cause was re-
quired.").
398 To be precise, the Court in Terry never did rule on what would become known
as a "Terry stop," nor did it use the "reasonable, articulable suspicion" terminology for
which the decision would become famous. For both, one must turn to Justice Harlan's
concurrence. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 31-34 (Harlan, J., concurring) (referring repeatedly
to "articulable suspicion" and arguing that a frisk is not constitutionally permissible
unless officers first have the right to make a forcible stop).
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tend to think it was, for the state of Ohio never advocated the consti-
tutional legitimacy of stop and frisk based on less than a reasonably
founded suspicion in the first place. Nowhere in its brief did Ohio
claim that stop and frisk was outside the Fourth Amendment's pur-
view; in fact, just the opposite was true. Explaining its position in the
case, Ohio stated:
Due regard for the practical necessities of effective law enforcement
requires that the validity of brief informal detention be recognized
whenever it appears from the totality of the circumstances that the de-
taining officers could have had reasonable grounds for their action. A
founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the
courts can determine that detention was not arbitrary or harassing....
While the rule permitting temporary detention for questioning is op-
erative under circumstances short of probable cause to make an arrest,
there must exist some suspicious or unusual circumstances to authorize
399even this limited invasion of citizens' privacy.
Similarly, the National District Attorneys Association, Americans for
Effective Law Enforcement, and the United States, each acting as ami-
cus curiae on Ohio's behalf, argued that a stop and frisk was permissi-
ble only when backed by a "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity
and danger to the approaching officer. In short, no one in Tery was
399 Brief for Respondent in Opposition for Petition of Certiorari at 15-16, 21, Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at
381, 403-04, 409 (citation omitted). Ohio's position during oral argument likewise
conceded that police conducting stop and frisk were bound by a reasonable suspicion
standard. Oral Argument at 22, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 83, at 694, 715 (reproducing Ohio's statement that police "'will not be permitted
to stop and frisk an individual simply because he has a suspicion-a mere suspicion-
unless there are reasonable circumstances justifying the frisk"' (quoting State v.
Chilton, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 489, 489 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1964), affd sub nom. Terry)).
400 The National District Attorneys Association amicus brief conceded that "[t]he
use of a constitutional standard less than probable cause to arrest does not require that
temporary field detentions and protective patdowns be conducted on police hunches,
uncontrollable by judicial scrutiny." Brief for Amicus Curiae National District Attor-
neys' Association at 32, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83,
at 653, 684. The United States's amicus brief was even more to the point, arguing:
The Fourth Amendment guaranty against unreasonable searches is satisfied if
the detention is reasonable under the circumstances, which necessarily must
vary from situation to situation. This is not to argue that the Fourth Amend-
ment is inapplicable to police conduct fairly described by the term, 'stop and
frisk'; rather, it is to say that a lesser showing will meet the constitutional test
of reasonableness in the case of a brief detention on the street than in the
case of a conventional arrest. If a right of limited detention does exist, we
suggest further that a law enforcement officer has the right to pat down the
COUNTERMAJORITARIAN HERO OR ZERO?
arguing that the police ought to be able to stop and frisk at will, so the
option of holding stop and frisk practices completely outside the
reach of the Fourth Amendment was never seriously on the table to
start with.
Recognizing what Terry was not-a compromise-is crucial to un-
derstanding what it was: a profoundly pro-law enforcement decision
that gave to the police almost all they had asked of the Court, as con-
temporary newspapers duly noted 0 ' And that understanding of Terry,
suspect's outer clothing in order to determine whether he possesses a weapon,
assuming that this step appears reasonably necessary for the detaining offi-
cer's self-protection.
Brief for Amicus Curiae United States at 2-3, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 438, 43940. Similarly, the Americans for Effective Law En-
forcement's amicus brief stated:
The law enforcement process which we ask this Court to sustain in the "stop
and frisk" cases under consideration is simply this: A police officer may detain
pedestrians or motorists in public places, and question them as to their iden-
tity and purpose in the particular location, when under the circumstances,
such detention and questioning seems appropriate to a prudent police offi-
cer-one mindful of his responsibility "'to prevent crime and catch crimi-
nals"'-because reasonable suspicion of criminality has been aroused, al-
though there is not yet probable cause to believe that a crime has been, or is
being, committed.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Americans for Effective Law Enforcement at 6, Terry (No. 67),
reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 499, 507 (citation omitted); see also
Brief for Amicus Curiae New York at 3-4, Terry (No. 67), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK
BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 38, 540-41 (arguing for the constitutionality of a New York
statute giving police officers the right "to question any individual in a public place
where there is a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed or is about to
be committed," and that the statute properly allowed a frisk of a suspect "only where
there are facts upon which to base a reasonable suspicion that the person being ques-
tioned is armed and may use his weapon").
401 See, e.g., Fred P. Graham, High Court Backs Rights of Police to Stop and Frisk, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1968, at 1 (noting that the Court's decision in Terry "gave the police
virtually the full range of powers that law enforcement representatives had asked of the
Court"); see also Editorial, "Unreasonable" Still Stands, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1968, at 46
(opining that Terry "will help persuade policemen that the Court does not lie awake
nights dreaming up ways to increase the hazards of theirjobs"). In fairness, the Court
in Terry stopped short of giving the police all they had asked, as the Court never for-
mally recognized the legitimacy of a stop based on less than probable cause. See Terry,
392 U.S. at 19 n.16 ("We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional pro-
priety of an investigative 'seizure' upon less than probable cause for purposes of 'de-
tention' and/or interrogation."). Yet neither did the Court deny the legitimacy of a
stop based on reasonable suspicion, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his concurrence.
See id. at 32 (HarlanJ., concurring) ("[I]f the frisk is justified in order to protect the
officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop."). If Terry is in any way a
compromise, perhaps it is here, in the Court's reticence to formally recognize what its
holding implicidy embraced.
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in turn, is key to seeing the Warren Court's dramatic change in atti-
tude toward criminal procedure in the late 1960s, especially when
compared to the Court's Miranda decision two years earlier. In
Miranda, the Court eschewed its multifactored voluntariness test for
judging the admissibility of police-procured confessions in favor of a
bright-line rule that gave interrogators more guidance and less con-
trol. Implicit in the Court's ruling was a need to curb police discre-
tion, a reflection of the fact that law enforcement could not be trusted
at that time. In Terry, by contrast, the Court's reasonable articulable
suspicion standard gave the police so much discretion (and reviewing
courts so little upon which to judge police conduct) that it is hard to
believe that both decisions were written by Chief Justice Warren .4
Even the tone of the opinions is notably different. In Miranda, the
Court showed no sympathy whatsoever for the difficulties police faced
in bringing criminals to justice, while in Terry, the Court's opinion is
all but dripping with that concern.)° As Bill Stuntz has likewise rec-
ognized, "[o]ne cannot read the two opinions without sensing that
something in the author's thinking changed between 1966 and
1 9 6 8 .
, 4
Given the potential for minority oppression inherent in stop and
frisk practices, the contrast between Miranda and Terry is even more
stark. In Miranda, racial concerns were just beneath the surface of the
• • 405
Supreme Court's opinion, but those concerns were miniscule com-
pared to what the Court confronted in Terry. In terms of sheer num-
bers, harassing street stops posed a much greater problem for blacks
than coercive custodial interrogation ever did.406 Indeed, those stops
were almost exclusively perpetrated on ghetto minorities-not, as civil
402 See Kamisar, supra note 59, at 117 (comparing Terry to Miranda and noting that
"the stop-and-frisk cases established such a spongy test, one that allowed the police so
much room to maneuver and furnished the courts so few bases for meaningful review,
that the [Terry] opinion must have been cause for celebration in a goodly number of
police stations").
403 See WilliamJ. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2152 n.43
(2002) (contrasting Terry and Miranda).
404 Id.
45 See supra note 276 and accompanying text (discussing an early draft of the
Miranda opinion that couched the problem of coercive interrogation in terms of po-
lice brutality against black defendants).
406 See Maclin, supra note 396, at 1295 (describing the prevalence of street stops in
minority communities compared to custodial interrogation).
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rights leader Bayard Rustin pointed out, on Wall Street's well-dressed
4017
bankers.
By 1968, the violent ramifications of abusive stop and frisk prac-
tices were also well known. While Tery was pending, the National Ad-
visory Commission on Civil Disorders (better known as the Kerner
Commission) issued a report assessing the urban riots that had
plagued the country for the past several years, concluding:
We have cited deep hostility between police and ghetto communities
as a primary cause of the disorders surveyed by the Commission....
Negroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur re-
peatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably one of
the major reasons for intense Negro resentment against the police....
... In nearly every city surveyed, the Commission heard complaints of
harassment of interracial couples, dispersal of social street gatherings
and the stopping of Negroes on foot or in cars without objective ba-
sis ....
Police administrators, pressed by public concern about crime, have
instituted such [stop and frisk] patrol practices often without weighing
their tension-creating effects and the resulting relationship to civil disor-
der.
40 8
Similarly, the National Crime Commission's 1967 report described
stop and frisk practices as "a major source of friction between the po-
lice and minority groups," noting that "an integral element in every
riot was strain between the police and members of the Negro com-. ,409
munity. Thus, by the time the Supreme Court decided Tery, the
racially discriminatory aspects of stop and frisk, along with the vio-
lence it precipitated, were well documented.
407 See id. at 1280 (discussing Bayard Rustin's comments in a 1967 national survey
on police and community relations); see also Fred P. Graham, The Cop's Right (?) to Stop
and Frisk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 ("Negroes, particularly
young Negro males, are the ones most likely to be stopped and frisked in these casual,
pre-arrest encounters between police and passers-by-and Negroes resent the fact.");
Zion, supra note 262, at 1 ("Many of the critics have contended that the [Model Code]
would most adversely affect Negroes and Puerto Ricans in the big city ghettoes because
most investigative arrests would probably be made there .... .").
408 NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 157-60 (1968).
409 TASK FORCE REPORT ON CRIME, supra note 343, at 116.
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No doubt, the Supreme Court was aware of stop and frisk's inher-
ent danger of abuse and its role in exacerbating racial tensions. The
NAACP had argued the point in its Terry amicus brief,4 10 the Justices'
internal memoranda show that they had considered it,4 1 and the Terry
opinion itself recognized the problem, citing the National Crime•• 411
Commission's findings. Yet in the face of clear evidence that police
were using stop and frisk to harass minorities, the Supreme Court
condoned the practice, breaking from an entire line of established
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to do it. Given Miranda, the
Court's decision in Terry was almost unthinkable just two years ear-
413lier-and Terry was an "easy" eight-to-one ruling. Obviously, some-
thing had changed, causing the Supreme Court to reevaluate its ear-
lier commitment to protecting minorities from abusive police
practices. The question, again, was what.
Because Teny was as much a blow to the civil rights movement as
414it was a bow to law enforcement interests, one consideration that
410 See Brief for Amicus Curiae N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund at
68, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (No. 67), reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra
note 83, at 565, 644 (arguing that "[i]f the police and the ghetto dweller view each
other with fear, suspicion, often hatred, any enforced stop is a potential source for
conflict").
411 A handwritten letter from Justice Brennan to ChiefJustice Warren stated:
I've become acutely concerned that the mere fact of our affirmance in Terry
will be taken by the police all over the country as our license to them to carry
on, indeed widely expand, present "aggressive surveillance" techniques which
the press tell us are being deliberately employed in Miami, Chicago, Detroit +
other ghetto cities. This is happening, of course, in response to the "crime in
the streets" alarums being sounded in this election year in the Congress, the
White House + every Governor's office.... It will not take much of this to ag-
gravate the already white heat resentment of ghetto Negroes against the po-
lice-the Court will become the scape goat.
Letter from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., United States Supreme Court, to Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren, United States Supreme Court (Mar. 14, 1968), reprinted in John Q.
Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court's Conference, 72
ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 749, 825-26 (1998).
412 See Tery, 392 U.S. at 14 & n.11 (recognizing "[t]he wholesale harassment by
certain elements of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Ne-
groes, frequently complain" (citing TASK FORCE REPORT ON CRIME, supra note 343, at
183)).
413 Only Justice Douglas dissented, and he had initially voted with the majority in
conference to affirm. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE, supra note 86, at 454
(reproducing Teny conference notes). Justice Douglas apparently remained with the
majority until the Court's opinion changed from a probable cause-based analysis to the
more general "reasonableness" analysis it ultimately chose. See Barrett, supra note 411,
at 838 (discussing justice Douglas's defection from the majority in the Terry opinion).
414 See WHITE, supra note 401, at 277 (describing Warren's position in Terry as "a
considerable bow" in favor of law enforcement interests).
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warrants mention is the nation's waning support for civil rights in the
late 1960s. With the rise of urban riots, the public image of black
Americans changed dramatically over the course of just a few years.
By the late 1960s, people no longer saw blacks as peaceful, praying
protesters being savagely beaten by white policemen, but as lawless
looters shouting "[b]urn, baby, burn" while exiting broken storefront
415windows with all they could carry. The emergence of militant
groups like the Black Panthers in late 1966 and radical civil rights
leaders like H. "Rap" Brown in 1967 only reinforced this image as
shouts of "black power" replaced pleas for black suffrage and racial
hate became the topic dujour on the evening news.1 6 By early 1968,
many Americans who had supported the civil rights movement in ear-
lier years no longer did, resulting in what one columnist described as
a "decisive, almost sudden shift" away from the movement's popularb . 417
backing. At the very least, the Supreme Court's decision in Terry was
consistent with that shift, echoing the country's loss of empathy for
the plight of blacks in the late 1960s.
Even so, the Supreme Court's decision in Terry almost certainly
had more to do with the nation's desire for "law and order" than its
growing disillusionment with the cause of civil rights. By early 1968,
crime and lawlessness were all that the nation could think about.
41 8
Then came one last spasm of violence that would help give the "turbu-
lent 1960s" its name. On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King, Jr. was as-
sassinated, setting off riots in over one hundred cities across the na-
tion, including Washington, D.C., where federal troops guarded the
415 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 12, at 49-50 (discussing the change in public
perception of blacks due to urban riots); TASK FORCE REPORT ON CRIME, supra note
343, at 116 ("The riots changed the attitude of some Americans toward the civil rights
movement from sympathy to antipathy."). This is not to say that urban riots were the
only factor contributing to the decline of support for civil rights in the mid- to late-
1960s' only that it was a factor-and a very salient one at that.
416 See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 12, at 58-59 (noting the formation of the
Black Panthers in October 1966 and subsequent decline in Northern, white support
for the civil rights movement); POWE, supra note 12, at 277-78 (discussing the ascen-
dancy to power of H. "Rap" Brown and its alienating effect on the civil rights move-
ment).
417 Herbers, supra note 339, at E3. Congressional activity during this time re-
flected the shift perfectly. In 1965, the Voting Rights Act sailed through both houses,
whereas in July 1967, the House refused to pass President Johnson's modest proposal
for rat extermination funding in urban ghettos, dubbed a "civil rats bill" by conserva-
tives. See MATUSOW, supra note 133, at 215 (discussing bill and unsympathetic mood of
Confress in 1967).
See supra notes 333-339 and accompanying text (noting the salience of the
crime problem in late 1967 and early 1968).
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White House and set up a machine gun post on the Capitol's front
steps."0  Over the course of the following week, nearly fifty people
across the country would die in connection with racial disturbances
420while another 21,000 would be charged with riot-related crimes.
The following month, student radicals at Columbia University seized
five campus buildings for days, culminating in a bloody confrontation
between students and police that led to over two hundred injuries,
seven hundred arrests, and the suspension of classes for the remain-
der of the spring semester. 42 And as if that were not enough, June 6,
1968, marked the assassination of presidential contender Robert F.
Kennedy,just days before the Court announced its Terry decision.
For those of us who were still in diapers in 1968 (or perhaps just a
twinkle in our fathers' eyes), it is difficult to imagine how crazy the
world must have appeared at that time. Without the benefit of hind-
sight, one would have thought the nation was truly coming apart at
the seams. Not surprisingly, most Americans surveyed in mid-1968
said law enforcement had "broken down' 2 3-and that was before any-
one knew about 1968's 16% rise in the crime rate, a record for the
424decade. Naturally, the nation's unrest put immense pressure on the
Court to support law enforcement, which by then had made a come-
back in public esteem.42
419 See CRAY, supra note 59, at 493-94 (discussing the riots in the wake of Martin
Luther King's assassination in 1968); MATUsOW, supra note 133, at 396 (same). The
United States Army was also dispatched to Chicago and Baltimore. Id. at 396.
420 See MATUSOw, supra note 133, at 396 (describing the riots in the wake of Martin
Luther King's assassination in 1968); RICE, supra note 96, at 48 (same).
421 See RICE, supra note 96, at 48 (mentioning the Columbia University incident);
WHITE, supra note 326, at 219-20 (same).
422 Robert Kennedy was shot on June 4, 1968, and died on June 6; Teny was an-
nounced on June 10. Barrett, supra note 411, at 758 n.29.
423 InJune, 1968, 53% of those surveyed agreed with the statement that "[l]aw en-
forcement has broken down in this country, and lawlessness has taken over," while
38% disagreed and 9% were unsure. Louis Harris and Associates, Harris Survey (June
16, 1968), WL USHARRIS 061668 R2C 013. In August, the percentage of those agree-
ing with that statement had risen to 81%. See Public Opinion Online, Accession No.
0174711, Question #012 (Harris Survey, Aug. 24, 1968).
424 See FED. BUREAU OF INvESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES-1968, at 4 (1969) (reporting a 16% increase in the
crime rate in 1968).
425 See Schumach, supra note 324, at I (noting the "great change from public skep-
ticism of the police position"). For a provocative discussion of how television portray-
als of police from the 1950s to the 1970s reflected the public's changing perception of
law enforcement, see Steven D. Stark, Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of
Lawyers and the Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229 (1987).
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Yet the Supreme Court in Terry must have felt pressure to support
law enforcement in general, and stop and frisk in particular, for other
reasons as well. By 1968, the Court had come under heavy fire for its
pro-defendant criminal procedure rulings, which, according to presi-
dential candidate Richard Nixon, were responsible for the breakdownS 421
of "law and order" in the first place. Moreover, while Terry was
pending, Congress debated and passed legislation purporting to re-
verse Miranda's holding-a clear signal to the Court that public re-
sentment over its previous efforts to regulate police conduct was run-
ning high.4 2 ' Additionally, the National Crime Commission's 1967
report and the ALI's 1966 draft Model Code had both recommended
the enactment of stop and frisk laws that would authorize police-
citizen encounters based on reasonable suspicion, more as an effort to
codify existing practices than to inspire legislative innovation. 428 Stop
and frisk based on reasonable suspicion had been a standard law en-
forcement practice since at least 1942,429 and by 1968, it had become
"a matter of routine in every major police department in the coun-
try. 4 30 Thus, for a number of reasons, Justice Douglas' observation in
his Terry dissent was undoubtedly right: the Court was under "power-
ful hydraulic pressures... to water down constitutional guarantees
426 See supra note 323 and accompanying text (discussing Nixon's anti-Court cam-
paign rhetoric).
427 See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968).
428 See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tentative Draft No.
1, 1966) (discussing stop and frisk issue); NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT, supra note
382, at 95 (same).
49 The Uniform Arrest Act of 1942 provided:
'A peace officer may stop any person abroad who he has reasonable ground to
suspect is committing, has committed or is about to commit a crime ...
A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon any person whom he
has stopped or detained to question ... whenever he has reasonable ground
to believe that he is in danger ... '
Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 320-21, 325 (1942) (quoting
the Act and discussing its provisions).
430 Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 42 (1968); see also Graham, supra note 333, at E8 (de-
scribing stop and frisk as "a matter of routine in most communities for years"). By the
time the Court decided Terry, six states had enacted stop and frisk laws (the most
prominent being New York), and sixteen states and seven courts of appeal had judi-
cially approved of the practice. Brief of National District Attorneys' Association, supra
note 400, at 15, 31-32, reprinted in 66 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 83, at 647, 667, 683-
85.
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and give the police the upper hand" and those pressures had probably
11 431"never been greater" than they were in 1968.
Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Terry reflected the Jus-
tices' fear of antagonizing public opinion or their genuine concern
about the collapse of law and order is, of course, impossible to know.
Either way, the timing of Terry's result was no fortuity. As Earl Dudley,
Chief Justice Warren's law clerk on the Terry decision, candidly ex-
plained:
Individually, the Justices of the Supreme Court may have felt differ-
ing degrees of sympathy with the arguments of the police, but collec-
tively they were unwilling to be-or to be perceived as-the agents who
tied the hands of the police in dealing with intensely dangerous and re-
432
curring situations on city streets.
Again, context matters, and given the context of 1968, it is inconceivable
that the Court in Terry would have decided the case any differently
than it did.433 In Terry, the Supreme Court had the perfect opportu-
nity to play the role of countermajoritarian hero. It chose not to. In-
stead, the Court capitulated to law enforcement interests, proving true
the adage that "courts love liberty most when it is under pressure
least., 434 As much as any landmark decision of the criminal procedure
revolution, Terry demonstrates that the Court is a product of its time.
431 Terry, 392 U.S. at 39 (Douglas,J., dissenting). As Fred Graham reported in the
New York Times:
The Supreme Court's decision will be its first comment on "stop and frisk"
laws, and the pressures will be strong for it to approve some degree of "frisk-
ing." The President's national crime commission and a panel of the Ameri-
can Law Institution have urged widespread enactment of such laws to improve
police efficiency. Further, public opinion would be outraged, under present
circumstances, if the courts should say states cannot pass laws to let police
search dangerous-looking characters who are suspected of committing crimes.
Graham, supra note 333, at E8.
432 Dudley, supra note 393, at 893. For an insightful argument that crime rates
have played a significant role in the ebb and flow of criminal procedure protections,
see Stuntz, supra note 403.
433 Others have likewise recognized that the sociopolitical context of the late 1960s
was extremely hostile to protecting defendant's rights. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 59,
at 116 (discussing the social upheaval of late 1960s and attributing that upheaval to
creating "an atmosphere that was unfavorable to the continued vitality of the Warren
Court's mission in criminal cases"); Allen, supra note 25, at 538-39 (arguing that "the
most fundamental reason" for the Court's conservatism on matters of criminal justice
in the late 1960s was the social and political context at that time).
434John P. Frank, Review and Basic Liberties, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW
109, 114 (Edmond Cahn ed., 1954).
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By 1968, the time to protect criminal defendants had passed, and the
criminal procedure revolution had come to an end.
CONCLUSION
By conventional wisdom, the criminal procedure revolution is a
perfect example of the Supreme Court playing the role of counterma-
joritarian hero, protector of those without power, popularity, or po-
litical clout. Upon close inspection, however, the revolution's five
most celebrated decisions-Mapp, Gideon, Miranda, Katz, and Terry-
fail to support that view. Only in Mapp and Miranda did the Warren
Court even come close to approaching the sort of countermajoritarian
decision making we tend to associate with the revolution, and both of
those decisions teach us something quite different than conventional
wisdom would have us believe. Mapp demonstrates that when enter-
ing a new doctrinal area, the Court's actions tend to be supported by
favorable sociopolitical conditions and a factual scenario ideally suited
for change. Miranda shows that even in its most aggressive decisions,
the Court tends to stay well within the parameters of publicly accept-
able policy positions. Though the Supreme Court in Mapp and
Miranda undoubtedly played the hero, in neither case did it act in the
truly countermajoritarian fashion for which it has been credited.
That said, all five landmarks of the criminal procedure revolution
do show what we in academia have tended to overlook: the Court's
inextricable tie to its historical setting. In the early- to mid-1960s, the
nation championed civil rights and fought a war on poverty. It is no
coincidence that the Supreme Court's criminal procedure decisions
during that period did so too. By the same token, when the consensus
supporting defendants' rights collapsed under the weight of riots and
skyrocketing crime rates in the late 1960s, it is hardly surprising that
the Court's criminal procedure rulings took a markedly conservative
turn toward the cause of "law and order." Simply put, the Court had
no inclination to impose significant pro-defendant protections on a
country that had lost interest in protecting criminal defendants.
Whether the Court was responding to the national mood or merely
reflecting it, the point is the same: in all five decisions, the Court
moved with the tide of public opinion rather than against it.
In the end, it is only natural that the Warren Court's landmark
criminal procedure cases coincided with the prevailing ideology of the
times in which they were decided. The Constitution is written in
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broad, sweeping terms. It takes judges to give those terms meaning. 43
Like it or not, the fact that judges decide cases and interpret the law
means that personal perspectives will inevitably make their way into
the decision-making process, and so will the social and political cur-
rents that shape those perspectives. As such, the Court's capacity for
playing a countermajoritarian role is extremely limited-closer, in
fact, to zero than the romantic hero we all tend to imagine.
In 1968, Kenneth Pye wrote: "A hundred years from now lawyers
will not be amazed by the changes wrought by the Warren Court.
They will wonder how it could have been otherwise in the America of
the sixties."43 6 It has been just over fifty years since Earl Warren be-
came Chief Justice, but already those words ring true. One need not
believe in the Supreme Court as a countermajoritarian hero to defend
judicial review, but often we do. We see the Court as impervious to
majoritarian pressures when, in fact, nothing could be further from
the truth. Time has shown that the Supreme Court is inextricably
bound by the historical context in which it operates. We ought to
recognize that fact and be more realistic in our approach to judicial
review.
435 See Michael J. Klarman, Fidelity, Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional
Evil, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1739, 1752 (1997) ("If most controversial social issues plau-
sibly can be converted into constitutional disputes, and the document's text is inde-
terminate as to how those disputes ought to be resolved, how do we show fidelity to the
Constitution without subjecting ourselves to uncabined judicial rule?"); Levy, supra
note 154, at 7 ("[W]hat counts is not what the Constitution says, because it says so very
little; what counts, rather, is what the Supreme Court has said about the Constitu-
tion....").
436 Pye, supra note 125, at 268.
